L’Orient Today: “The Ever-shifting Sands of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon”

I have a new commentary in Lebanon's L'Orient Today on how to understand the number of Syrian refugee returns from Lebanon since December, and the implications for Lebanon's returns policy:

https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1466835/the-ever-shifting-sands-of-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon.html

Since December, about as many Syrians have fled from Syria to Lebanon as have returned from Lebanon to Syria – maybe more. That's something unique to Lebanon, among regional host countries. It's also an important reason why Lebanese decision-makers ought to view returns as a long-term challenge and to focus on returns that are really sustainable.

Enab Baladi: “Trump Syria Policy's Cold Features”

Again, for Arabic readers: I have a new op-ed in Syria's Enab Baladi about the Trump administration's Syria policy and prospects for sanctions relief, based on my visit to Washington earlier this month:

https://www.enabbaladi.net/751283/ملامح-باردة-لسياسة-ترامب-السورية/

I thought a Syrian audience might be interested in some of my takeaways from Washington meetings. Hopefully useful for people!

An-Nahar: “Displaced Syrians Haven't Returned After Assad's Fall… Study Lays Out the Reasons”

For any Arabic readers: I published an op-ed in Lebanon's An-Nahar yesterday about the reality of Syrian refugee return from Lebanon since Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was toppled in December – a reality that has been more complicated than many in Lebanon expected:

https://www.annahar.com/articles/Opinion/210327/نازحون-سوريون-لم-يعودوا-بعد-سقوط-الأسد-دراسة-تبين-الأسباب

Century International: “Cross-Border Shuffle: Refugee Movement Between Lebanon and Syria after Assad”

Since the fall of Assad, tens of thousands of Syrians have been moving across the Lebanese-Syrian border – in both directions, from Lebanon to Syria and Syria to Lebanon. My new report for Century International lays out who is moving where, and why:

https://tcf.org/content/report/cross-border-shuffle-refugee-movement-between-lebanon-and-syria-after-assad/

Century International: “Will Sectarian Massacres Derail Syria’s Transition?”

A short Q&A with me and my Century International colleague Aron Lund on the sectarian killings that the Syrian coast saw this past weekend, and their lasting ramifications:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/will-sectarian-massacres-derail-syrias-transition/

Century International: “Assad Is Gone—But for Refugees to Return, the World Needs to Invest in Syria’s Peace”

My new Century International commentary on the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon, and why we may not see large-scale returns just yet:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/assad-is-gone-but-for-refugees-to-return-the-world-needs-to-invest-in-syrias-peace/

The fall of the Assad government in Syria has raised expectations in Lebanon and other refugee-hosting countries that large numbers of Syrian refugees will now go home. For many refugees, though, return is not so easy – and there's a lot more to be done in Syria, if the country is actually going to be someplace livable for returnees.

This short piece draws on interviews I did in north Lebanon last month, as part of a larger ongoing project on Syrian refugees in Lebanon and return to Syria – more soon, hopefully!

Foreign Affairs: “How to Hold Syria Together”

My new article for Foreign Affairs, on why I think people's focus on the Syrian Islamist group  Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its ideology might be misplaced – based on Syrian rebels' previous, largely anarchic experiments in governance, and the generally depleted state of the country, I'm less worried about religious extremism and more worried about chaos:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/syria/how-hold-syria-together

Century International: “Syria’s Civil War Has Roared Back. How Far Can the Rebels Go?”

A quick Q&A that my Century International colleague Aron Lund and I did on Syrian opposition factions' rapid advance in the country's northwest:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/syrias-civil-war-has-roared-back-how-far-can-the-rebels-go/

Century International: “The United States Should Stop Cosponsoring Israel’s War on Lebanon”

My latest commentary for Century International, on my extreme dismay 😐 at the Biden administration's support for Israel's war on Lebanon:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/the-united-states-should-stop-cosponsoring-israels-war-on-lebanon/

The Biden administration has withdrawn its previous calls for a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon's Hizbullah; now it unequivocally supports Israel's "limited" military operations to "degrade" Hizbullah. Perhaps unsurprisingly, though, Israel's war does not feel particularly "limited" for Lebanese currently being terrorized by Israeli airstrikes, and facing an Israeli invasion whose geographic ambitions and duration remain unclear. To add insult to injury, the Biden administration is now also trying to exploit Israeli military pressure to strong-arm Lebanese political leaders and force political change in Lebanon. It's a policy that is irresponsible and offensive, and that belies America's regular claims to be a friend to Lebanon. Because right now, the United States is now a full, open partner in Israel's war on the country.

TIME: “Where Hezbollah Goes From Here”

Here’s a quick analysis I wrote for TIME, on the outlook for Lebanon and Hizbullah now that whatever deterrence previously constrained Israel has broken down:

https://time.com/7049289/hezbollah-israel-war/

Hizbullah units are fighting now to repel Israel's ground invasion of Lebanon, but after successive Israeli blows to the organization, it's not clear how badly it has been degraded, or to what extent Israel has disrupted its internal command. In the air, meanwhile, Israel now has free rein – bombing at will, unimpeded by whatever deterrent threats Hizbullah could previously muster. Now Lebanon is waiting to see what Israel's full war aims might be, and how far it will try to go.

Century International: “Washington Can’t Make Israel’s War in Gaza Moral. Instead, It Needs to End the War.”

My latest for Century International, on the nature of Israel's military campaign in Gaza and U.S. policy elites' seeming inability to see the war for what it is:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/washington-cant-make-israels-war-in-gaza-moral-instead-it-needs-to-end-the-war/

World Politics Review: “The U.S. Should Start Planning Its Exit From Iraq and Syria”

My latest for World Politics Review, this time on a U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria that seems to have run its course:

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/us-military-iraq-syria

A U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq and Syria seems unlikely in the near term, despite some recent speculation and media excitement. But Washington probably should start thinking about how to responsibly exit these countries – Syria, certainly – now that the counter-ISIS rationale for staying is basically defunct.

Hamas’s Hamad Promises Further ‘al-Aqsa Floods’ (in Context)

Below is a partial translation/transcript of Hamas political official Ghazi Hamad’s October 24, 2023, appearance on LBCI program “Nharkom Said” (Have a Happy Day), with host Nada Andraos. I’ve translated the segment in which Hamad promised there would be a “a second, a third, a fourth” al-Aqsa Flood, from 18:45 to 20:31.

Hamad’s remarks featured (stripped of context) in Western news reporting following October 7. They were subsequently referenced by President Biden (for example, see below) to justify his support for Israel’s maximalist war aims in Gaza and his rejection of a ceasefire that left Hamas in control of the territory.

I had been interested in tracking down Hamad’s original remarks to get a sense of the relevant context, but I only just managed to find the link to the “Nharkom Said” episode.

You’ll see from the partial transcript below that Hamad does promise further “al-Aqsa Flood”–type attacks, but he also situates October 7 and any future attacks in the context of Israel’s continuing occupation, which he says Palestinians will not just passively endure.

(Please let me know if I’ve mistranslated anything, and I’ll correct.)

Transcript (18:45–20:31)

Andraos: Is this a war to end Israel?

Hamad: Of course–

Andraos: This time? Or another round [of conflict], to improve conditions–

Hamad: It’s one round, but this time it achieved a very advanced qualitative leap.

Andraos: A war that ends with an exchange of captives and the opening of prisons, for thousands of prisoners–

Hamad: That’s among the goals.

Andraos: What about the siege?

Hamad: We have – I’m telling you, that’s among the goals. A main goal was, as I said, shattering the prestige [of Israel] and this arrogance – I’ll tell you something. A little while ago we had been in touch with mediators, whether it was the Qataris, the Egyptians, or the UN. We told them, these things being done in the West Bank and Jerusalem–

Andraos: Before the operation [al-Aqsa Flood]?

Hamad: Before the operation. These provocations, and bringing so-called sacred cows inside the al-Aqsa Mosque, bringing extremist Jews to pray in the mosque grounds, these provocations were near-daily. Also the raids that happened in Jenin and Nablus, and killing people for no reason – we told them, this needs to end. Once, twice, three times [we told them] – we’ll reach a point where things boil over. But unfortunately, [the reception was] cold. We didn’t get [a response] – we got more trouble, they’d go into Hawara, where they might kill people, settlers would come and cut down people’s trees, kill people in cold blood. And we Palestinians were supposed to stay polite and not do anything. So I think this will give them a lesson: next time, if they think [about doing this], then we’ll discipline them. And we’ll discipline them a second and a third time. And Al-Aqsa Flood won’t [just] be the first time. No, there will be a second, a third, a fourth, because we have determination, and we have [our] decision, and we have the means. We’ll fight, we’ll fight. But like I told you, will we pay a price? Yes, and we’re ready for that. And let me tell you clearly: we’re called ‘the people of martyrs.’ And we’re proud of offering up martyrs. And we want to do that for our people–

Andraos: But the greatest proportion of martyrs are women, children, the elderly…

Hamad: We’re looking for a good life for our Palestinian people, like all the peoples of the world. We’re no different than other people…

World Politics Review: “Hezbollah Won’t Stand Down Without a Cease-Fire in Gaza”

My latest for World Politics Review, on the limited – but still deadly – war between Hizbullah and Israel since October, and the seeming impossibility of de-escalating the Lebanon-Israel front without a ceasefire in Gaza:

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/hezbollah-israel-lebanon-hamas/

Century International: “It’s Time for a Ceasefire in Gaza—and Then a New Push for Peace”

Century International colleagues Thanassis Cambanis, Dahlia Scheindlin and I urge the Biden administration to push for a ceasefire in Gaza:

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/its-time-for-a-ceasefire-in-gaza-and-then-a-new-push-for-peace/

Century International: “Adopt a Ministry: How Foreign Aid Threatens Lebanon’s Institutions”

I have a new report out for Century International, on how international donor support is keeping Lebanon's public institutions and services running:

https://tcf.org/content/report/adopt-a-ministry-how-foreign-aid-threatens-lebanons-institutions/

Lebanon's economic crisis has brought the Lebanese state to the brink of collapse. International donors have stepped in to sponsor many of the country's public institutions and essential services, even going so far as to pay partial salaries for teachers and soldiers. It's the type of assistance normally reserved for countries devastated by war, donor country representatives told me.

It's not clear all this aid is particularly considered or wise, and it risks various perverse effects for Lebanon and its long-term development. This report lays out donors' most significant aid interventions in Lebanon and the debates and controversies over that support. The aim is to, hopefully, jump-start a debate over foreign donor assistance to Lebanon and where the country is heading.

We've also put out a shorter, more digestible Century commentary highlighting some of the report's most important points:

In English: https://tcf.org/content/commentary/international-aid-keeps-lebanon-afloat-it-could-also-be-destroying-its-institutions/

And Arabic: https://tcf.org/content/commentary/international-aid-keeps-lebanon-afloat-it-could-also-be-destroying-its-institutions/ar/

Foreign Affairs: “The Upsides of Syrian Normalization”

Another new article from me, this time a piece for Foreign Affairs on why Arab normalization with Assad's Syria is basically fine – potentially even good: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/syria/upsides-syrian-normalization-assad

In May, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad made his triumphant return to the Arab League, after a decade-long absence. People were, understandably, distressed at his rehabilitation.

Really, though, I think that angst is misplaced. This was bound to happen, sooner or later. And in practical terms, the actual downsides of Arab normalization with Damascus are limited. (Many of the risks that opponents of normalization have warned about relate more to Syrian-Turkish normalization, which is something more genuinely dangerous.) And the potential upsides of Arab normalization are substantial, both for the countries presently engaging Damascus and for ordinary Syrians. Now these Arab countries have committed with Damascus, at least on paper, to a set of joint political, security and humanitarian steps that could improve living conditions for Syrians stuck in a destroyed country.

For Washington and its Western allies, it doesn't make sense to try to stop this, or even reverse it. Normalization is inevitable. Better, instead, to work with their Arab partners now dealing with Damascus to make sure ordinary Syrians get something out of all this.

The New Humanitarian: “What lessons can be drawn from the international earthquake response in Syria?”

Today at The New Humanitarian, I have an article on why international aid was so slow to reach Syria's northwest after February's devastating earthquakes: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/08/14/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-international-earthquake-response-syria

It's been six months since a pair of deadly earthquakes hit southern Turkey and northwest Syria. After the quakes, it took days for international assistance to reach Syria's opposition-held northwest from Turkey – in that critical window of time, Syrians died. People are still debating why.

Much of the criticism has focused on the UN's supposed failures in responding to the disaster. But northwest Syria seems to have suffered largely because of its in-between, non-state status. The UN-led cross-border aid response in northwest Syria relied on a complex logistical operation in southern Turkey that proved acutely vulnerable to this type of disaster. And northwest Syria's de facto governing authorities, for their part, weren't able to avail themselves of international emergency response systems built for use by states. Foreign governments proved unwilling to send search-and-rescue teams into areas controlled by non-state armed groups, where those governments had no existing relationships and interlocutors.

The aftermath of February's earthquakes challenges the international emergency response system to better prepare for future disasters in areas that don't fit neatly in the international state system. And it raises more questions about the future of Syria's northwest, especially now that, as of July, the UN Security Council's exceptional mandate for cross-border assistance in Syria has ended. The cross-border humanitarian response is now changing, at a moment when needs inside the northwest are greater than ever.

Century International: “How Lebanon’s Elites Sabotaged an IMF Rescue”

At Century International, The Policy Initiative's Sami Zoughaib and I have a new commentary that works as a short, shareable version of our recent report on Lebanon’s stalled IMF talks: https://tcf.org/content/commentary/how-lebanons-elites-sabotaged-an-imf-rescue/

You can still read the full report (https://tcf.org/content/report/the-shadow-plan-how-lebanese-elites-are-sabotaging-their-countrys-imf-lifeline/) if you want some granular detail and punchy quotes, but now you also have this brief commentary if you want to skip right to the report’s most important (and distressing 😬) points.

Century International/The Policy Initiative: “The Shadow Plan: How Lebanese Elites Are Sabotaging Their Country’s IMF Lifeline”

I have a new report out, this time a collaboration with Sami Zoughaib of Lebanese think tank The Policy Initiative on how Lebanon's IMF talks have gone so badly awry:

https://tcf.org/content/report/the-shadow-plan-how-lebanese-elites-are-sabotaging-their-countrys-imf-lifeline/

Sami and I started work on this report late last year. It's been clear since early in Lebanon's economic crisis that the country's only hope for real recovery was an IMF program. Yet there seemed to be very little reliable information on how the country's IMF talks were really going – how they worked, who was involved, and why they didn't actually seem to be leading anywhere useful. This all seems pretty important! For Lebanon, the stakes of reaching an IMF deal – or not – are huge. Sami and I set to work figuring out what was going on, so we could make sense of things for (primarily) a Lebanese readership.

What we found out was definitely enlightening, if not especially positive or encouraging. Our report lays out what we learned about Lebanon's IMF talks have proceeded, and why, absent some major course change, Lebanon will not have an IMF program. The main problem is a Lebanese ruling elite hostile to reforms that threaten their entrenched interests. That hits Lebanon's IMF talks in two main ways: first, in the disconnect between these elites and an official Lebanese negotiating team that doesn't really represent them, and can't properly commit to reforms on their behalf; and second, in a political media discourse too full of bogus narratives and disinformation for people to make sense of what's going on.

Lebanon's ruling elites all profess their commitment to reaching an IMF program. Their revealed preference, though, is inaction and an alternative, non-IMF "shadow plan." It's the "shadow plan" to which Lebanon has been subjected since the start of its crisis – a super-regressive economic correction that is stabilizing the Lebanese economy at a new, low level on top of the country's middle class and poor.

Our report includes some recommendations for interested outsiders, including the IMF and donor countries. But mainly we hope to address members of Lebanese civil society, who will need to keep working to inform the Lebanese public about the issues and the stakes; and the public itself, who, with a better sense of what's really going on, can hopefully reclaim some agency in this process.

This report is a collaboration between Century International and Lebanon's The Policy Initiative (www.thepolicyinitiative.org). TPI was founded in 2021, and since then it has produced exactly the kind of research on Lebanon that I, personally, have been looking for. It was super partnering with TPI, which I think is a really exciting and important initiative. You can also read our report on TPI's website and in PDF form here: https://www.thepolicyinitiative.org/article/details/294/the-shadow-plan-how-lebanese-elites-are-sabotaging-their-country%E2%80%99s-imf-lifeline