World Politics Review: "PKK Links, Nusra Parallels Make Syrian Kurds a Troubling U.S. Partner"

New from me on World Politics Review:

At least on this, Erdogan is right: The U.S. government’s absurd, untenable denials of YPG-PKK links are – surprise – absurd and untenable.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18201/pkk-links-nusra-parallels-make-syrian-kurds-a-troubling-u-s-partner

VICE News: "A Ceasefire Is Beginning in Syria — Except Where It Won't"

New from me on VICE News:

With a nationwide ceasefire set to go into effect tonight, there’s still little clarity on who it will actually cover – so at least in northern Syria, people just assume they’ll be bombed.

https://news.vice.com/article/a-ceasefire-is-beginning-in-syria-except-where-it-wont

Syria:Direct Interview

New two-part interview with me at Syria:Direct:

"Sam Heller on this moment in Syria: 'Building towards a soft partition,'" 24 February 2016.

"Sam Heller: 'Fighting over towns that exist in name only,'" 25 February 2016.

VICE News: "The Battle for Aleppo Shows That US Strategy in Syria Is in Tatters"

New from me on VICE News:

As fighting in north Aleppo rages out of control, all the things that don't make sense about U.S. strategy to combat ISIS in Syria are all not making sense, all at once.

https://news.vice.com/article/the-battle-for-aleppo-shows-that-us-strategy-in-syria-is-in-tatters

World Politics Review: "Handing Syria to Russia Would Inflame Jihadism Abroad"

New from me on World Politics Review:

So all the West cares about in Syria is counterterrorism? Well, here’s what would a regime victory would do to jihadism, inside and outside the country.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/17934/handing-syria-to-russia-would-inflame-jihadism-abroad

VICE News: "The Syrian Regime Is Close to a Victory That Could Turn the War"

New from me on VICE News:

The Syrian regime just cut rebels’ main Aleppo supply line, and it’s a disaster for the opposition.

https://news.vice.com/article/the-syrian-regime-is-close-to-a-victory-that-could-turn-the-war

VICE News: "Syria Peace Talks in Geneva Get Suspended Even Before Really Beginning"

New from me on VICE News:

Syria peace talks in Geneva have already flamed out. A guide to the main players and the basic disconnect that stopped negotiations before they could start:

https://news.vice.com/article/syria-peace-talks-in-geneva-get-suspended-even-before-really-beginning

VICE News: "Faced With A Russian Onslaught, Syrian Rebels Are Calling for Help From All Muslims"

New from me on VICE News:

Russian and Iranian intervention has turned the military balance in Syria’s civil war, and rebels fighting Bashar al-Assad’s regime are struggling to cope. Some rebels have decided they urgently need more men – Syrian or not – and have issued calls to arms not just to able-bodied Syrians, but to the entire Muslim nation. But while Syrians in the opposition agree the military situation is dire, they disagree on whether they want a new wave of foreign fighters, especially after many of those who came before went nuts and joined ISIS.

https://news.vice.com/article/faced-with-a-russian-onslaught-syrian-rebels-are-calling-for-help-from-all-muslims

War on the Rocks: "A Cause for All Turks: Turkey and Syria's Turkmen Rebels"

New from me and S.G. Grimaldi on War on the Rocks:

The plight of Syria’s Turkmen minority has rallied groups across Turkey’s political spectrum, from pan-Islamists to hard-right Turkish nationalists. This mobilization is getting needed support to civilians inside Syria – but it may also be reshaping Turkish politics, as advocacy for the Turkmen helps to mainstream organizations that had been on the country’s political fringe.

http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/a-cause-for-all-turks-turkey-and-syrias-turkmen-rebels/

World Politics Review: "Why Diplomatic Talks to End Syria’s Civil War Will Fail—Again"

New from me on World Politics Review:

Everyone is currently very excited about negotiations between Syria’s regime and opposition to resolve the country’s brutal war. But maybe don’t be? Because talks aren’t going to work, come on.

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/17701/why-diplomatic-talks-to-end-syria-s-civil-war-will-fail-again

Ahrar al-Sham media activist: "I won’t claim that al-Fou’ah and Kafarya are entirely besieged."

Below is something I thought might be pertinent amid the coverage of Madaya, the Damascus countryside town that has recently been subjected to a crushing siege by the regime and Hizbullah. I’ve translated a response from Ahrar al-Sham media activist Marwan Khalil (Abu Khaled al-I’lami) to criticism of Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusrah’s blockade of the Shi’ite regime loyalist towns of Kafarya and al-Fou’ah. The criticism, which Ahrar and Nusrah have received from multiple opposition quarters: Their siege of the towns actually isn’t intense enough.

Kafarya and al-Fou’ah are Idlib towns that have been stranded deep behind rebel lines since the Jeish al-Fateh (Army of Conquest) rebel coalition, of which Ahrar and Nusrah are the main components, swept the regime out of most of Idlib province in early 2015. The two towns were half of the September 2015 deal negotiated by, reportedly, Ahrar al-Sham and Iran; the other half were the Damascus countryside towns of al-Zabadani and Madaya.

Since then, Ahrar and Nusrah have been obliged, somewhat awkwardly, to respect a truce with pro-regime militias inside al-Fou’ah and Kafarya. They’ve also had to allow shipments of supplies to enter the two towns and, as part of a December swap, some residents of the towns to leave. Relief to any town under the truce has only been allowed on a reciprocal basis – thus, relief to Madaya this week had to be delivered simultaneously with relief to al-Fou’ah and Kafarya.

The deal has attracted critics, who argue that Ahrar and Nusrah have made some impermissible compromise with the regime and its allies or – to put it in crude sectarian terms – are “feeding the Rawafidh (Shi’a).” Abu Khaled was responding to a report from Murasel Souri (Syrian correspondent), a pro-opposition Syrian activist news outlet, claiming that shipments of food, water and diesel are being diverted by Ahrar and Nusrah to al-Fou’ah and Kafarya and that any talk of a “siege” is purely for media consumption. Others have echoed similar criticisms, ranging from premiere Salafi-jihadist theorist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to Syrian Revolutionaries Front chief Jamal Ma’rouf, a southern Idlib rebel warlord whom Nusrah ran out of the country in November 2014. (Ma’rouf’s tweets are translated below the jump.)

صورة اليوم :أحد اساد #جبهة_النصرة يحمي قافلة مجرمي #كفريا و#الفوعة بكل فخر واعتزاز pic.twitter.com/fE4T829DSg

— نضال محمد صبيح (@nedal_sbaih) December 29, 2015

Nidhal Sbeih, former spokesman for the Syrian Revolutionary Front: “Picture of the day: One of the lions of Jabhat al-Nusrah proudly protects a bus of al-Fou’ah and Kafarya’s criminals.”

To be clear: I don’t think this intra-opposition static provides the whole story of conditions in al-Fou’ah and Kafarya, on which no one seems to have reported satisfactorily.

My impression, and what I’ve heard from others, is that Ahrar and Nusrah have not exercised leverage on al-Fou’ah and Kafarya (and thus Iran, Hizbullah and the Assad regime) by imposing the sort of crushing deprivation we’ve seen in Madaya. As Abu Khaled argues, al-Fou’ah and Kafarya benefit not just from relief shipments that fall under the Zabadani truce, but also from opportunistic residents of neighboring towns willing to sell supplies and from regime airdrops. Instead, rebels have leaned on the towns by shelling them indiscriminately and threatening them through conventional military means. Indeed, we saw Saudi jihadist evangelist and chief Jeish al-Fateh judge Abdullah al-Muheisini argue earlier this month al-Fou’ah should be “exterminated” if the siege on Madaya weren’t lifted.

That said, by at least some accounts – in one case, local militiamen who had been evacuated to Lebanon – residents of the two Idlib towns are also desperate enough to eat grass. I don’t know.

But the political dimensions of the al-Fou’ah–Kafarya siege and the controversy it has stirred within some parts of the opposition are knowable.

In some ways, the criticisms of Ahrar and Nusrah are a mirror image of loyalist outrage over the Syrian regime’s recent truce with Homs’s rebel-held al-Wa’ar neighborhood. They seem to be more evidence of the popular resistance – on both sides – to any deal, on any terms.

---

Ahrar al-Sham media activist Abu Khaled al-I’lami, January 7 2015

“In response to the accusations of treason leveled by Murasel Souri against the factions active on the Kafarya and al-Fou’ah fronts”

My revolution has taught me that there are opportunists who wait to take advantage of some moments.

When Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusrah lost nearly 56 men in their last battle with [regime forces in al-Zabadani and al-Fou’ah], we found that everyone was silent. But when we managed to get our wounded out of besieged al-Zabadani in exchange for al-Fou’ah’s wounded leaving, suddenly we were feeding the Rawafidh (derog., Shi’a) and taking money. Anyone who says, “Attack al-Fou’ah,” says that because he doesn’t have a relative under siege [in al-Zabadani]. All of our people have learned this language, these accusations of treason and empty theorizing. It reminds me of when we used to play strategy games.

Yes, I won’t claim that al-Fou’ah and Kafarya are entirely besieged. There are failures to which everyone admits, and anyone who denies them is as deluded as those who level accusations at us.

And some of the reasons for that:

1. The presence of a number of factions around al-Fou’ah and Kafarya and the differences between them has led to gaps on the front lines. This happens on any front line, and it’s something from which the Syrian revolution has suffered since the start, and for which all the factions are to blame – within the bounds of advice and constructive criticism, not accusations of betrayal or acting like some opportunistic hustler.

2. Al-Fou’ah and Kafarya are surrounded by a long perimeter, and so encircling them requires large numbers of men. Because of that, some weak-willed people in the surrounding towns sell them food, and they’ll be held accountable for that.

3. In addition, the regime provides them with food by plane, albeit not a lot.

I wrote this not to wipe out some of this totally unrealistic talk, but rather in the interest of advice and criticism, so that Murasel Souri might not be biased to a particular side. The best thing, as I see it, is for someone to be honest, even if someone runs against his ideology.

“The one who hears is not like the one who sees.”

Marwan Khalil, Abu Khaled al-I’lami.

---

Syrian Revolutionaries Front commander Jamal Ma’rouf, October 5 2015

سؤال موجه للمحيسني هل الهدنه التي حصلت بينكم وبين بشار وإيران مثتثنى منها روسيا! لأننا نرى روسيا إذدادت شراسةً بعد الهدنه !؟ إنهاالخيانه ؟؟؟

— جمال معروف أبو خالد (@gmal_marouf) October 5, 2015

Jamal Ma’rouf, commander of the Syrian Revolutionary Front: “A question for al-Muheisini: Is Russia is exempt from the truce between you, Bashar and Iran? Because we see that Russia has only gotten more ferocious since the truce!? Is this not a betrayal???”

لوأن مقاتلين الفوعه وكفريا أسرى بيد النصره. ماتجرأت روسيا على قصف مواقع المجاهدين ! ولكن هدنة تهريب مرتزقة الشيعه هي التي جعلت روسيا تتغطرس؟

— جمال معروف أبو خالد (@gmal_marouf) October 5, 2015

Jamal Ma’rouf: “If al-Fou’ah and Kafarya’s fighters were al-Nusrah’s captives, Russia wouldn’t dare bomb the positions of the mujahideen. But a truce to smuggle out Shi’a mercenaries, is that what made Russia so cocky?”

VICE News: "How Assad Is Using Sieges and Hunger to Grab More of the 'Useful Syria'"

New from me on VICE News:

As the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad wages an offensive with Russia’s backing on rebels across the country, behind the front lines it has been consolidating its hold in Syria’s west.This is the part of the country sometimes called “useful Syria,” home to most of its population and economic centers. The consolidation of regime control here may be a harbinger of a future, divided country — or it may create a base from which the regime can launch attacks on the rest of Syria.

https://news.vice.com/article/how-assad-is-using-sieges-and-hunger-to-grab-more-of-the-useful-syria

VICE News: "Turkey Is Betting on Aleppo Rebels to Get Islamic State Out of Border Area"

New from me on VICE News:

In the wake of the ISIS’s November attack on Paris, carried out by European fighters returning from the Syrian battlefield, the U.S. and Turkey have been debating how to shut ISIS’s last open border. US officials have been publicly leaning on Turkey to immediately close its border with ISIS in Syria’s northern Aleppo province and deploy thousands of troops on the frontier. The Turkish government has proposed instead that Turkey and the US-led coalition first back Syrian rebels who can drive IS out of the area and create a rebel-controlled “safe zone.”

But amid this public back-and-forth, Turkey’s plan is already underway — and, according to local rebels, it is making some progress.

https://news.vice.com/article/turkey-bets-on-aleppo-rebels-to-get-islamic-state-out-of-border-area

Jabhat al-Nusrah's Abu Muhammad al-Jolani: "Of course we won’t be bound by [Riyadh]."

Below are some notes on Jabhat al-Nusrah chief Abu Muhammad al-Jolani’s recent “press conference,” which aired on December 12. In the conference, al-Jolani entertained questions from Mousa al-Omar of al-Ghad al-Arabi, Adham Abul-Husam of Al Jazeera, Muhammad al-Feisal of Orient and independent celebrity activist Hadi al-Abdullah. These notes aren’t meant to be comprehensive – there’s more to the conference, which is worth watching in full – but they do highlight a few of the things I thought were most interesting.

Destroy the Riyadh Conference

So al-Jolani’s main theme here is “burn down the Riyadh conference,” more or less. (The press conference was apparently recorded before Riyadh but released afterwards.) Al-Jolani argues that the Riyadh conference is integrally related to the Vienna negotiations process, which he says will retain President Bashar al-Assad in power, integrate opposition brigades with the regime’s military, and then compel them to turn on Nusrah, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and others viewed as jihadist irreconcilables.

Al-Jolani not only attacks the conference itself, but really goes in on rebel brigade participants, accusing them of “treason” for playing along with this international conspiracy. In what I thought was most shocking, he attempted to destroy the credibility of any agreement with rebel buy-in by arguing that, in fact, these brigade representatives exert no real command and control over their units on the ground and can’t compel them to abide by any agreement. This is the sort of argument that is a real dagger in the heart of any negotiations process because, after all, if rebel leadership can’t actually restrain their footsoldiers, then no agreement means anything. It’s also pretty insulting to the brigades that chose to endorse or participate in the conference, which is more or less everyone to the left of al-Qaeda.

Muhammad al-Feisal, Orient News: “Returning to the Riyadh conference, will you be bound by the Riyadh resolutions on the ground?”

Al-Jolani: “Of course we won’t be bound by any of it. We won’t abide by [these outcomes], and in fact we’ll work to make them fail.”

Al-Feisal: “And their impact on the ground, what do you expect?”

Al-Jolani: “I don’t think that anyone who went to negotiate at the Riyadh conference is capable of implementing [any agreement], even if he repeats whatever was dictated to him or impressed upon him. I don’t think he’s capable of implementing anything he promised on the ground.”

19:24-20:04

Battlefield Optimism

Al-Jolani also offers a pretty strikingly optimistic take on rebels and jihadists’ battlefield progress, arguing that negotiations have only resurfaced as an international priority because the regime continues to weaken and lose ground. Al-Jolani’s rejectionist stance on negotiations basically requires him to adopt this line so he can claim that acquiescence to talks and a negotiated resolution amounts, more or less, to seizing defeat from the jaws of victory. Still, in arguing for such a rosy outlook, al-Jolani occasionally contorts himself into weird positions. For example, he claims that the regime controls only 20 percent of Syrian territory, which is arguably true – but only if you exclude the country’s central Badiyyah wasteland, ISIS territory, and areas held by the Kurdish PYD/YPG. By that sort of reckoning, I’d guess that mixed rebels and non-ISIS jihadists probably don’t hold much more than 20 percent of the country themselves.

ISIS as a Second-Order Threat

While al-Jolani doesn’t seem to be inching towards a reconciliation with ISIS, he also makes it clear that fighting ISIS is not an urgent priority for Nusrah and that he’s personally uninterested in capturing Syrian public support by claiming to fight ISIS. When he discusses the northern Aleppo front, for example, he says that even before Nusrah withdrew south over concerns about the legitimacy of collaborating with Turkey and the international Coalition, Nusrah was not fighting ISIS or manning the front lines against the group. And in later discussing al-Qaeda’s historic victories and vanguard role, he claims both Afghanistan and Iraq as victories for al-Qaeda and defeats for America – somewhat odd considering that ISIS ate up al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Iraqi jihad has turned out to be, realistically, a total mess.

Combative Questioning

I think I’m still in shock from seeing the head of a Jabhat al-Nusrah affiliate subject himself to open and occasionally challenging questioning. Through the conference, these journalists and activists interrupt or push back on al-Jolani in a way that is very different from some of the staged “interviews” Nusrah has released previously.

Hadi al-Abdullah stands out for putting al-Jolani in a genuinely difficult spot in several instances. Take, for example, al-Abdullah’s question about Nusrah arresting FSA commanders, which prompted al-Jolani’s controversial denial that there’s such a thing as the “Free Syrian Army.” (I’m less exercised about this than some for reasons I’ve tweeted about previously.) Orient’s al-Feisal follows up with a question about Nusrah’s Dar al-Qada judiciary, which prompts al-Abdullah to offer a pretty real interjection:

Al-Feisal, Orient News: “A question from the street: If someone has a grievance about Jabhat al-Nusrah or about a detainee or something like that, where should he go?”

Al-Jolani: “He can go to the branches of Dar al-Qada, which are for the public. And there’s an office to receive complaints…”

Hadi al-Abdullah, interrupting: “Sheikh, Dar al-Qada, in one way or another, belong to Jabhat al-Nusrah. When someone goes [to Dar al-Qada], Nusrah becomes both the opposing party and the judge.”

Al-Jolani: “Jabhat al-Nusrah supports Dar al-Qada, but its judiciary is entirely independent. We provide it with support, we sponsor it, but its judiciary is totally independent. And those working in it, more than 80 percent of them, or about 80 percent, are independent. They don’t have any link to Jabhat al-Nusrah or anything like that…”

49:15-50:07

So, first of all, al-Abdullah is right. With the seeming exception of Hreitan (Aleppo), Dar al-Qada is basically a Jabhat al-Nusrah project that is not seen as effectively independent. But by challenging al-Jolani like this, al-Abdullah is calling into question the core of Nusrah’s governing program in northern Syria, of which Dar al-Qada is right at the heart. And he’s doing it to al-Jolani’s face, it’s bonkers.

The Al-Qaeda Affiliation

Short version, Jabhat al-Nusrah is not going to break its link with al-Qaeda. Al-Jolani doesn’t even promise to split with al-Qaeda if Syria’s jihadist or mujahideen factions join together to form a purely Islamic state – he says Jabhat al-Nusrah will be among the first soldiers of that state, but I don’t think that even implies Jabhat al-Nusrah will dissolve itself. He also continues to distance Nusrah from terrorist attacks abroad in only the most narrow terms. He says al-Qaeda has other people who handle those things, but Jabhat al-Nusrah just fights in Syria – for now.

Al-Jolani: “At this time, Jabhat al-Nusrah isn’t concerned with anything but fighting Bashar al-Assad and Hizbullah, who are hurting the people of Syria. Al-Qaeda has many roles that are divided; not everyone has the same role. Maybe al-Qaeda has people who fight America or work in Europe, but our mission is just…” (interrupted)

52:55-53:16

Jabhat al-Nusrah leader on splits in Egyptian Brotherhood: “And that’s what jihadists are waiting for…”

Below I’ve translated a series of tweets from Abu Obeida al-Gharib, a leader in Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah. He weighs in at length on divisions within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which was mostly decapitated after Egypt’s 2013 coup and has since been split between a militant youth wing and a more circumspect old guard.

Al-Gharib – who may himself be Egyptian, although I can’t say that definitively – provides a sort of outside, jihadist perspective on the Brotherhood’s splits and how its leadership have struggled with how far to take violent revolutionary action. He also refers more or less matter-of-factly to the Brotherhood’s links to various nascent militant organizations, including al-Uqab al-Thouri (Revolutionary Punishment). (For more on the new rise of Egypt militancy, see Mokhtar Awad and Mostafa Hashem’s recent “Egypt’s Escalating Islamist Insurgency.”)

Anyway, read for the narrative, but stick around for the final, closing punch. Spoiler alert: Jihadists may not love any wing of the Brotherhood, youth or old guard, but they do have a vested interest in how this debate shakes out.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is witnessing a sharp division between its older and youth trends. The youth trend within the Brotherhood thinks there has to be new mechanisms to confront Egypt’s coup, including popular and armed confrontation in addition to protests.

The youth trend in the Egyptian Brotherhood took control of the organization’s field leadership for a period after the first and most of the second tier of its leadership was arrested. That resulted in the establishment of two wings to confront the security forces and the military: one military wing, represented by the groups of al-Uqab al-Thouri (Revolutionary Retribution); and one semi-military wing, the groups of al-Muqawamah al-Sha’biyyah (the Popular Resistance).

The goal of the groups of al-Uqab al-Thouri was to carry out purely military operations targeting the Egyptian security services and army. As for al-Muqawamah al-Sha’biyyah, it was meant to target security and army vehicles randomly and burn them with Molotov cocktails and other means. That was done randomly by different groups of young people who would move in all the streets and neighborhoods.

What was left of the old leadership inside the country and the leadership abroad turned a blind eye to what the youth were doing for a while so they could pressure the Egyptian regime and its security services. But the scope of [the youth’s] action started to expand, and the leadership started to feel that things were getting out of their control, that Egypt was on its way towards becoming a new Algeria, and so they decided to back off.

That’s when this clash happened between the old leadership and the youth leadership, who rejected this. The youth decided to continue their action, without paying attention to the old leadership, and in particular those leaders outside the country. The external leadership and those remaining senior figures inside the country cut off funding from the youth leadership and the families of the martyrs, detainees, and fugitives from the security services in an effort in an effort to split the Brotherhood’s membership from the youth leadership. And they managed to do it, and they regained control over the Brotherhood.

The dispute returned again with the approach of the anniversary of the January Revolution and calls to revive the revolution in Egypt, and it manifested itself in the removal of Brotherhood spokesman [Muhammad Muntasser]. The old leadership of the Brotherhood wants to rule out confrontation as an option because they know that the rug will pulled out from under them, and that things will get out of control in Eygpt. They want to keep the matter to either [Egyptian President Abdulfattah] al-Sisi or [deposed President Muhammad] Morsi. And other option is rejected, even if it’s in the interest of Muslims and sparing them from slavery and oppression.

[Abu Obeida shares a series of related headlines from Al Jazeera and Al-Islamiyun.]

The return of Muhammad Muntasser as official spokesman of the Brotherhood is the first real victory of the youth trend inside the group. Muhammad Muntasser: “The dispute inside the Brotherhood is one between the reformist and revolutionary wings. Those who lead the Brotherhood are its members inside the country, not abroad. And we won’t allow anyone to dictate to us from abroad. I don’t know anything about a deal between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood abroad, but what is for sure is that we’ll continue on the revolutionary path.”

It the revolutionary youth line succeeds in dominating the Brotherhood inside Egypt, that means a direct, intense confrontation with the security services.

And that’s what jihadists are waiting for…

الاخوان المسلمين فى مصر يشهدون انقسامأ حادا بين التيار القديم وتيار الشباب فيه

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

التيار الشبابى داخل الاخوان يرى بوجوب وجود اليات جديدة لمواجهة اﻹنقلاب بمصر بما فيها المواجهة الشعبية والمسلحة الى جانب المظاهرات

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

سيطر تيار الشباب فى إخوان مصر فترة من الزمن على مقاليد القيادة الميدانية بعد اعتقال الصف الاول وأغلب الصف الثانى فنتج عن ذلك

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

إنشاء جناحين احدهما عسكرى وتمثل فى مجموعات العقاب الثورى وشبه عسكرى فى مجموعات المقاومة الشعبية لمواجهة قوات الامن والجيش

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

مجموعات العقاب الثورى كان هدفها عمليات عسكرية بحته تستهدف الامن والجيش المصريين ،أما المقاومة الشعبية فهى ﻻستهداف سيارات الامن والجيش

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

بشكل عشوائى وحرقها بالملتوف او غيره وتتم بشكل عشوائى من مجموعات شبابية متنوعه تتحرك فى كافة الشوارع والاحياء

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

غضت القيادة القديمة المتبقية فى الداخل الى جانب قيادة الخارج الطرف عن الشباب لبعض الوقت من باب الضغط ع النظام المصرى وأجهزة أمنه

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

ولكن بدأت رقعة العمل تتسع وزادت وأحست القيادة أن اﻹمور بدأت بالخروج عن السيطرة وأن مصر تتجه لجزائر جديدة فقررت التراجع

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

هنا حدث الصدام بينهم وبين القيادات الشبابية الرافضة لهذا الامر وقرر الشباب اﻹستمرار ف العمل دون اﻹلتفات لقرارت القيادة القديمة بالذات الخارج

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

قامت القيادات الخارجية وبقايا القدامى بالداخل عبر قطع التمويل عن القيادات الشبابية وأسر الشهداء والمعتقلين والمطاردين من أجهزة الامن

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

فى محاولة لفض جماهير الجماعة عن القيادات الشبابية وبالفعل تم لهم ما أرادوا وأعادوا السيطرة على مفاصل الجماعة

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

عاد الخلاف من جديد مع اقتراب موعد ذكرى ثورة يناير والدعوات ﻹحياء الثورة من جديد فى مصر وتجلى فى قضية عزل المتحدث الرسمى للإخوان

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

القيادات القديمة للإخوان تريد إستبعاد خيار المواجهة ﻹنهم يعلمون ان البساط سيسحب من تحت أقدامهم وسيخرج اﻷمر عن السيطرة فى مصر

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

هم يريدون حصر القضية أما السيسى وأما مرسى أى خيار أخر فهو مرفوض حتى لو فيه مصلحة للمسلمين وخلاصهم من العبودية والظلم

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

10 مكاتب إدارية لجماعة #الإخوان ترفض قرارت مجموعة عزت بإقالة #محمد_منتصر #محمد_منتصر_يمثلني https://t.co/PalspooMMC pic.twitter.com/6dZ2wLRqYB

— الإسلاميون (@islamioon) December 15, 2015

#محمد_عبدالرحمن أحد أقطاب طرفى الازمة داخل #الإخوان يوجه رسالة إلى الثوار https://t.co/wIVVD2bIjA #التحالف_الاسلامي pic.twitter.com/iMvfdW7RnU

— الإسلاميون (@islamioon) December 15, 2015

اللجنة الادارية العليا للإخوان: #محمد_منتصر متحدثا اعلاميا للجماعة https://t.co/4bHaVaRT3c https://t.co/KFVld8Msb0

— الإسلاميون (@islamioon) December 15, 2015

هذا التصريح يلخص لك أسباب الصراع بين أقطاب اﻹخوان@ajmubasher

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

عودة محمد المنتصر متحدثا رسميا لﻻخوان هو أول نصر حقيقى للتيار الشبابى داخل الجماعة

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 15, 2015

محمد منتصر : الخلاف داخل الجماعة هو خلاف بين التيار اﻻصلاحى والتيار الثورى #الإخوان_المسلمين

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 16, 2015

محمد منتصر : من يقود الاخوان هم اخوان الداخل لا الخارج ولن نقبل ان يملى علينا شىء من الخارج #الإخوان_المسلمين

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 16, 2015

محمد منتصر: ليس لدى معلومة هل هناك صفقة بين النظام المصرى وأخوان الخارج ولكن اﻷكيد أننا سنستمر فى النهج الثورى #الإخوان_المسلمين

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 16, 2015

فى حال نجاح الخط الثورى الشبابى ف الجماعة ف السيطرة على الاخوان داخل مصر يعنى حدوث صدام مباشر وقوى مع أجهزة الأمن وهو ماينتظره الجهاديون ..

— أبو عبيدة الغريب (@aba_obeida) December 16, 2015

VICE News: "Syrian Rebels Took One Very Small Step Closer to Negotiating an End to the War"

New from me for VICE News:

At a meeting in Riyadh this week, the fractious Syrian opposition made its most encouraging progress to date towards forming a single political front. But after the last-minute withdrawal of major Salafist rebel brigade Ahrar al-Sham, will that be enough?

https://news.vice.com/article/syrian-rebels-took-one-very-small-step-closer-to-negotiating-an-end-to-the-war

VICE News: "Syria's Newest Rebel Army Has Its Sights on the Islamic State"

New from me for VICE News:

Meet the New Syrian Army, a force of eastern Syrian rebels who want to liberate their home province of Deir al-Zour from ISIS and have U.S.-issued weaponry and international Coalition air strikes on their side. They face long odds — their numbers are low, in part because other rebels are dubious about their international backing — but they may still be the best chance to taking back Deir.

https://news.vice.com/article/syrias-newest-rebel-army-has-its-sights-on-the-islamic-state

Top Jabhat al-Nusrah shar'i attacks Jeish al-Islam, highlights broader jihadist anxieties

Below we see Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah’s top shari’ah official Sami al-Oreidi issue an unusually direct attack on top leadership in Jeish al-Islam, the most powerful rebel faction in Damascus’s East Ghouta suburbs. Al-Oreidi’s tweets (translated below) make clear that members of Nusrah’s top leadership share and endorse hardline jihadists’ hostility to Jeish al-Islam and its leader, Zahran Alloush. They also speak to broader anxieties among Syria’s jihadists as they attempt to coexist, often uncomfortably, with other political and ideological trends within the Syrian opposition.

Al-Oreidi is apparently annoyed over comments from Jeish al-Islam leader and religious figure Sheikh Sami (Abu Abdurrahman) Ka’ka’ criticizing Jabhat al-Nusrah for shelling Damascus city after an aborted Russian-brokered ceasefire that would have allowed relief into the besieged East Ghouta suburbs. (I’ve been unable to find Ka’ka’s original comments.) Al-Oreidi reproaches Jeish al-Islam for its own overreach and, somewhat more dramatically, endorses premiere Salafi-jihadist theorist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s comparison between the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the “Alalish” – Zahran Alloush’s supporters, or Jeish al-Islam.

Al-Oreidi’s comments are in one sense a product of personality clashes and local, Damascus-area politics. Jihadists have long been hostile to Jeish al-Islam and Alloush personally; in turn, Jeish al-Islam and Alloush have had a reputation for heavy-handedness in how they dealt with local political and military rivals. Recently tensions in East Ghouta have spiked amid jostling over control of smuggling tunnels into East Ghouta and allegations that Jeish al-Islam was behind the assassination of a local jihadist cleric and judge.

These disputes have prompted jihadists outside the Ghouta, many of whom view Alloush as an enemy-in-waiting, to weigh in. A series of leaked video and audio recordings of Jeish al-Islam leaders allegedly plotting assassinations is actually what prompted al-Maqdisi – who has controversially attacked Alloush before – to compare ISIS and the “Alalish.” Now we have apparent evidence that Jabhat al-Nusrah’s top religious official is sympathetic to al-Maqdisi’s position on Jeish al-Islam and Zahran Alloush, which seems to promise new waves of intra-rebel violence.

Al-Oreidi’s reference to “Bosnia,” though, shows that his mind is also on broader rebel-jihadist dynamics. Al-Oreidi’s allusion to his remarks to now-deceased Ahrar al-Sham leader Hassan Abboud (Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi) refers to their sharp back-and-forth over the “Revolutionary Covenant” that was announced in May 2014. “They say, ‘We don’t want the Iraqi tragedy to repeat itself,’” wrote al-Oreidi at the time, “but they are heading towards a new Bosnian tragedy, on Syrian soil. Save yourselves, save yourselves from the whirlpool of the past.” (For more on al-Oreidi and Abboud’s argument, see my June 2014 article on Syrian factions’ “shar’is.”)

The Revolutionary Covenant was framed in uncomfortably nationalist, non-religious terms for al-Oreidi, hence his evocation of Bosnia’s Dayton Accords. The 1995 Dayton agreement is a recurring bugbear for jihadists, who view its requirement that all foreign fighters withdraw from Bosnia (Annex 1A, Article III) as a nationalist betrayal of the jihadist foreign fighters who had sacrificed for their Muslim brothers. (Al-Oreidi is himself a foreign fighter of Palestinian-Jordanian origin.)

Jihadists fear a Dayton-style settlement in which Syria’s nationalist – or not-transnationalist, at least – rebels compromise on the jihadists’ goal of a purely Islamic state and turn on the jihadists themselves, many of whom would become stateless fugitives. In that sense, jihadists have adopted Zahran Alloush as a sort of hate object in part because he symbolizes many of jihadists’ fears and suspicions about the revolutionary context around them. He is, they think, exactly the sort of Syrian nationalist who would sell them out.

This is the sort of angst that will only intensify as regional and international actors push for a political settlement. When the next round of rebel-jihadist violence breaks out, it will likely have a local spark, but these arguments and apprehensions about the character of the Syrian state mean the stakes will be much bigger.

Translation follows. (Note: To the extent possible, I’ve maintained the odd, haiku-ish way al-Oreidi splits his individual tweets between multiple lines.)

#Truth_in_a_Tweet

When [ISIS spokesperson Abu Muhammad] al-Adnani spoke, we saw a thousand pens respond.

But when [Jeish al-Islam commander Zahran] Alloush and [top Jeish al-Islam religious official and judge Samir “Abu Abdurrahman”] Ka’ka’ slander the mujahideen,

Then we don’t hear a whisper.

It’s

#The_Brotherhood_of_No_Manhaj

#حقيقة_في_تغريدة لمّا تكلم العدناني رأينا ألف قلم يرد عليه ولما تكلم علوش وكعكة بالطعن بالمجاهدين لم نسمع لهم همسا إنها #أخوة_اللامنهج

— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015

The disastrousness of what Alloush and Ka’ka’ say

Is no less than that of al-Adnani.

What is the matter with you? How do you judge? [Quran 10:35]

Our Sheikh al-Maqdisi spoke the truth when he compared the Da’adish [derog., ISIS members] with the Alalish [derog., Alloush/Jeish al-Islam supporters].

إن الطامات الواردة في كلام علوش وكعكة لاتقل عن طامات العدناني ما لكم كيف تحكمون صدق شيخنا المقدسي لما كان يقرن بين #الدعاديش و #العلاليش

— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015

1

Ka’ka’ resembled al-Adnani

When he described Jabhat al-Nusrah’s shelling of Damascus after their supposed truce as “foolishness”

Because the regime targeted Jeish al-Islam positions afterwards.

1 كعكة شابه العدناني إذ وصف استهداف جبهة النصرة لدمشق بالقذائف بعد #هدنتهم المزعومة بالحماقة لأن النظام استهدف مواقع جيش الاسلام بعدها

— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015

2

What would he say about what [Jeish al-Islam] did – foolishness, according to Ka’ka’ and his sheikh Alloush – when they shelled Damascus.

And after that, the Duma massacre happened. Is that jihad?

What is the matter with you? How do you judge?

2 ماذا يقول عن فعلهم #حماقتهم على مذهب كعكة وشيخه علوش لما استهدفوا دمشق بالقذائف ووقعت بعدها مجزرة دوما هل هو جهاد مالكم كيف تحكمون

— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015

I said it before to [now-deceased Ahrar al-Sham head] Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi – may God have mercy on him: You say you don’t want [Syria] to be another Iraq. We say that we don’t want it to be another Bosnia.

God, may You guide us toward Your religion and put our Islamic nation on Your path.

قلتها قديما لأبي عبد الله الحموي -رحمه الله- تقولون لا تريدونها عراقا أخرى وكذلك نقول لا نريدها بوسنة أخرى اللهم أحينا لدينك وأمتنا في سبيلك

— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015

Catching Up: (Most of) 2015

Woof, I really let this blog slide.Anyway, I plan to update this more regularly as I continue to publish, if only to ensure that there's a single clearinghouse for everything I've written. (You know, in case people are interested.)Pieces I've published since my last post, in chronological order:

• Jihadology, "Abdullah al-Muheisini Weighs in on Killing of Alawite Women and Children." A translation and analysis of jihadist evangelist and dealmaker Abdullah al-Muheisini's ruling on killing Alawite women and children - he's against it, but he also includes enough caveats and qualifications that we should be worried. Al-Muheisini is extreme, but he's also influential, and he's closer to the rebel center in northwest Syria than we might like.
• Jihadology, "Ahrar al-Sham Spiritual Leader: The Idol of Democracy Has Shattered." The second piece is another translation and analysis, this one of an argument on democracy from the top spiritual leader of Syria's most powerful rebel militia, Ahrar al-Sham. This official doesn't rule out some democracy-like mechanisms, but he's pretty clear that "democracy" per se is not happening - particularly after Algeria and Egypt, he argues it's a trap for Islamists.
• War on the Rocks, "The Trouble with Turkey's Favorite Islamists" (co-authored with Aaron Stein). Turkey has good relations with a broad spectrum of Syrian rebels, but it has forged especially close ties with Ahrar al-Sham, a Salafist brigade with one foot in global jihadism. As Turkey flirts with the possibility of establishing a "safe zone" in Aleppo, it remains an open question whether Turkey will enlist Ahrar's support on the ground - and, if so, whether Ahrar can participate without also inviting in jihadist fellow travellers.
• War on the Rocks, "Ahrar al-Sham's Revisionist Jihadism." The fanaticism and brutality of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have shocked people around the world, and Syria's "mujahideen" are no exception. Inside Syria, a revisionist critique of ISIS's hyper-extremism has emerged from within the jihadist movement, a corrective trend that's been championed by the Salafist rebels in Ahrar al-Sham. Now Ahrar al-Sham is both manning the front lines against ISIS and vying with ISIS – and al-Qaeda – to define the jihadist movement writ large.
• World Politics Review, "The End of the Army of Conquest? Syrian Rebel Alliance Shows Cracks." Over the spring and summer of this year, the Jeish al-Fateh (Army of Conquest) rebel coalition scored a series of dramatic victories over the regime of Bashar al-Assad in northwest Syria. But just as Jeish al-Fateh has announced a major new offensive, ultra-extreme faction Jund al-Aqsa has very publicly quit the coalition. The resulting acrimony has exposed the persistent and probably unresolvable divisions within Jeish al-Fatah and among Syria’s rebels more broadly.

Catching Up: Two Jihadology Pieces and Middle East Week

Apologies, super-behind in updating this blog! (Also, following me on Twitter is a much better way to stay up-to-date on anything I'm writing.)Two recent Jihadology guest pieces:

• "Recriminations on Social Media Shed Light on Jabhat al-Nusrah's Inner Workings": Ex-Nusrah shari'ah official Sultan al-Atwi returned from social media dormancy with a broadside against Nusrah, and specifically its Eastern leadership. The resulting back-and-forth shows something both about how Nusrah functions and how it's engaged major, divisive programmatic issues. Features analysis plus translations of al-Atwi's open letter and the key Nusrah responses.
• "Muhammad al-Amin on Ahrar al-Sham's Evolving Relationship with Jabhat al-Nusrah and Global Jihadism": Relative insider Sheikh Muhammad al-Amin writes about both how close Ahrar al-Sham was to Jabhat al-Nusrah and how they subsequently diverged ideologically. Features analysis and translation of al-Amin's original Facebook post.

Also, tune into my recent appearance on the Middle East Week podcast, on which I discuss the above two pieces and how Nusrah has evolved more broadly over the course of 2014.