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Top Jabhat al-Nusrah shar'i attacks Jeish al-Islam, highlights broader jihadist anxieties
Below we see Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah’s top shari’ah official Sami al-Oreidi issue an unusually direct attack on top leadership in Jeish al-Islam, the most powerful rebel faction in Damascus’s East Ghouta suburbs. Al-Oreidi’s tweets (translated below) make clear that members of Nusrah’s top leadership share and endorse hardline jihadists’ hostility to Jeish al-Islam and its leader, Zahran Alloush. They also speak to broader anxieties among Syria’s jihadists as they attempt to coexist, often uncomfortably, with other political and ideological trends within the Syrian opposition…
Below we see Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah’s top shari’ah official Sami al-Oreidi issue an unusually direct attack on top leadership in Jeish al-Islam, the most powerful rebel faction in Damascus’s East Ghouta suburbs. Al-Oreidi’s tweets (translated below) make clear that members of Nusrah’s top leadership share and endorse hardline jihadists’ hostility to Jeish al-Islam and its leader, Zahran Alloush. They also speak to broader anxieties among Syria’s jihadists as they attempt to coexist, often uncomfortably, with other political and ideological trends within the Syrian opposition.
Al-Oreidi is apparently annoyed over comments from Jeish al-Islam leader and religious figure Sheikh Sami (Abu Abdurrahman) Ka’ka’ criticizing Jabhat al-Nusrah for shelling Damascus city after an aborted Russian-brokered ceasefire that would have allowed relief into the besieged East Ghouta suburbs. (I’ve been unable to find Ka’ka’s original comments.) Al-Oreidi reproaches Jeish al-Islam for its own overreach and, somewhat more dramatically, endorses premiere Salafi-jihadist theorist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s comparison between the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the “Alalish” – Zahran Alloush’s supporters, or Jeish al-Islam.
Al-Oreidi’s comments are in one sense a product of personality clashes and local, Damascus-area politics. Jihadists have long been hostile to Jeish al-Islam and Alloush personally; in turn, Jeish al-Islam and Alloush have had a reputation for heavy-handedness in how they dealt with local political and military rivals. Recently tensions in East Ghouta have spiked amid jostling over control of smuggling tunnels into East Ghouta and allegations that Jeish al-Islam was behind the assassination of a local jihadist cleric and judge.
These disputes have prompted jihadists outside the Ghouta, many of whom view Alloush as an enemy-in-waiting, to weigh in. A series of leaked video and audio recordings of Jeish al-Islam leaders allegedly plotting assassinations is actually what prompted al-Maqdisi – who has controversially attacked Alloush before – to compare ISIS and the “Alalish.” Now we have apparent evidence that Jabhat al-Nusrah’s top religious official is sympathetic to al-Maqdisi’s position on Jeish al-Islam and Zahran Alloush, which seems to promise new waves of intra-rebel violence.
Al-Oreidi’s reference to “Bosnia,” though, shows that his mind is also on broader rebel-jihadist dynamics. Al-Oreidi’s allusion to his remarks to now-deceased Ahrar al-Sham leader Hassan Abboud (Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi) refers to their sharp back-and-forth over the “Revolutionary Covenant” that was announced in May 2014. “They say, ‘We don’t want the Iraqi tragedy to repeat itself,’” wrote al-Oreidi at the time, “but they are heading towards a new Bosnian tragedy, on Syrian soil. Save yourselves, save yourselves from the whirlpool of the past.” (For more on al-Oreidi and Abboud’s argument, see my June 2014 article on Syrian factions’ “shar’is.”)
The Revolutionary Covenant was framed in uncomfortably nationalist, non-religious terms for al-Oreidi, hence his evocation of Bosnia’s Dayton Accords. The 1995 Dayton agreement is a recurring bugbear for jihadists, who view its requirement that all foreign fighters withdraw from Bosnia (Annex 1A, Article III) as a nationalist betrayal of the jihadist foreign fighters who had sacrificed for their Muslim brothers. (Al-Oreidi is himself a foreign fighter of Palestinian-Jordanian origin.)
Jihadists fear a Dayton-style settlement in which Syria’s nationalist – or not-transnationalist, at least – rebels compromise on the jihadists’ goal of a purely Islamic state and turn on the jihadists themselves, many of whom would become stateless fugitives. In that sense, jihadists have adopted Zahran Alloush as a sort of hate object in part because he symbolizes many of jihadists’ fears and suspicions about the revolutionary context around them. He is, they think, exactly the sort of Syrian nationalist who would sell them out.
This is the sort of angst that will only intensify as regional and international actors push for a political settlement. When the next round of rebel-jihadist violence breaks out, it will likely have a local spark, but these arguments and apprehensions about the character of the Syrian state mean the stakes will be much bigger.
Translation follows. (Note: To the extent possible, I’ve maintained the odd, haiku-ish way al-Oreidi splits his individual tweets between multiple lines.)
#Truth_in_a_Tweet
When [ISIS spokesperson Abu Muhammad] al-Adnani spoke, we saw a thousand pens respond.
But when [Jeish al-Islam commander Zahran] Alloush and [top Jeish al-Islam religious official and judge Samir “Abu Abdurrahman”] Ka’ka’ slander the mujahideen,
Then we don’t hear a whisper.
It’s
#The_Brotherhood_of_No_Manhaj
#حقيقة_في_تغريدة لمّا تكلم العدناني رأينا ألف قلم يرد عليه ولما تكلم علوش وكعكة بالطعن بالمجاهدين لم نسمع لهم همسا إنها #أخوة_اللامنهج
— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015
The disastrousness of what Alloush and Ka’ka’ say
Is no less than that of al-Adnani.
What is the matter with you? How do you judge? [Quran 10:35]
Our Sheikh al-Maqdisi spoke the truth when he compared the Da’adish [derog., ISIS members] with the Alalish [derog., Alloush/Jeish al-Islam supporters].
إن الطامات الواردة في كلام علوش وكعكة لاتقل عن طامات العدناني ما لكم كيف تحكمون صدق شيخنا المقدسي لما كان يقرن بين #الدعاديش و #العلاليش
— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015
1
Ka’ka’ resembled al-Adnani
When he described Jabhat al-Nusrah’s shelling of Damascus after their supposed truce as “foolishness”
Because the regime targeted Jeish al-Islam positions afterwards.
1 كعكة شابه العدناني إذ وصف استهداف جبهة النصرة لدمشق بالقذائف بعد #هدنتهم المزعومة بالحماقة لأن النظام استهدف مواقع جيش الاسلام بعدها
— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015
2
What would he say about what [Jeish al-Islam] did – foolishness, according to Ka’ka’ and his sheikh Alloush – when they shelled Damascus.
And after that, the Duma massacre happened. Is that jihad?
What is the matter with you? How do you judge?
2 ماذا يقول عن فعلهم #حماقتهم على مذهب كعكة وشيخه علوش لما استهدفوا دمشق بالقذائف ووقعت بعدها مجزرة دوما هل هو جهاد مالكم كيف تحكمون
— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015
I said it before to [now-deceased Ahrar al-Sham head] Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi – may God have mercy on him: You say you don’t want [Syria] to be another Iraq. We say that we don’t want it to be another Bosnia.
God, may You guide us toward Your religion and put our Islamic nation on Your path.
قلتها قديما لأبي عبد الله الحموي -رحمه الله- تقولون لا تريدونها عراقا أخرى وكذلك نقول لا نريدها بوسنة أخرى اللهم أحينا لدينك وأمتنا في سبيلك
— سامي بن محمود (@sami_mahmod2) November 28, 2015
Abu Azzam al-Najdi: "No one has a successful plan to implement God’s law except the Islamic State."
Below we see Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA) shar’i “Abu Azzam al-Najdi’s” frank rationale for leaving JMA to join the Islamic State (IS / ISIS). Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar is a mostly foreign fighter battalion that has been active in Aleppo. It is best known for its Caucasian (e.g., Chechen) contingent, but it also counts Arabs among its ranks — it recently absorbed the heavily Saudi al-Katibah al-Khadra (the Green Battalion), and Abu Azzam’s nom du guerre indicates that he hails from the Najd (east Saudi Arabia). Abu Azzam had been JMA’s shar’i and, at least in Arabic media, its main fundraising point of contact. Saudi fundraiser and ideologue Abdullah al-Muheisini had recommended as late as April that any would-be foreign fighters should reach out specifically to Abu Azzam…
Below we see Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA) shar’i “Abu Azzam al-Najdi’s” frank rationale for leaving JMA to join the Islamic State (IS / ISIS). Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar is a mostly foreign fighter battalion that has been active in Aleppo. It is best known for its Caucasian (e.g., Chechen) contingent, but it also counts Arabs among its ranks — it recently absorbed the heavily Saudi al-Katibah al-Khadra (the Green Battalion), and Abu Azzam’s nom du guerre indicates that he hails from the Najd (east Saudi Arabia). Abu Azzam had been JMA’s shar’i and, at least in Arabic media, its main fundraising point of contact. Saudi fundraiser and ideologue Abdullah al-Muheisini had recommended as late as April that any would-be foreign fighters should reach out specifically to Abu Azzam.
Abu Azzam defected to ISIS alongside a substantial chunk of al-Katibah al-Khadra, including its commander Omar Seif and at least one of its shar’is. (Seif had apparently just been detained by the Syrian Revolutionaries Front on suspicions, now vindicated, that he was linked to ISIS. Other jihadists intervened to broker his release.)
As can be seen below, there are a number of strains to Abu Azzam’s thinking, or at least what he’s willing to disclose of it. Some of it reads like picking a winner: on the one hand, an endorsement of ISIS’s success in building a functional Islamic state; on the other, disillusionment with the dysfunction of rebel-controlled areas and a clear distrust of non-jihadist rebels. The current U.S./Coalition campaign on ISIS apparently figures into his logic, too, pushing him to advocate jihadist solidarity with ISIS to better resist “the nations of disbelief.”
ISIS and pro-ISIS accounts have been crowing about successive jihadist defections to ISIS, doing everything they can to advertise ISIS’s continuing momentum. When it comes to drawing away foreign fighters, I suspect they’re right – Abu Azzam is not the first to defect to ISIS, and I doubt he’ll be the last.
I’ve been asked a lot about my reason for leaving [Jeish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar] and pledging allegiance to the Islamic State.
I would say, frankly, that no one has a successful plan to implement God’s law except the Islamic State. It has established Islamic courts and implemented the hudoud (Islamic criminal punishments) in its territory. Meanwhile, if we go and look at the other side, we find not only sincere battalions but also – on the same land – criminal battalions and apostate battalions supported by the military councils that call openly for the establishment of a democratic state. Then we fight on the fronts while they work behind us to carry out their projects and plots… Yes, there are those who work [at that], but they’ll never succeed – although only God knows – because of their division and fragmentation. Even the courts that have been established have seen what they’ve seen because of nepotism and what have you…
You might say that the [Islamic] State has made mistakes. I say that they themselves admit these mistakes, and they work to rectify them and hold accountable the responsible party. They’ve established Islamic courts and implemented the hudoud, so you see nothing here but the rule of Islamic law. Stores close at prayer time, women are modest in the markets, nobody sells cigarettes or anything else.
I say this is not the time for division with the Islamic state. The nations of disbelief have gathered against us, so we must come to [the Islamic State’s] aid. This is not the time for the division of “groups.” Rather, it is the time for solidarity and union.
Below are Abu Azzam’s original tweets:
١- الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على أفضل الخلق نبينا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين.. سألت كثيرا سبب خروجي ومبايعتي للدولة الإسلامية..
— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014
2- أقول صراحة لا يوجد أحد لديه مشروع ناجح لتطبيق شرع الله إلا في الدولة الإسلامية فقد أقامت المحاكم الإسلامية وطبقت الحدود على أرضها أما لو
— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014
3- ذهبنا لننظر في الجهة المقابلة لوجدنا على نفس الأرض كتائب صادقة وكتائب مفسدة وكتائب مرتدة مدعومة من المجالس العسكرية التي تدعوا لإقامة
— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014
4- دولة ديمقراطية صراحة , ثم نحن نقاتل في الجبهات وهم يسعون من خلفنا لإقامة مشاريعهم ومخططاتهم.. نعم هناك من يسعى ولكن لن يستطيعوا والله
— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014
5- أعلم بسبب تفرقهم وتشرذمهم.. حتى المحاكم التي قامت حصل فيها ماحصل بسبب المحسوبيات وغيرها.. قد تقولون يوجد عند الدولة أخطاء..
— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014
6- أقول هم أنفسهم يقرون أن عندهم أخطاء وهم يسعون في إصلاحها ومحاسبة المخطأ وقد أقاموا المحاكم الإسلامية وأقيمت الحدود فلا ترى هنا إلا معالم
— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014
7- تحكيم الشريعة فالمحلات تغلق وقت الصلوات والنساء محتشمات في الأسواق ولا أحد يبيع الدخان في المحلات وغير ذلك.. أقول ليس هذا وقت الخلاف
— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014
8- مع الدولة الإسلامية فأمم الكفر قد اجتمعت عليها فالواجب مناصرتها.. وليس هذا وقت تفرق الجماعات بل هو وقت الإعتصام والإجتماع..
— ابو عزام النجدي (@aboazaam122) October 21, 2014
Suqour al-Sham commander: "Our land can’t bear a proxy war."
Below is Suqour al-Sham / Islamic Front commander Abu Ammar’s response to impending U.S. intervention in Syria. Unsurprisingly, after America’s stop-and-start support for rebels and recurring rumors that Ahrar al-Sham or the entire Islamic Front would be designated as terrorists, he is not in love with the idea…
Below is Suqour al-Sham / Islamic Front commander Abu Ammar’s response to impending U.S. intervention in Syria. Unsurprisingly, after America’s stop-and-start support for rebels and recurring rumors that Ahrar al-Sham or the entire Islamic Front would be designated as terrorists, he is not in love with the idea.
One idea worth bearing in mind when evaluating American intervention in Syria is “path dependence,” the idea that your previous action (or inaction) bounds the options currently available to you. Goodwill towards America among Syria’s rebels – while not necessarily exhausted – is a wasting asset, one that has been depleted as the war has dragged on without meaningful American support for rebels. When America was considering action in August and September 2013, the rebels most unfriendly to a U.S. role were substantially less powerful and dug into areas outside regime control. I don’t think it’s controversial to say that America is going to have a much tougher time finding partners now than it would have last year.
For three years, the Syrian people have tasted the al-Assad regime’s artistry at torture, murder and displacement. Thousands of children, women and the elderly have been killed; prisons filled; millions made homeless; and women raped. All this in full view of the world and its [Security] Council, which met time and again to no avail, and which never moved a muscle.
Instead, it acted to designate some of the factions working to end the oppression of this bereaved people as “terrorists,” and it threatened the same for others.
God willing, we’re able to topple the al-Assad regime and repel Da’ish’s [ISIS] aggression without foreign intervention. To aid our people, it’s enough to stop aiding the al-Assad regime and its minions and to pull away its cover, as well as not tightening the screws on the factions working to topple al-Assad.
Our land can’t bear a proxy war. It can't bear more settling of scores and more experiments on our wounded people.
Ahrar al-Sham's Abu Yazan: "It’s our country and our revolution."
Below is a translation of Ahrar al-Sham shar’i-commander “Abu Yazan’s” apparent response to Jordanian Salafi-jihadist theorist Eyad Quneibi. Quneibi has attracted sharply critical responses – particularly from prominent Ahrar leadership – for his non-specific warnings against cooperation with Syrian factions that are Western agents and are otherwise tainted. In this 3 September response, we see Abu Yazan rebuke not only (an unnamed) Quneibi, but also ideas of Salafi-jihadist purism more broadly. This is quite striking coming from a leader in Ahrar, which has itself flirted with Salafi-jihadism but now may have reverted to a more nationalist brand of (still hardline) Salafism…
Below is a translation of Ahrar al-Sham shar’i-commander “Abu Yazan’s” apparent response to Jordanian Salafi-jihadist theorist Eyad Quneibi. Quneibi has attracted sharply critical responses – particularly from prominent Ahrar leadership – for his non-specific warnings against cooperation with Syrian factions that are Western agents and are otherwise tainted. In this 3 September response, we see Abu Yazan rebuke not only (an unnamed) Quneibi, but also ideas of Salafi-jihadist purism more broadly. This is quite striking coming from a leader in Ahrar, which has itself flirted with Salafi-jihadism but now may have reverted to a more nationalist brand of (still hardline) Salafism.
O enlightened one,
We have a saying in al-Sham (Syria): “If someone won’t come, you have to go with him.”¹ The One Most High said, “And when they meet those who believe, they say, ‘We believe.’ But when they are left to their devils, they say, ‘Truly, we are with you; we were only jesting.’” As for presenting this like it’s a matter of defending [Jabhat] al-Nusra, dear brother, we and al-Nusra are in the same boat, and it’s called “the Syrian jihad.” When people like you – may God bless you – and like al-Maqdisi in his last publications echo the culture of takhwin (accusations of treason), whisper campaigns and casting aspersions on any faction that isn’t Salafi-jihadist with obtuse, airy turns of phrase, then al-Nusra is pushed towards becoming a movement of societal isolation, and we fear it might evolve into a movement of societal rejection. So we say to you, Fear God for the sake of the battlefield. The battlefield can’t sustain this. Believe me, we care for al-Nusra more – God willing – than you and al-Maqdisi, and the days to come will show this. And even before that, we care more for the Syrian battlefield, because it’s our country and our revolution. (Of course, I assume our dear brother al-Muheisini would say this is ‘Sykes-Picot’ .) So know, my brothers from all factions – from Hazm to al-Nusra – yes, I was Salafi-jihadist, and I was imprisoned in the regime’s jails for it. Today, I ask for God’s forgiveness and repent to Him, and I apologize to our people for involving them in Quixotic battles of which they have no need. I apologize for being apart from you for even a day, as when I exited my intellectual prison and mingled with you and with your hearts, I said that the Prophet, peace be upon him, spoke true when he said, “If the people of al-Sham are corrupted, then there is no good in you.” I apologize to you, and God willing, the days to come will be better than those past – for our revolution and for our Islam.
And to those who reproach me for being harsh in my speech, I say:
And I ask God for forgiveness if I’ve erred, and may God reward you for your advice.
Also, for anyone who missed my June Foreign Policy article on Syrian rebel shar’is (jurists), here it is.
1. The saying, to my knowledge, basically means that if someone can’t be made to do/understand something, you have to walk him through it yourself.
Qaradawi: Egyptian Protests Fitna, Khurouj 'ala Wali al-Amr
There were a number of noteworthy points in the November 25 episode of Sharia and Life. Certainly one of the most striking, though, was Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi’s characterization of recent protests against President Muhammad Morsi’s constitutional declaration as khurouj ’ala wali al-amr and fitna. These (related) charges are grave. I’ve left these terms untranslated below, as they have no immediate English parallel, but they basically amount to “rebellion against the legitimate ruler” and “chaos and discord,” respectively. These ideas were among those deployed by authority-friendly clerics (Egyptian and otherwise) during Egypt’s January 25 Revolution to discourage protesters and discredit their actions as un-Islamic. Qaradawi has now turned them on those organizing and participating in Tuesday’s planned mass protests…
There were a number of noteworthy points in the November 25 episode of Sharia and Life. Certainly one of the most striking, though, was Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi’s characterization of recent protests against President Muhammad Morsi’s constitutional declaration as khurouj ’ala wali al-amr and fitna. These (related) charges are grave. I’ve left these terms untranslated below, as they have no immediate English parallel, but they basically amount to “rebellion against the legitimate ruler” and “chaos and discord,” respectively. These ideas were among those deployed by authority-friendly clerics (Egyptian and otherwise) during Egypt’s January 25 Revolution to discourage protesters and discredit their actions as un-Islamic. Qaradawi has now turned them on those organizing and participating in Tuesday’s planned mass protests.
What follows is the most relevant back and forth (33:37 – 34:38):
عثمان عثمان: بالعودة إلى الموضوع المصري، الأخ عمرو نصر يسأل: هل تعدّ ما يحدث في مصر الآن من الدعوة إلى إضراب وتعليق عمل المحاكم والاعتراض على القرارات السياسية لرئيس الجمهورية وحشد الجماهير لذلك، هل يعتبر ذلك نوعاً من أنواع الخروج على ولي الأمر الذي وجب الـ(garbled)
الشيخ يوسف القرضاوي: نعم، هذا نوع من الفتنة، ومن الإفساد في الأرض. أنا أدعو إلى من يريد أن، يعني، يتشاور مع الآخرين، يفتح حوار مع الناس، يتكلّمهن. أما الذين يدعون إلى أن البلد تتوقّف وإن الناس يحارب بعضهم بعضاً وإنه ليس هناك إلا أنّنا نفرض أنفسنا على الآخرين، هذا أمر لا يجوز أبداً. ولا يقبل في لا منطق الشوى لا منطق الديمقراطية ولا أي منطق.
Othman Othman: Returning to the subject of Egypt, Brother Amr Nasr asks: Do you consider what is happening now in Egypt – in terms of a call for a strike, suspension of the functioning of the courts, objection to the political decisions of the president of the republic, and, to that end, assembling for mass action – do you consider that a kind of al-khurouj ’ala wali al-amr who we must (garbled).
Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi: Yes. This is a sort of fitna, of corruption on earth (al-ifsad fil-ardh). I call on those who want to consult with others, open a dialogue with people, speak to them. As for those who are calling for the country to come to a standstill and for people to go to war with each other and that there is nothing left but to impose ourselves on others, this is not at all permissible. It is not acceptable according to the logic of shura, of democracy, of anything.
Elsewhere, Morsi differentiates between those who disagree and those who are obstructionist (10:07 – 10:20):
الشيخ يوسف القرضاوي: أنا لا أمنع الناس تطالب مثلاً بأنّها تتشاور في هذا الأمر، أنّ يكون من حقّهم التشاور، لا بأس. الشورى شيء، ولكن المعارضة لأجل المعارضة…
Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi: I would not stop people from demanding, for example, to be consulted on this issue. Consultation is their right. Of course. Shura is one thing, but opposition for the sake of opposition [is another]…
Other notable passages include this (3:15 – 4:17), in which Qaradawi defends, in general terms, Morsi’s right to issue the constitutional declaration. Later in the program, he goes on to defend the declaration’s individual points on their merits.
الشيخ يوسف القرضاوي: نعم، من حقه أن يفعل ذلك بحكم المسؤولية التي كلّفه الله إياها. هو رئيس مصر. ما معنى رئيس مصر؟ يرأسها بأي شيء؟ يرأسها بأن يتولّى مسؤوليتها. هو مسؤول عن كل فرد فيها. كلّكم راعِ، وكلكم مسؤول عن رعايته – كل واحد مسؤول عن رعايته. فالمسؤولية مسؤولية عامّة، وهذا كلام رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلم. ولذلك، من حقنا أن نسأل لماذا فعلت كذا ولماذا فعلت كذا. الدكتور مرسي أصدر قرارات من أجل الوطن المصري الذي هو رئيسه، والذي هو مسؤول عنه أمام الله وأمام الناس وأمام التاريخ.
Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi: Yes, [Morsi] has the right to do that by virtue of the responsibility with which God has entrusted him. He is the president of Egypt. What does it mean to be president of Egypt? How does he lead? He leads by assuming responsibility for it. He is responsible for everyone in it. All of you are shepherds, and all of you are of the flock – everyone is responsible for those in his care. The responsibility is a public responsibility. This is what the Prophet of God said. So yes, we have the right to ask why you did this or that. Morsi issued resolutions for the sake of the Egyptian nation of which he is the president, and for which he is responsible before God, the people, and history.
Here Qaradawi discusses further the “enemies” of Egypt and the umma and how they aim to sabotage Egypt’s recovery (13:00 – 14:00):
الشيخ يوسف القرضاوي: هناك أناس، طبعاً، لا يهمّهم إن البلد تستقرّ وتبدأ في مرحلة الإنتاج الحقيقي. يريدوا أن تظل البلد في فوضى مستمرة وهؤلاء أعداء هذا البلد، والله العظيم ليسوا مخلصين أبداً. (garbled) الفساد في هذه الديار وهذه الأمّة، وسينتقم الله منهم. لأنّهم لا يرودون الخير لأمّتهم، يريدون أنّهم يشغبوا على الناس لتظل البلاد مضطربة مضطربة، وهذا لا يستفيد منه أحد إلا أعداء الأمّة. الأمّة الحقيقة تريد أن تستقرّ، والاستقرار معناها العمل، والعمل معناه الإناج، والإنتاج معناه النفع العام للجميع! لماذا لا نهيّن لأنفسنا هذا الأمر؟!
Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi: There are people, of course, who aren’t concerned with whether the country becomes stable and begins a new stage of productivity. They want the country to remain in a state of continuous chaos. They are the enemies of this country, by God, they are not righteous at all. (garbled) the corruption in these houses and in this nation (umma), and God will exact retribution from them, because they do not want the best for the nation. They want to stir up discord among people so that the country remains unsettled. Nobody benefits from this except the enemies of the nation. The true nation wants to become stable – stability means work, and work means production, and production means the benefit of all! Why do we not make this easier for ourselves?!
And here Qaradawi dismisses the idea that Egypt’s opposition will be able to rally a million-man protest (milyouniya) on Tuesday (14:13 – 15:44):
الشيخ يوسف القرضاوي: (garbled) مظاهرات مليونية من أعداء الثورة أبداً. لا يستطيعون أن يخرجوا مليونية إطلاقاً. الذين يستطيعون أن يخرجوا المليونيات هم الإسلاميون وأتباعهم من أبناء البلد المخلصين الصادقين. أبناء العمال وأبناء الفلاحين وأبناء المعلّمين وأبناء الأطباء والمحامين. هؤلاء هم الذين يخرجون، الذين يخرجون بمليونيات. الآخرون ليس عندهم مليونيات. أرجوهم أن يكفّوا عن الشغب على الأمة. من أراد أن يناقش الآخرين، يناقش بالحسنة! الباب مفتوح للجميع. ليس هناك، يعني، سلطة مستبدّة، وربّنا أنقذنا، أنقذ هذا البلد من هؤلاء الذين كانوا يتحكّمون فيه ولا يكاد يسمع لأحد! لا يكاد يسمع لنا صوت! ندخل البلد، ويفرض علينا حصار من أوّل من ندخل، ويعني… فأنقذنا الله وأكرمنا بهذه الثورة التي أصبحنا فيها أحرار، سادة أنفسنا! تستطيع أن نقول وأن نفعل …
Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi: There will never be million-man marches by the enemies of the Revolution. They can’t muster a million-man march. The ones who can turn out a million-man march, they are the Islamists and their followers among the righteous, honest sons of the country. Sons of workers and peasants and doctors and lawyers. They are the ones who come out, who attend million-man marches. The others do not have million-man marches. I ask of them to refrain from sowing discord within the nation (umma). Whoever wants to discuss with others, let him discuss with good intentions! The door is open to all. There is no[longer] tyranny. God saved us, saved this country from those who were ruling it, when hardly anyone could be heard! People’s voices were barely heard! As soon as we would enter the country, they would encircle us… So God saved us and graced us with this Revolution in which we became free, our own masters!
[Transcription note: In some cases, the transcription reflects al-Qaradawi’s use of Egyptian dialect instead of more rigid Fusha, particularly on أن/إن and pronoun suffixes.]