The Islamic State Conceptualizes Guerrilla Warfare

Below is a translation of the editorial from issue 236 of the Islamic State’s weekly newsletter al-Naba, in which the group theorizes guerrilla warfare.

In the editorial, the Islamic State offers its membership a religious-jurisprudential justification for hit-and-run guerrilla warfare when they are outmatched conventionally. Though the group’s ultimate goal remains a territorial “state” – akin to what it realized in Syria and Iraq 2014 – it also recognizes the need for extended irregular warfare below that semi-conventional threshold, in order to create conditions appropriate for territorial control. The editorial thus instructs the group’s membership not to attempt to hold and defend territory prematurely, and not to squander manpower and resources. Rather, the editorial makes clear that in the long lead-up to open, semi-conventional warfare, hit-and-run attacks are advisable and entirely legitimate.

The editorial comes as the Islamic State is midway through the third iteration of a global campaign titled “the Raid of Attrition,” and thus synergistically offers religious support for that campaign. (As with the Islamic State’s other announced campaigns, I tend to be skeptical that they amount to anything other than a branding exercise, and a label applied to affiliates’ activities that were already underway.)

As with other instances in which the organization has issued strategic or tactical guidance to its affiliates worldwide, the thinking in this editorial is not hugely novel or inventive – the Islamic State has not necessarily innovated irregular warfare. What the group does seem to have done is compile and synthesize sound foundational ideas, then rationalize them in religious terms. I don’t see any reason to think the group’s tactics derive originally from the religious textual basis in this editorial, as opposed to, say, the accumulated know-how of veterans of the pre-2003 Iraqi military and security forces, or the other diverse militants who have cycled through the Islamic State and the broader transnational jihadist movement over the last several decades. If I had to guess, I would assume the group is mainly finding religious validation for guerrilla warfare fundamentals that it assimilated from other sources.

The editorial’s guidance to avoid the pointless, self-destructive defense of territory seems logical, and consistent with the behavior of Islamic State affiliates globally, including in West Africa and, most recently, Mozambique. On the other hand, that guidance seems inconsistent with the group’s seizure of large sections of territory in Iraq and Syria in 2014, followed by its invitation of an international military intervention against itself and costly, losing defense of that territory, part of a series of decisions that are difficult to explain in retrospect.

Still, the editorial is a further reminder that we shouldn’t assume the Islamic State will imminently attempt a return to territorial control, and that we shouldn’t use that as our measure of the group’s capability. For more on how to gauge the Islamic State’s strength, see my recent Crisis Group commentary, “When Measuring ISIS’s ‘Resurgence’, Use the Right Standard.”

Translation follows:

“Except for one maneuvering for battle, or retreating to [another fighting] company”

Al-Naba, no. 236, 28 May 2020

The mujahid may use every permissible weapon or means of combat to realize the aim of his jihad: the defeat of his enemy, and the establishment of the law of God almighty in the land in which He grants him tamkin [literally “empowerment,” here meaning territorial control and administration.] [The mujahid] works to choose from [those means of combat] that which suits him at every stage, among the stages of his long jihad.

And even if the Islamic State has lost tamkin in most regions, the establishment of religion has not come to a halt, praise be to God, Lord of worlds. For the mujahideen still institute, everywhere, that which their Lord prescribed them, in terms of jihad against the polytheists. And that is – without a doubt – among the highest degrees of enjoining virtue and discouraging vice.

And if the combat of static fronts and marching armies to conquer the country was the appropriate mode of combat for the stage of tamkin, in terms of what it offered of the possibility to control territory and establish God’s law in it, and protect it from the polytheists seizing it and establishing on it their polytheism and unbelief in awesome God; then the style of hit-and-run guerrilla warfare is the most appropriate, without a doubt, for the mujahideen in areas which the polytheists have seized totally and that have come under their dominion.

For the basic aim of guerrilla warfare is realizing the nikayah [injury, vexation] of one’s enemies. This aim is legitimate, if it is understood to be for the sake of God almighty. And glorious God enjoined this, for He said: “Fight them; God will torment them by your hands, humiliate them, and grant you victory over them, and heal the breasts of believers” (Quran 9:14). Nikayah is accomplished by killing, injuring and capturing them, as well as capturing their wealth or destroying it.

Thus, the [guerrilla] bands of mujahideen focus their efforts on dealing the greatest possible losses to the enemy, in terms of lives and wealth; while they are diligent not to offer more than the minimum possible losses [in their own ranks], in terms of lives and wealth. To the contrary, they work to increase their stock of both. To the extent those two conditions are realized, their nikayah of the enemy continues, such that the enemy grows weaker, and [these bands] grow stronger, until the conditions become appropriate to transition from the stage of guerrilla warfare to other stages necessary to realize tamkin in the land.

These blessed [guerrilla] bands, at their inception, are not tasked with holding territory, because that is beyond their capacity. Nor are [they tasked with] holding their ground against the enemy in battles in which they think they do not have superiority. That is because the mujahideen in those areas are typically few in number and weak in means, and they do not possess territory in which to organize their affairs, and to which their supporters can mass. They face an enemy holding territory, large in number and materiel, and prepared to crush any indication of activity by the mujahideen – to eradicate them and prevent their plant from growing and standing upright on its stalk, such that it might fasten its roots in the ground and its branches might tower in the sky, leaving [the enemy] weak and defeated before it.

Given the [mujahideen’s] condition, they do not need to burden themselves beyond their capacity, and to hold territory for the sake of tamkin when they are a weak few, and their enemy is greater than them by hundreds or, sometimes, thousands of times. For their almighty Lord has permitted them to turn their backs and flee to safety, then return to attack anew at the time and place that permits them to realize the nikayah of [their enemy], and superiority over him, and then to return to hiding once more before [the enemy] can converge on them and harm them. This is the type of maneuver in battle in which the Lord of worlds permitted the believers to turn their backs in war. For the Almighty said: “O you believers, when you meet those who disbelieve marching [into battle], do not turn your backs to them For whoever turns his back to them on that day – except for one maneuvering for battle, or retreating to [another fighting] company – has incurred God’s wrath, and his abode is Hell, a miserable fate” (Quran 8:15-16). The Imam Tabari, may God have mercy on him, said: “‘Except for one maneuvering for battle,’ says, ‘Except for one going on to fight his enemy, and who requires a weakness from [his enemy] that he might strike, and then descend upon him” (Jami’ al-Bayyan). And the Imam Baghawi, may God have mercy on him, said: “Any juncture at which he sees [it incumbent on] himself to retreat, when his aim is to seek a moment of inattentiveness, so that he might attack” (Ma’alim al-Tanzil). Thus, he, the mujahid, believes he will be defeated in battle opposite his enemy, so he retreats from opposite [that enemy] to avoid losses, with the intent of descending upon [the enemy] when he sees in himself strength and in his enemy weakness.

And so, the soldiers of the Islamic State must focus their efforts on attriting their enemy as much as possible at this stage, and not preoccupy themselves with rushing to realize tamkin in the land. For it is the inevitable result of their jihad – with the permission of God almighty – which will be realized for them soon, and the reason for its realization is that which now occupies them, this fighting and nikayah of the enemies of religion.

By “attrition,” we do not mean merely weakening the enemy until we compel him to withdraw from some territory, so that we might seize it and enjoy tamkin in it. Rather, we aim to deliver [the enemy] to a state in which his bleeding brings him to the point of destruction, or to exhaust him to such a great degree that he can only muster the strength to rise up and fight us again after a long time, during which we have prepared to repel him and break his power. [We aim for] his costly war with us to sow desperation and despair of victory in his heart and mind, such that he views our victory over him in any possible confrontation as a fait accompli, something inescapable.

So raid your enemies constantly, o soldiers of the State of Islam. Do not come to them except in their moment of inattentiveness, so they do not gain from you what they covet: pushing you into a [head-on] confrontation in a circumstance that is better for them than for you. And safeguard your capital – your men, and your arms – and do not hazard it, so that your profits continue and increase over time, with the permission of God almighty. For we are at an act of worship, in which God almighty has not charged us with what is beyond our capacity, and for which He did not constrain us in terms of time. God does not charge any soul except with what is within its ability, praise be to God, Lord of worlds.

Islamic State: Substantial, continuous "returns"

Below is another translation from issue 192 of the Islamic State’s weekly newsletter al-Naba, this time the latest in a series of columns on operational guidance titled “Take Care.”

This seems notable in terms of how it presents a sort of Unified Theory of operations, conceptualizing Islamic State units’ modal shift from high-volume rudimentary violence to more sophisticated attacks, to in-between hybrid approaches, depending on that unit’s capability and circumstance. The column adopts the figurative language of “returns,” in discussing how best to balance and diversify an Islamic State detachment’s portfolio of violence. The thinking here seems to apply to ground-level insurgency as much as to external operations globally.

It’s unknown to what extent this sort of thinking is communicated through the Islamic State’s ranks globally, or guides the organization’s day-to-day operations. What we can say, though, is that elements in Islamic State’s central apparatus have evidently put some thought into when and how the group steps up and down its operational ladder, and they want to communicate that thought to al-Naba‘s Islamic State readership.

Translation follows:

Take Care 8: Planning for Action and the Constraints of Reality

Al-Naba, no. 192, 25 July 2019

For the mujahideen, the subject of target selection depends on a number of issues. They include those related to [the mujahideen], such as the importance of the target to them and the possibility of executing against it; and those related to the enemy, such as the importance of the target to him, and the extend of the damage to him through targeting it.

On this basis, the mujahideen are often faced with numerous options when devising the battle plan on which they will depend to exhaust their enemy before eventually destroying him, with the permission of God Almighty.

The most important of these options:

First: Concentrating on operations that are small-scale, numerous and widespread, abandoning large-scale operations given their difficulty in execution and their costs.

Second: Concentrating on operations that are large-scale, few and focused in terms of their target, and neglecting small operations given their limited return and weak impact.

Between these two opposing options, we find middle options, the most important of which are:

Third: Concentrating on continuous small operations, while constantly searching for important targets to strike when possible.

Fourth: Concentrating on large targets, even if they are few, without leaving any opportunity to strike the enemy with small operations.

Fifth: Working without focus, in order to strike the enemy wherever possible, with small or large operations.

Work at the Outset

Generally, we can say that the mujahideen’s choice of any of these options is subject to internal conditions related to the situation of the mujahideen, in terms of organization, means and targets; and external conditions, related to the situation of their enemy, in terms of his strength and empowerment.

So when the mujahid detachment is small in size, weak in means and primitive in terms of its members’ ability to plan and execute, with the goal of continuing and developing its work until destroying the enemy entirely and realizing tamkin (empowerment) on the ground; and when its enemy is strong and empowered on the ground, then it will be in [the detachment’s] interest to begin its work by pursuing the first option.

If the goal of the detachment is limited to producing the maximum damage to the enemy, and the enemy is strong and empowered, such that the mujahideen assume they will not be able to continue executing attacks for long, then it is best for them to pursue the second option.

This is what we see typically in the operations of mujahideen detachments or their members working in Crusader countries. They take into account the difficulty of withdrawing from the site of the attack after executing, or the difficulty of continuing to execute consecutive attacks given their exposure to the enemy, and so they operating according to this option in line with the means available, most importantly the weapons required and [their] ability to deliver them to the site of the attack. Thus, we see them vary between using knives, in attacks that leave few dead and wounded in the Crusaders’ ranks, with a limited psychological and propaganda impact; and large, coordinated attacks using explosives and firearms, which leave major losses – material and human – in the Crusaders’ ranks, and have a major media echo.

If the detachment is strong – in that its members possess the expertise necessary to carry out large operations, even if it is weak in numbers and means – then it can also follow the second option, in order to achieve swift growth for itself, as large operations draw the eyes and hearts of local supporters faster. This is what the Islamic State did when it first entered Syria, as it was limited at the start to a few expert brothers with a small number of local supporters with limited expertise. Thus, work started with large attacks concentrated on the key junctures of the Nuseiri [derog., Alawite] regime, which help earn notoriety for the detachment, ‘Jabhat al-Nusrah,’ and encourage tens, then hundreds of muhajireen and ansar [foreign fighters and locals] to join it, especially after they learned it answered to the Islamic State.

Similarly, Sheikh Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and his brothers followed this option at the start of their fight against the invading Crusader forces in Iraq. These larger operations that the mujahideen executed against the United Nations and the Crusaders’ embassies and barracks helped earn them widespread notoriety, which overshadowed that of all the factions present in that arena. That encouraged the muhajireen and ansar to join Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, especially after it became clear to them that its creed was based on monotheism and its program was based on jihad on the path of God until the establishment of religion and the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate.

Work in Advanced Stages 

After the detachment grows, in quantity and quality – such that it becomes reasonably numerous, making it difficult to eliminate it totally, and likewise its material means and its members’ technical capabilities grow, in terms of expertise at planning and executing attacks – then it is harmful for the group to limit itself to one of these two options (the first and second). Limiting itself to the first means letting slip these larger attacks with a major impact on the enemy, despite its ability to execute them; and limiting itself to the second leads to freezing a major part of its members and means, as it is not possible to mobilize all of that to execute major operations, which are typically few in number, thus afflicting the detachment with inactivity.

Thus, it is better for [the detachment] to transition to one of the middle options (the third or fourth), by dividing the detachment into two sections:

The first [section] relies on quantity, including mujahideen with limited expertise, spread widely, who can carry out [attacks] in quantitatively large numbers and over a wide geographic range. That leads, in aggregate, to achieving a major return through the sum total of their attacks, not with some of them individually. They are akin to vendors at intersections, who sell small quantities of goods that realize a relatively small return for them, but – if we combine all their returns – add up to a substantial aggregate return.

The second [section] relies on quality, including mujahideen with expertise, capable of planning, managing and executing major attacks that bring a substantial, raised return to the mujahideen, and large losses for their enemies. They are akin to wholesalers, who realize a large return from each deal, one that might equal or exceed the gain of hundreds of sales conducted by their clients over the long term.

By combining the two options, it is possible to employ a major part of the detachment in a plan of action that prevents inactivity, and achieves returns that are continuous over time and large in terms of aggregate operations, distributed over the work’s spread and expanse, and that help capacitate and train the mujahideen to fight and acquire substantial working expertise. At the same time, [these operations] permit major quantitative and qualitative leaps in the course of the jihad, by achieving substantial damage and losses for the enemy in material, human, psychological and media terms; and major returns for the mujahideen, in terms of material spoils and attracting new mujahideen for recruitment and work within the detachment.

As for the fifth option, the mujahid detachment typically follows it in instances of a weak apparatus of command, control and communications, such that the detachment’s command orders its members to work according to what is possible; or in emergency cases, in which the mujahideen find themselves forced to strike the enemy with everything available in order to preoccupy him so as not to resist some important action by the mujahideen, or to scramble his offensive or defense movements against them; or just to strike his stability at a particular time. Thus, the detachment’s command orders its members to work to the utmost extent, without consideration for any constraints to divide the work, or plan over the long term.

We notice that the Islamic State’s policy towards operations in Crusader countries oscillates between the third and fifth options. Indeed, it called on Muslims there to attack what targets they could strike, with what weapons were available, to achieve the greatest possible losses in the Crusaders’ ranks. That was in light of the difficulty of controlling and directing the mujahideen’s operations there, and the danger of communicating with them about this. Thus, they were expected to execute small, continuous operations, with the possibility that some of them might be able to carry out large operations.

At the same time, though, when [the Islamic State] has sent trained detachments prepared to execute attacks, it has pushed these detachments to execute major attacks in terms of their targets, the way of executing the attacks against them, and the losses expected from striking them.

[The Islamic State] has thus achieved continuous returns from the attacks of lone mujahideen and detachments that are small in size, limited in expertise, and weak in preparation. Even though the returns of each of their attacks have been relatively limited, they have nonetheless, in aggregate, been large, approaching the substantial returns of the qualitative operations that the Islamic State’s soldiers have carried out in the past few years.

Despite all that, we know that it is beneficial for the mujahideen to liberate themselves from the constraints with which they can restrict their work sometimes, and to build their plans on the basis of their [local] reality, their means and their targets, and on the reality of their enemy and his means and targets, as well as for them to rely on God Almighty in executing what they have set their minds on, for what a blessed Patron and Helper He is.

Islamic State: "In the eyes of his enemies an army of heroes..."

Below is a translation of the editorial from issue 192 of the Islamic State’s weekly newsletter al-Naba. The editorial – which is presumably aimed at the Islamic State’s core supporters, including militants active in the field – takes a derisive tone on Iraqi security forces’ pursuit of Islamic State fighters, and emphasizes the futility and emptiness of their efforts. Per the editorial, Iraqi forces’ energetic operations are driven by their fear of once more ceding the country’s countryside to the insurgent group, allowing it to reorganize and penetrate Iraq’s cities. Islamic State militants must therefore cultivate that fear and recall the divine reward awaiting them, even as they now live as fugitives.

Set aside the editorial’s posturing: It’s worth noting the editorial seemingly indicates an understanding of the complementary logics of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Its authors describe, correctly, why Iraqi forces and their international partners are working to keep up pressure on Islamic State insurgents with operations like “Will of Victory,” thus preventing the group’s small units from coalescing and organizing more dangerous attacks.

The editorial is also an apparent acknowledgement that, for the Islamic State’s insurgents in Iraq, times are hard, albeit spiritually rewarding. It seems to admit that Islamic State militants are ragged and hungry, even if their enemies think they’re “an army of heroes on the verge of storming cities anew.” For the Islamic State, stoking fears of its resurgence (for example) is evidently a deliberate strategic choice, even as the group’s ambitions, for now, may not rise far beyond continued insurgent survival.

Translation follows:

Indeed, God does not waste the reward of the good

Al-Naba, no. 192, 25 July 2019

Before the conquest of Mosul, Iraq’s Rafidhah [derog., Shi’a] would persistently muster thousands from their army and police to march in the Anbar desert and Badiyat al-Jazirah searching for the Islamic State’s camps and its soldiers’ hiding places. These columns were huge, sometimes reaching hundreds of armored vehicles. They move like parades, while, really, all their soldiers hoped for was not to happen on any mujahid whom they might be forced to engage. These campaigns would usually end with a photo of their commanders at the bottom of a ravine or near the wreckage of a village, which let them claim that the remains indicated the Islamic State’s soldiers had passed by that day.

Typically the rapture of those empty parades would come to an end with a calamity befalling the apostates, far from the locales of their supposed victories, as the mujahideen’s security detachments surprised them with powerful blows in the most fortified areas inside Baghdad, Mosul, Samarra, Kirkuk and Baqouba. They would awake once more from their beautiful dreams to horrible nightmares that would bring down their security and military commanders, force them to reorder their forces and reorganize their formations, then take off once more into the desert towards some new dream of a conclusive victory over the Islamic State.

Someone considering these campaigns, which the Rawafidh [derog., Shi’a] have repeated today at an even greater pace and scale, will find they are a ruse by the incapable and the choice of someone with no other option. The alternative is for them to sit in their bases and barracks waiting for shells and missiles to fall on them, or for [explosive] charges and ambushes to cut their roads. At the same time, these campaigns represent for them one form of the control on the ground they are working to preserve, as, by halting [these campaigns], these areas in which the Islamic State’s soldiers move today would become effectively fallen militarily. The apostates would become encircled in the urban areas they are attempting to secure, which would turn little by little into fortresses, for fear that the Islamic State might storm them once more. Likewise, what the Rawafidh and their Crusader allies fear most today is that the mujahideen now spread out shift from the mode of small bands carrying out military attacks with limited force to the mode of semi-conventional formations that can – with the permission of God Almighty – carry out coordinated, medium-size or even large operations, in terms of their range and the nature of their targets. Through these ongoing campaigns, therefore, they are attempting to keep the mujahideen in a state of constant movement and dispersal, by continuously pursuing them and preventing them from establishing long-term settlements by searching for and destroying [those positions]; in that way, they pressure [the mujahideen] to prevent them from receiving large numbers of nafirin [incoming, newly mobilised fighters], especially in areas of operation surrounding cities and main roads. And so we find that no sooner do the Rawafidh today hear of a tent pitched in the desert than they move columns to it to confirm that those sheltering in it are not among the Caliphate’s soldiers. No sooner does a spy tell them that he saw some people in a remote, mountainous area than they launch a sweeping campaign on it, for fear that [those people] might be among the Islamic State’s mujahideen. This terror is not the exclusive to the Rawafidh in Iraq, rather – praise to God Almighty – it pervades the souls of infidels and apostates everywhere. Since the announcement of the Caliphate, they have been in a state of constant alert, one that their supposed announcements of final victory over the Islamic State have not ended, for they know, before others, that [these announcements] are nothing but vain lies.

And so, the Islamic State’s mujahideen ought to rejoice at this great blessing from their Lord Almighty, that He has made the continued existence of their raised banner a source of wrath and fear and panic, and a reason for the infidels’ attrition, exhaustion and constant movement. What they instill in the hearts of God’s enemies is all jihad on the path of God Almighty, for which they will be rewarded with good deeds through which their belief will grow and which will disavow their ill deeds and elevate their [divine] status. Perhaps they pay this no mind, given the height of their morale and their aspiration to what is higher and greater than these deeds, and more damaging and deadlier to the enemies of God, Lord of Worlds. How could they, when added to that is hunger, fear, concern and sorrow they encounter, even as they hold fast to their religion, gripping their monotheism. As God Almighty said: “It was not becoming for the people of Medinah and those Bedouins around it not to follow God’s Messenger, nor to prefer their own souls over his. For they are not afflicted by thirst, fatigue or hunger on the path on God, nor do they tread a path that enrages the infidels, nor do they gain at the enemy’s expense, but that a righteous deed is recorded for them. Indeed, God does not waste the reward of the good. They do not spend anything, small or large, nor cross a valley, but that it is recorded for them that God might reward them with the best of what they have done (9:120, 9:121).”

[The mujahideen] must be confident that they are, with God’s permission, made victorious by their Lord with terror and with what He wishes from His soldiers. For many a mujahid grown weak, with little aid, unable to afford ammunition, with the Crusaders’ planes hovering overhead and surrounded by masses of apostates, may be in his own eyes put-upon, a fugitive; but in the eyes of his enemies an army of heroes on the verge of storming cities anew, their spirits broken before him, unable to hold fast in the face of his fierce, terrifying advance. So let [the mujahideen] work to further frighten their enemies, and to terrify them more, and let them endure what they encounter on the path of God Almighty. For what is all their work but worship, and what is its fruit but the best [reward] and more. For their Lord Almighty said: “And say, ‘Act! For God will see your work, as will his Prophet and the believers. And you will be returned to the Knower of the Unseen and the Seen, and He will inform you of what you used to do (9:105).”

Tahrir al-Sham's Abu al-Yaqadhan al-Masri: "The coming days are pregnant with surprises."

Below is a 17 September Telegram post from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham shar’i Abu al-Yaqadhan al-Masri, one of a number of Tahrir al-Sham officials/media personalities who have reacted unfavorably to the announcement of a new Turkish-Russian deal for Syria’s Idlib. province.

Addressing the press after bilateral talks Monday, Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin announced a memorandum of understanding meant to stabilize the Idlib “de-escalation zone.” Critically, the memorandum stipulates the creation of a de-militarized buffer zone along northwest Syria’s rebel-government line of contact, to be jointly policed by Russia and Turkey. Rebels’ heavy weaponry will be removed from the zone, which is also to be cleared of (per Putin) “Jabhat al-Nusrah” (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham).

Like other Tahrir al-Sham figures, Abu al-Yaqadhan is not amicable to disarmament; he and his comrades portray their weapons as integrally to their dignity and continued jihad. Abu al-Yaqadhan may be particularly hardcore, among Tahrir al-Sham’s public-facing figures. He previously stirred controversy by apparently licensing Tahrir al-Sham fighters to shoot uncooperative rebel rivals in the head and take a relaxed approach to civilian collateral damage. But he is by no means alone among Tahrir al-Sham personalities who have voiced hostility to the Sochi agreement. Whether their snap reactions represent Tahrir al-Sham’s collective position remains to be seen. The initial response to the Sochi deal from the group’s official media outlet has been negative.

Abu al-Yaqadhan’s Telegram post:

Sham the Revealer

For the continuation of the jihad and the rule of shari’ah, the way forward is striking necks.

Whoever asks you to surrender your weapon, he deserves most to be fought, ahead of others.

Whoever retreats from his slogans of ‘continuing the fight until the regime is toppled’ and surrenders his weapon, he is a hypocrite #frog*.

Whoever manufactures problems to eliminate the mujahid factions to advance the Sochi agreement, he is a traitor [intelligence] agent.

The coming days are pregnant with surprises, so prepare for epic battles.

* Note: “Frog” (difda’) is a Syrian opposition neologism for someone who flips to join the government loyalist camp, after Kafrbatna (East Ghouta) sheikh Bassam al-Difda’, a particularly well-publicized recent example.

Source: Abu al-Yaqadhan al-Masri, Telegram

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni on Idlib protests: "Brothers, a very important issue..."

Below are translations of two voice recordings purported to be of Tahrir al-Sham emir “Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni,” via anti-Jabhat al-Nusrah/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group “JAN Violations.” The voice messages are notable for their apparently acute sensitivity to the optics of Idlib’s protests and those protests’ portrayal in foreign media, which Abu Ikrimah sees as directly linked to action against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Abu Ikrimah coaches his Tahrir al-Sham audience on flexibility and subtlety in dealing with protesters in order to avoid embarrassing anti-Tahrir al-Sham scenes.

Idlib is primed today for another Friday of protests against a Syrian military offensive on the province. But Tahrir al-Sham seemingly recognizes that those protests can be turned against it, either spontaneously or by outside hands.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emir Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni, voice message 1: “Brothers, a very important issue: We don’t want it to be come out in the Western media that the people opposes us, and that the people brought down our banner and stomped on it. Pay attention: If the banner is raised, there will be people placed just to pull away the banner and stomp on it. And it will appear in the Western media that they stomped on the Hayah’s banner. This is a big issue, brothers. It means that the battle will be against us, in the future. They’ll say that the people is ready now to announce the battle in these protests. Because these protests are what, the people, the public. If the people and the public pull away our banner in front of the media and stomp on it, that means the battle is ready against us now.”

Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni, voice message 2: “Peace and God’s blessings be upon you, something very important to say: Coordinate with those responsible for these protests and say to them, ‘We’re with you, your brothers, and whatever you need, we’ll walk with you. And for your protection.’ Talking is free, brothers. Why not speak to them kindly. They’ll say, ‘God reward you, we don’t need anything.’ Tell them, ‘Okay, we’ll walk with you. We’re Muslims, too, and we demand the toppling of the regime.’”

Original tweet/audio:

هذا ماقاله المدعو أبو عكرمة الأردني أحد أمراء هيئة تحرير الشام
فما رأيك؟!#JNV pic.twitter.com/BQSt7gIOD0

— انتهاكات جبهة النصرة (@JAN_Violations) September 13, 2018

Sina'at al-Fikr: "The mujahideen at this stage shouldn’t defend according to the principle, 'Until the last man, and the last bullet.'"

Below is how I think Hayat Tahrir al-Sham may now be fighting the Syrian regime’s forces, as the latter push deeper into rebel-held Idlib. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham seems not to be mounting a valiant, heels-dug-in last stand, but rather a fighting, attritive retreat paired with asymmetric insurgent tactics.

The text I’ve translated is a set of posts from a Telegram account called “Sina’at al-Fikr” (Producing Thought), which, per one description, is a channel for “programmatic guidance in order to produce right-minded consciousness.” In practice, it seems to function as a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-aligned outlet that offers short pieces of ideological and strategic advice and instruction, like a sort of jihadist think tank publishing in bite-sized installments. (There are several Sina’at al-Fikr accounts currently on Telegram. The one that is currently active and being referred to by other accounts describes itself as a reserve account.)

These posts were originally from May 2017, but they’ve recently been published again, both by the current Sina’at al-Fikr account on 17 January 2018 and by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham media official Muhammad Nazzal (Abu Khattab al-Maqdisi) on 17 and 23 January 2018. They come in the wake of Tahrir al-Sham’s loss of the eastern Idlib countryside – including the Abu al-Dhuhour airbase – and amid complaints from other opposition constituencies about Tahrir al-Sham’s successive retreats ahead of the regime’s ongoing offensive.

If the thinking outlined below is what’s behind Tahrir al-Sham’s repeated withdrawals and its judicious use of manpower and resources in defense of insurgent-held territory, I think it’s probably the smart move for the group. As Tahrir al-Sham itself apparently recognizes, it can’t prevail in open battle with the regime and its allies, particularly against Russian airpower.

But the smart strategic move for Tahrir al-Sham – which is probably better equipped than other factions to resort to a rural insurgency – is not good for Idlib’s other, locally grounded rebel factions, or for civilians.

When Sina’at al-Fikr tells “the mujahideen” they shouldn’t aim “to prevent the enemy from reaching the areas he wants” – those “areas he wants” are cities like Saraqib and the provincial capital Idlib, where civilian Idlibis live. Realistically, there’s probably no way to defend these areas. But Tahrir al-Sham’s strategic shift means these cities and towns’ civilian residents will need to run, or otherwise fend for themselves.

Translation follows. (Note: The repeated ellipses are in the original Arabic.)

Sina’at al-Fikr, 17 May 2017:

“The most important tactics the mujahideen need to adopt at this stage of the Syrian jihad:

“In the event the regime launches military campaigns, then generally any defense ought not be meant to prevent the enemy from reaching the areas he wants… But, instead, to make his arrival there extremely costly… And attritive in the full meaning of the word.

“That is because the enemy still enjoys a military strength that enables him to reach any point he wants… So, the mujahideen at this stage shouldn’t defend according to the principle, ‘Until the last man, and the last bullet,’ rather according to the principle, ‘The greatest loss for the enemy.’ Let [the mujahideen] raise, to the maximum extent, the price the enemy pays… In terms of the lives of his soldiers and his military material… In order to reach the point he wants.

“That’s in the first defensive stage… Then let [the mujahideen] raise, to the maximum extent, the price the enemy pays to remain in that area he sought after…

“This is the tactic to which we need to be attentive:
– Booby-trapping and rigging before retreating, which makes the enemy lose dearly before taking any military point.
– Sniping and flanking maneuvers, which mean heavy losses for the enemy when he’s charging in.
– Inghimasi [suicide commando] groups that assault the enemy continuously while he mans his positions.

“Offensive tactics at this stage:

“They need to be premised on implementation with precision, speed, and discipline to avoid aerial efforts… Which may, when they’re present, result in serious losses in the ranks of the mujahideen.”

War on the Rocks: "America in Search of an Un-Geneva for Syria"

For War on the Rocks, I’ve written a companion piece to my recent Century Foundation commentary on America’s re-investment in Syria’s Geneva talks. In this latest, I try to answer: If Geneva won’t secure U.S. interests in Syria, what will?

“America in Search of an Un-Geneva for Syria”

I argue America shouldn’t count on Geneva, or on any national-level processes – negotiations over the whole of Syria or control of Syria’s center in Damascus – that have been thoroughly colonized by Russia.

Instead, the United States should invest in subnational processes focusing on Syria’s southwest and northeast. It’s at this level where America has more useful influence relative to Russia, and where there might be a genuine intersection of U.S. and Russian interests.

Perspectives on Terrorism: "The Strategic Logic of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham"

New paper from me, for a special al-Qaeda-focused issue of Perspectives on Terrorism:

“The Strategic Logic of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham”

For this issue, I wrote on the strategic thinking behind the 2017 establishment of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the latest iteration of former Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah. To frame that logic, I relied on the work of political scientist Peter Krause and his “Movement Structure Theory.” Krause’s theory is useful in describing the dynamics of northwest Syria’s insurgency and the rationale for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s project of intra-insurgent hegemony, as the group itself articulated it. The paper hopefully sheds light on Tahrir al-Sham’s priorities and prospects, as well as avenues for building on Krause’s work.

This paper was originally prepared for a September conference in Oslo organized by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), in cooperation with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the full issue of Perspectives on Terrorism, including other papers by a fairly heavy-duty assortment of researchers, see: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot

The Century Foundation: "Syrian Humanitarian 'Lifeline' Goes to Vote"

Today at The Century Foundation, I have a new report on the stakes of Tuesday’s expected vote to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2165 – the international legal mandate for Syria’s cross-border humanitarian response.

“Syrian Humanitarian ‘Lifeline’ Goes to Vote”

For months, humanitarians and donors have been anxious over the renewal of UNSCR 2165. On Tuesday, December 19, the Security Council is expected to finally vote on what a top UN relief official has called a “lifeline” for Syrians in need.

Most of the Security Council backs renewal of UNSCR 2165, which they argue is purely humanitarian. But the resolution also has clear political implications, insofar as cross-border aid without the permission of Syria’s Assad regime has been a potent symbol of Syria’s broken sovereignty.

And only one vote really matters: Russia’s. Russia has said UNSCR 2165 was an emergency response to conditions that no longer exist and that the resolution should be phased out. No one really knows whether Russia will ultimately opt for renewal, or what concessions it wants in exchange.

Of the more than a dozen humanitarians and donor-country diplomats who spoke to me ahead of the vote, most thought the resolution would be renewed – this time.

But even though a renewal will save lives, it’s also only a temporary reprieve. As the Assad regime returns from the brink, an international system premised on state sovereignty is likewise reasserting itself. In that normal international order, it’s tough to imagine a place for something exceptional like UNSCR 2165 – and without that exception, there’s no good alternative means to help millions of Syrians.

The Century Foundation: "Geneva Talks Will Not Salvage U.S. Syria Policy"

At The Century Foundation, I’ve written about America’s reinvestment in Geneva peace talks and how – as I understand it – Russia is simultaneously managing Geneva and its own set of parallel processes.

“Geneva Talks Will Not Salvage U.S. Syria Policy”

Washington is now counting on Geneva to tie together the disparate strings of U.S. policy in Syria. It’s not going to work. Geneva is structurally broken, and no amount of American enthusiasm will fix that.

Geneva won’t make U.S. Syria policy make sense, and it won’t lead to a political settlement Washington actually likes. If these talks produce anything at all, that thing will be made to Russian specifications. So America needs to ask itself – is that what it wants?

The Century Foundation: "Turkey Through the Syrian Looking Glass"

For The Century Foundation (originally published November 28):

“Turkey Through the Syrian Looking Glass”

More than a month after Turkey’s intervention to enforce a “de-escalation” in Syria’s Idlib province, there’s still little clarity on exactly what Turkey is doing in Syria.

That might be deliberate, because Turkey’s deployment is – as best as I can tell – based on an unpalatable deal with the jihadists who control Idlib. To secure Turkish interests and safeguard at least some of Idlib’s residents, Turkey seems to be working with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the successor to Syria’s former al-Qaeda affiliate.

By engaging Tahrir al-Sham mostly Syrian leadership, Turkey may be working to flush the northwest of transnational, al-Qaeda-loyal jihadists . Or, less charitably, it may just be looking after Turkish concerns and collaborating with the local partner closest at hand.

Either way, the Turkish move into Idlib is risky, both in terms of its slim chances and Turkey’s reputation. But it may also be the only way to avert a battle for Idlib that would be disastrous for millions of civilians.

War on the Rocks: "What an Unfolding Humanitarian Disaster in a U.S.-Protected Enclave Tells Us About American Strategy in Syria"

New from me today on War on the Rocks:

“What an Unfolding Humanitarian Disaster in a U.S.-Protected Enclave Tells Us About American Strategy in Syria”

The American base in Tanaf, in Syria’s southeastern desert, has taken on outsized political import. It was originally meant to be a staging ground for a southern prong of the counter-ISIS military campaign. Then, for a brief, overheated moment, it was supposedly where America would block an Iranian “land bridge.” Now it is a symbol of Washington’s refusal to yield to Syrian, Iranian, and Russia pressure and, in theory, key leverage on Damascus and its allies.

But on the ground – below the cloud of geopolitical intrigue and the U.S. military’s defense of Tanaf – the base is tangled up with the Rukban camp. Rukban is an improvised, squalid settlement between the earth berms marking the Syrian and Jordanian border that is home to 50,000 displaced people, among them the families of America’s local Syrian partners. The “deconfliction” zone around Tanaf is all that protects Rukban from a Syrian regime advance.

The United States has taken ownership of the Tanaf zone, including Rukban. And Rukban’s residents are miserable and hungry. The United States and its allies have been unable to convince the Jordanians to allow a new delivery of assistance to Rukban’s residents, just over the border berm from Jordan. Now America has to appeal for a cross-line aid delivery via Damascus, pending the approval of a regime that has weaponized humanitarian access.

The whole thing is a farce.

Rukban is an embarrassment, as well as a lesson in America’s ability to bend Syria and the region to its strategic ambitions. Before Washington wants to start marshaling its allies towards big geopolitical ends, it should start by convincing Jordan to allow a crane drop of tarps, blankets, and food into Rukban.

World Politics Review: "What Will a Post-ISIS Political Order in Syria Actually Look Like?"

New from me for World Politics Review:

“What Will a Post-ISIS Political Order in Syria Actually Look Like?”

The United States and its Coalition allies never had a real political vision for a post-ISIS Syria. Now the country’s post-ISIS political order will be defined by the ground reality of how, militarily, ISIS lost.

The Century Foundation: "Saving America's Syrian Ceasefire"

My latest for The Century Foundation:

“Saving America’s Syrian Ceasefire”

I went to Jordan in September to get a sense of one of America’s last major policy efforts in Syria: the “de-escalation” agreement covering Syria’s southwest. The de-escalation is the product of months of trilateral negotiations between the United States, Russia, and Jordan. So far it has yielded a clear reduction in violence – but its future is uncertain.

Beyond immediate practical steps like a ceasefire and, potentially, the reopening of a key border crossing with Jordan, the agreement seems not to outline any real future or political vision for Syria’s south – no one knows what comes next, and the mood in Amman is uneasy. Meanwhile, a separate U.S. government decision to cut off arms and salaries to southern rebels late this year threatens to destabilize the de-escalation. The move raises more questions about U.S. commitment to the south and its neighboring allies’ security.

The de-escalation seems worth saving, but it’s going to mean more work. It’s going to require the sort of forward-looking institutional groundwork that positions the south for successful reintegration into the Syrian state – not just dissolution and piecemeal “reconciliation” by the regime. And in the meantime, someone has to step in pay these fighters’ salaries, or the south’s going to go haywire.

Tahrir al-Sham official on Turkey's intervention to implement Astana: "That’s not the reality."

Below is a translation of a 13 October Telegram post by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (previously Jabhat al-Nusrah) media official Muhammad Nazzal (“Abu Khattab al-Maqdisi”).

This post represents the purest distillation I’ve seen of how Hayat Tahrir al-Sham seems to be justifying the limited entrance of Turkish forces in the northern Idlib/western Aleppo countryside, including the various pragmatic considerations at work and the mutually agreed-upon, explicit conditions of the Turkish presence.

What Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has agreed to, per Nazzal and other prominent Tahrir al-Sham figures, would seem not to satisfy the expected terms of a tripartite Turkish-Iranian-Russian agreement in Astana. Nazzal is emphatic that Turkey is taking up positions opposite the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Afrin, an enclave north of the insurgent-held northwest, and not deploying further south to police the line of contact between Tahrir al-Sham and the Assad regime. It’s tough to imagine how this would address the concerns of Turkey’s co-guarantors in Astana – unless there is another big shoe to drop, one these Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leaders don’t know about or won’t acknowledge. Nazzal’s contention is that when the Turks claim to be implementing the Astana de-escalation, they’re basically just fudging it.

These sorts of claims from Tahrir al-Sham only raise more questions about a Turkish intervention that is, frankly, bizarre. For a NATO member state to enter Syria with an armed escort from a sort-of al-Qaeda affiliate is, um, non-standard. It currently seems impossible to say how far Turkey’s intervention will go, or where it will end. Maybe Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani has deceived his own rank-and-file about the scope of his agreement with Turkey, or maybe Turkey plans to unilaterally amend or abrogate the terms of the agreement it’s reached with Tahrir al-Sham. If the deal between Turkey and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is less explicit or mutually understood than Nazzal says, then an armed showdown between the two is likely on the way, whatever the Turkish government has claimed publicly about a non-combat observer mission.

And if Turkey and Tahrir al-Sham turn on each other and this does get violent, then – as Nazzal makes clear at the start – Tahrir al-Sham has options.

Translation and original post follow, below the jump.

Jabhat al-Nusrah/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham media official Muhammad Nazzal (“Abu Khattab al-Maqdisi”), 13 October 2017:

“If it happens – and this is possible – that Turkey betrays [us] after entering the liberated territories, it won’t make any difference. Anyone who thinks repelling a cross-border Turkish invasion with one long defensive line makes military sense is mistaken. Even if there were an invasion – without this latest [Turkish] entrance – you wouldn’t deal with it just by facing it with a defensive line. Rather, that would be part of it, but the larger, stronger, and more important part would be inside the liberated territories. That’s if it happened, God forbid…

“And anyone who draws an equivalency between allowing the Turks to enter as part of a clear, explicitly drafted agreement to assume three military positions opposite these Kurdish militias and a full [Turkish] invasion, which would lead to grave ills, is likewise mistaken.

“No one says that the Turks’ entrance to these points is some desirable interest; rather, it’s the lesser of two evils. And none of what is now happening involves the implementation of the Astana agreement on the ground, as some are trying to depict it.

“Yes, Turkey wants to show to Russia and others that it’s implementing what they emerged with from Astana. But that’s not the reality.

“Likewise, drawing an equivalency between the Hayah and Ahrar [al-Sham] on the grounds that the Hayah did an injustice to Ahrar and aggressed on it because of Astana – just Astana – is also incorrect. Everyone knows what happened, and how things developed and worsened, starting with the Hayah’s request for military positions and a presence alongside Ahrar on the borders to secure [itself] from [Ahrar’s] treachery, and because Ahrar, in the Hayah’s view, wasn’t worth of its trust; and then these positions came from Ahrar, then the problems in the Badiyah, then Jabal al-Zawiyah, then Ahrar expanded the fight to Sarmada and its surroundings, then Salqin and its surroundings; until things ended with removing Ahrar from the border strip. Even if that had been the Hayah’s goal, it wouldn’t have been capable of doing it if it hadn’t been for Ahrar’s own aggression and behavior, starting with Jabal al-Zawiyah and on through Sarmada, and before that the points on the border.

“And there’s a point that some dear ones who have discussed [Turkey’s] entry have neglected, which is that what the Hayah – and previously the Jabhah – has done now, ending with its agreement to the entrance of a Turkish force, is a reaction and an attempt to minimize the losses from what happened in the Astana and Geneva agreements and the equivalent. It is not an acknowledgement of [those agreements], as some are claiming and trying to portray. [They’re trying] to show that the position of someone who went [to these talks], negotiated, sat down, and signed, to the point of giving coordinates and maps of his locations is similar to the positions of the Hayah, which has worked to minimize the harms of what they produced in these meetings and conferences abroad.

“And for [everyone’s] information: This [Turkish] entrance has conditions, including that the Turks will not control [these areas] or interfere in any form in the administration of any village or city, as well as our total dominance over them, such that we have the power to expel them at any time. This is the biggest distinction between [the Turks’] entrance within this framework and between those who wanted to bring them in unconditionally, for [the Turks] to come in to supervise the de-escalation agreement, which stipulates their presence on the entirety of the fronts with the regime… So the revolution would end, and it would come to a close overnight!”

Foreign Affairs: "Don't Fund Syria's Reconstruction"

New from me from for Foreign Affairs:

“Don’t Fund Syria’s Reconstruction”

As the regime of Bashar al-Assad draws closer to a victory on the battlefield, domestic Syrian and international attention has turned to the next fight – the terms of Syrian reconstruction. The opposition’s Western backers have supposed that reconstruction funds are their last useful means of extracting concessions from the regime, while experts have theorized how reconstruction efforts can be insulated from the politics of re-legitimizing Assad.

My take – well, I guess it’s in the article title.

المدن: "مسألة البادية وانهاء الجيش الحر"

مقالتي الأولى لصحيفة "المدن"، حول معارك البادية والموقف الأمريكي:

"مسألة البادية وانهاء الجيش الحر"

حلب اليوم، "سورية في أسبوع": "هل تغيرت أولويات الغرب في سورية؟ أم كانت مواقفه السابقة مجرد متاجرة سياسية؟"

مشاركتي في برنامج "سورية في أسبوع" على قناة "حلب اليوم" حول أولويات الغرب في سوريا وآفاق القضية السورية:

The Century Foundation: "Desert Base Is Displaced Syrians’ Last Line of Defense"

New from me for The Century Foundation:

“Desert Base Is Displaced Syrians’ Last Line of Defense”

In the Badiyah desert, the Syrian regime’s eastward advance has jammed together America’s covert war in Syria, its overt campaign against the Islamic State, and two camps holding tens of thousands of vulnerable displaced people, all in one shrinking space.

The United States and Russia reached a “deconfliction” arrangement to protect U.S.-led Coalition forces in the Tanf base – but now the Coalition presence at Tanf is all that protects the camps from advancing regime and allied forces.

The Coalition isn’t there to protect civilians, it’s there to fight the Islamic State – and around the base, there’s no more Islamic State. The U.S.-led Coalition won’t stay in this base forever, even if it’s unlikely to leave just yet. Now U.S. planners have to figure out how to safeguard these displaced Syrians and produce a solution for these camps, which have merged with America’s more hard-edged covert and overt efforts to become a single intractable problem.

War on the Rocks: "A Deadly Delusion: Were Syria's Rebels Ever Going to Defeat the Jihadists?"

New from me for War on the Rocks:

“A Deadly Delusion: Were Syria’s Rebels Ever Going to Defeat the Jihadists?”

Whatever else Syria’s rebels were, and whatever the reasons for backing them – they were never going to be a “counter-terrorism force.”

As combating al-Qaeda and the Islamic State gradually subsumed America and the rest of the world’s policy priorities in Syria, opposition boosters increasingly argued for backing Syria’s rebels in “counter-terrorism” terms. But this argument was never real. There were only sao many times rebels could work alongside (or under) jihadists, or stand aside while jihadists liquidated rival factions, before it became clear they would never be a useful counter-terrorism partner.

Yet because of outside policymakers and analysts’ simplistic sectarian logic and unhelpful repetition of opposition tropes, the policy debate on Syria got more and more disengaged from this reality. And in the end, there was no necessary reckoning over the opposition’s entanglements with jihadists until it was too late.