Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni on Idlib protests: "Brothers, a very important issue..."

Below are translations of two voice recordings purported to be of Tahrir al-Sham emir “Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni,” via anti-Jabhat al-Nusrah/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group “JAN Violations.” The voice messages are notable for their apparently acute sensitivity to the optics of Idlib’s protests and those protests’ portrayal in foreign media, which Abu Ikrimah sees as directly linked to action against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Abu Ikrimah coaches his Tahrir al-Sham audience on flexibility and subtlety in dealing with protesters in order to avoid embarrassing anti-Tahrir al-Sham scenes.

Idlib is primed today for another Friday of protests against a Syrian military offensive on the province. But Tahrir al-Sham seemingly recognizes that those protests can be turned against it, either spontaneously or by outside hands.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emir Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni, voice message 1: “Brothers, a very important issue: We don’t want it to be come out in the Western media that the people opposes us, and that the people brought down our banner and stomped on it. Pay attention: If the banner is raised, there will be people placed just to pull away the banner and stomp on it. And it will appear in the Western media that they stomped on the Hayah’s banner. This is a big issue, brothers. It means that the battle will be against us, in the future. They’ll say that the people is ready now to announce the battle in these protests. Because these protests are what, the people, the public. If the people and the public pull away our banner in front of the media and stomp on it, that means the battle is ready against us now.”

Abu Ikrimah al-Urduni, voice message 2: “Peace and God’s blessings be upon you, something very important to say: Coordinate with those responsible for these protests and say to them, ‘We’re with you, your brothers, and whatever you need, we’ll walk with you. And for your protection.’ Talking is free, brothers. Why not speak to them kindly. They’ll say, ‘God reward you, we don’t need anything.’ Tell them, ‘Okay, we’ll walk with you. We’re Muslims, too, and we demand the toppling of the regime.’”

Original tweet/audio:

هذا ماقاله المدعو أبو عكرمة الأردني أحد أمراء هيئة تحرير الشام
فما رأيك؟!#JNV pic.twitter.com/BQSt7gIOD0

— انتهاكات جبهة النصرة (@JAN_Violations) September 13, 2018

The Atlantic: “Russia Can Stop a Slaughter in Idlib”

My piece for The Atlantic about Syria's Idlib province and the reasons to forestall a deadly Syrian military offensive:

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/idlib-syria-russia-turkey/569590/

War on the Rocks: “As Assad Turns to Syria’s Southwest, Washington Faces a Choice”

Out today, I have a new piece for War on the Rocks that’s a companion to our Crisis Group report on Syria’s southwestern de-escalation. At War on the Rocks, I focus on the United States’ role in the de-escalation agreement and how U.S. policy on Syria broadly has frequently undercut the deal – but why the southwest still matters and deserves an urgent U.S. response:

https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/as-assad-turns-to-syrias-southwest-washington-faces-a-choice/

Southwestern Syria is vital to the security of two of America’s closest regional allies, Israel and Jordan. The southwest merits U.S. attention and effort, on the area’s own terms.

A wide-open Syrian military offensive on the south would be disastrous for its Syrian residents, first and foremost, but also dangerous and worse for America’s regional allies. There may still be time for a negotiated alternative that spares needless bloodshed, prevents the south’s communities and social fabric from being further shredded, and helps safeguard U.S. allies. But on their own, Jordan and Israel likely can’t broker much more than “de-confliction” of an offensive – if there’s going to be a better deal, America needs to act.

Valdai Club: “Syria: Humanitarian Corridors”

My piece for the Valdai Club:

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/russia-should-go-beyond-humanitarian-corridors-syria

Russia has proposed "humanitarian corridors" to evacuate Damascus's East Ghouta suburbs and the area around the Tanaf base. Those corridors are unlikely to accomplish humanitarian ends because – realistically, in both areas – civilians can't count on safety on the other side. Yet Ghouta and Tanaf both present opportunities for Russia to play a role that is stabilizing and life-saving, if only it can bring its Syrian partner on-side.

The Century Foundation: “Managing Syrian Conflict May Be Possible. Resolving It Isn’t” (with Thanassis Cambanis)

In this last piece for The Century Foundation, my TCF colleague Thanassis Cambanis and I debate reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and the trajectory of Western Syria policy broadly:

https://tcf.org/content/report/managing-syrian-conflict-may-possible-resolving-isnt/

This was a fun one to do, and it reflects the sort of (friendly) argument we'd have within the TCF Foreign Policy team.

Sina'at al-Fikr: "The mujahideen at this stage shouldn’t defend according to the principle, 'Until the last man, and the last bullet.'"

Below is how I think Hayat Tahrir al-Sham may now be fighting the Syrian regime’s forces, as the latter push deeper into rebel-held Idlib. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham seems not to be mounting a valiant, heels-dug-in last stand, but rather a fighting, attritive retreat paired with asymmetric insurgent tactics.

The text I’ve translated is a set of posts from a Telegram account called “Sina’at al-Fikr” (Producing Thought), which, per one description, is a channel for “programmatic guidance in order to produce right-minded consciousness.” In practice, it seems to function as a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-aligned outlet that offers short pieces of ideological and strategic advice and instruction, like a sort of jihadist think tank publishing in bite-sized installments. (There are several Sina’at al-Fikr accounts currently on Telegram. The one that is currently active and being referred to by other accounts describes itself as a reserve account.)

These posts were originally from May 2017, but they’ve recently been published again, both by the current Sina’at al-Fikr account on 17 January 2018 and by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham media official Muhammad Nazzal (Abu Khattab al-Maqdisi) on 17 and 23 January 2018. They come in the wake of Tahrir al-Sham’s loss of the eastern Idlib countryside – including the Abu al-Dhuhour airbase – and amid complaints from other opposition constituencies about Tahrir al-Sham’s successive retreats ahead of the regime’s ongoing offensive.

If the thinking outlined below is what’s behind Tahrir al-Sham’s repeated withdrawals and its judicious use of manpower and resources in defense of insurgent-held territory, I think it’s probably the smart move for the group. As Tahrir al-Sham itself apparently recognizes, it can’t prevail in open battle with the regime and its allies, particularly against Russian airpower.

But the smart strategic move for Tahrir al-Sham – which is probably better equipped than other factions to resort to a rural insurgency – is not good for Idlib’s other, locally grounded rebel factions, or for civilians.

When Sina’at al-Fikr tells “the mujahideen” they shouldn’t aim “to prevent the enemy from reaching the areas he wants” – those “areas he wants” are cities like Saraqib and the provincial capital Idlib, where civilian Idlibis live. Realistically, there’s probably no way to defend these areas. But Tahrir al-Sham’s strategic shift means these cities and towns’ civilian residents will need to run, or otherwise fend for themselves.

Translation follows. (Note: The repeated ellipses are in the original Arabic.)

Sina’at al-Fikr, 17 May 2017:

“The most important tactics the mujahideen need to adopt at this stage of the Syrian jihad:

“In the event the regime launches military campaigns, then generally any defense ought not be meant to prevent the enemy from reaching the areas he wants… But, instead, to make his arrival there extremely costly… And attritive in the full meaning of the word.

“That is because the enemy still enjoys a military strength that enables him to reach any point he wants… So, the mujahideen at this stage shouldn’t defend according to the principle, ‘Until the last man, and the last bullet,’ rather according to the principle, ‘The greatest loss for the enemy.’ Let [the mujahideen] raise, to the maximum extent, the price the enemy pays… In terms of the lives of his soldiers and his military material… In order to reach the point he wants.

“That’s in the first defensive stage… Then let [the mujahideen] raise, to the maximum extent, the price the enemy pays to remain in that area he sought after…

“This is the tactic to which we need to be attentive:
– Booby-trapping and rigging before retreating, which makes the enemy lose dearly before taking any military point.
– Sniping and flanking maneuvers, which mean heavy losses for the enemy when he’s charging in.
– Inghimasi [suicide commando] groups that assault the enemy continuously while he mans his positions.

“Offensive tactics at this stage:

“They need to be premised on implementation with precision, speed, and discipline to avoid aerial efforts… Which may, when they’re present, result in serious losses in the ranks of the mujahideen.”

War on the Rocks: "America in Search of an Un-Geneva for Syria"

For War on the Rocks, I’ve written a companion piece to my recent Century Foundation commentary on America’s re-investment in Syria’s Geneva talks. In this latest, I try to answer: If Geneva won’t secure U.S. interests in Syria, what will?

“America in Search of an Un-Geneva for Syria”

I argue America shouldn’t count on Geneva, or on any national-level processes – negotiations over the whole of Syria or control of Syria’s center in Damascus – that have been thoroughly colonized by Russia.

Instead, the United States should invest in subnational processes focusing on Syria’s southwest and northeast. It’s at this level where America has more useful influence relative to Russia, and where there might be a genuine intersection of U.S. and Russian interests.

Perspectives on Terrorism: "The Strategic Logic of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham"

New paper from me, for a special al-Qaeda-focused issue of Perspectives on Terrorism:

“The Strategic Logic of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham”

For this issue, I wrote on the strategic thinking behind the 2017 establishment of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the latest iteration of former Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah. To frame that logic, I relied on the work of political scientist Peter Krause and his “Movement Structure Theory.” Krause’s theory is useful in describing the dynamics of northwest Syria’s insurgency and the rationale for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s project of intra-insurgent hegemony, as the group itself articulated it. The paper hopefully sheds light on Tahrir al-Sham’s priorities and prospects, as well as avenues for building on Krause’s work.

This paper was originally prepared for a September conference in Oslo organized by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), in cooperation with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the full issue of Perspectives on Terrorism, including other papers by a fairly heavy-duty assortment of researchers, see: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot

The Century Foundation: "Syrian Humanitarian 'Lifeline' Goes to Vote"

Today at The Century Foundation, I have a new report on the stakes of Tuesday’s expected vote to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2165 – the international legal mandate for Syria’s cross-border humanitarian response.

“Syrian Humanitarian ‘Lifeline’ Goes to Vote”

For months, humanitarians and donors have been anxious over the renewal of UNSCR 2165. On Tuesday, December 19, the Security Council is expected to finally vote on what a top UN relief official has called a “lifeline” for Syrians in need.

Most of the Security Council backs renewal of UNSCR 2165, which they argue is purely humanitarian. But the resolution also has clear political implications, insofar as cross-border aid without the permission of Syria’s Assad regime has been a potent symbol of Syria’s broken sovereignty.

And only one vote really matters: Russia’s. Russia has said UNSCR 2165 was an emergency response to conditions that no longer exist and that the resolution should be phased out. No one really knows whether Russia will ultimately opt for renewal, or what concessions it wants in exchange.

Of the more than a dozen humanitarians and donor-country diplomats who spoke to me ahead of the vote, most thought the resolution would be renewed – this time.

But even though a renewal will save lives, it’s also only a temporary reprieve. As the Assad regime returns from the brink, an international system premised on state sovereignty is likewise reasserting itself. In that normal international order, it’s tough to imagine a place for something exceptional like UNSCR 2165 – and without that exception, there’s no good alternative means to help millions of Syrians.

The Century Foundation: "Geneva Talks Will Not Salvage U.S. Syria Policy"

At The Century Foundation, I’ve written about America’s reinvestment in Geneva peace talks and how – as I understand it – Russia is simultaneously managing Geneva and its own set of parallel processes.

“Geneva Talks Will Not Salvage U.S. Syria Policy”

Washington is now counting on Geneva to tie together the disparate strings of U.S. policy in Syria. It’s not going to work. Geneva is structurally broken, and no amount of American enthusiasm will fix that.

Geneva won’t make U.S. Syria policy make sense, and it won’t lead to a political settlement Washington actually likes. If these talks produce anything at all, that thing will be made to Russian specifications. So America needs to ask itself – is that what it wants?

The Century Foundation: "Turkey Through the Syrian Looking Glass"

For The Century Foundation (originally published November 28):

“Turkey Through the Syrian Looking Glass”

More than a month after Turkey’s intervention to enforce a “de-escalation” in Syria’s Idlib province, there’s still little clarity on exactly what Turkey is doing in Syria.

That might be deliberate, because Turkey’s deployment is – as best as I can tell – based on an unpalatable deal with the jihadists who control Idlib. To secure Turkish interests and safeguard at least some of Idlib’s residents, Turkey seems to be working with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the successor to Syria’s former al-Qaeda affiliate.

By engaging Tahrir al-Sham mostly Syrian leadership, Turkey may be working to flush the northwest of transnational, al-Qaeda-loyal jihadists . Or, less charitably, it may just be looking after Turkish concerns and collaborating with the local partner closest at hand.

Either way, the Turkish move into Idlib is risky, both in terms of its slim chances and Turkey’s reputation. But it may also be the only way to avert a battle for Idlib that would be disastrous for millions of civilians.

War on the Rocks: "What an Unfolding Humanitarian Disaster in a U.S.-Protected Enclave Tells Us About American Strategy in Syria"

New from me today on War on the Rocks:

“What an Unfolding Humanitarian Disaster in a U.S.-Protected Enclave Tells Us About American Strategy in Syria”

The American base in Tanaf, in Syria’s southeastern desert, has taken on outsized political import. It was originally meant to be a staging ground for a southern prong of the counter-ISIS military campaign. Then, for a brief, overheated moment, it was supposedly where America would block an Iranian “land bridge.” Now it is a symbol of Washington’s refusal to yield to Syrian, Iranian, and Russia pressure and, in theory, key leverage on Damascus and its allies.

But on the ground – below the cloud of geopolitical intrigue and the U.S. military’s defense of Tanaf – the base is tangled up with the Rukban camp. Rukban is an improvised, squalid settlement between the earth berms marking the Syrian and Jordanian border that is home to 50,000 displaced people, among them the families of America’s local Syrian partners. The “deconfliction” zone around Tanaf is all that protects Rukban from a Syrian regime advance.

The United States has taken ownership of the Tanaf zone, including Rukban. And Rukban’s residents are miserable and hungry. The United States and its allies have been unable to convince the Jordanians to allow a new delivery of assistance to Rukban’s residents, just over the border berm from Jordan. Now America has to appeal for a cross-line aid delivery via Damascus, pending the approval of a regime that has weaponized humanitarian access.

The whole thing is a farce.

Rukban is an embarrassment, as well as a lesson in America’s ability to bend Syria and the region to its strategic ambitions. Before Washington wants to start marshaling its allies towards big geopolitical ends, it should start by convincing Jordan to allow a crane drop of tarps, blankets, and food into Rukban.

World Politics Review: "What Will a Post-ISIS Political Order in Syria Actually Look Like?"

New from me for World Politics Review:

“What Will a Post-ISIS Political Order in Syria Actually Look Like?”

The United States and its Coalition allies never had a real political vision for a post-ISIS Syria. Now the country’s post-ISIS political order will be defined by the ground reality of how, militarily, ISIS lost.

The Century Foundation: "Saving America's Syrian Ceasefire"

My latest for The Century Foundation:

“Saving America’s Syrian Ceasefire”

I went to Jordan in September to get a sense of one of America’s last major policy efforts in Syria: the “de-escalation” agreement covering Syria’s southwest. The de-escalation is the product of months of trilateral negotiations between the United States, Russia, and Jordan. So far it has yielded a clear reduction in violence – but its future is uncertain.

Beyond immediate practical steps like a ceasefire and, potentially, the reopening of a key border crossing with Jordan, the agreement seems not to outline any real future or political vision for Syria’s south – no one knows what comes next, and the mood in Amman is uneasy. Meanwhile, a separate U.S. government decision to cut off arms and salaries to southern rebels late this year threatens to destabilize the de-escalation. The move raises more questions about U.S. commitment to the south and its neighboring allies’ security.

The de-escalation seems worth saving, but it’s going to mean more work. It’s going to require the sort of forward-looking institutional groundwork that positions the south for successful reintegration into the Syrian state – not just dissolution and piecemeal “reconciliation” by the regime. And in the meantime, someone has to step in pay these fighters’ salaries, or the south’s going to go haywire.

Tahrir al-Sham official on Turkey's intervention to implement Astana: "That’s not the reality."

Below is a translation of a 13 October Telegram post by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (previously Jabhat al-Nusrah) media official Muhammad Nazzal (“Abu Khattab al-Maqdisi”).

This post represents the purest distillation I’ve seen of how Hayat Tahrir al-Sham seems to be justifying the limited entrance of Turkish forces in the northern Idlib/western Aleppo countryside, including the various pragmatic considerations at work and the mutually agreed-upon, explicit conditions of the Turkish presence.

What Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has agreed to, per Nazzal and other prominent Tahrir al-Sham figures, would seem not to satisfy the expected terms of a tripartite Turkish-Iranian-Russian agreement in Astana. Nazzal is emphatic that Turkey is taking up positions opposite the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Afrin, an enclave north of the insurgent-held northwest, and not deploying further south to police the line of contact between Tahrir al-Sham and the Assad regime. It’s tough to imagine how this would address the concerns of Turkey’s co-guarantors in Astana – unless there is another big shoe to drop, one these Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leaders don’t know about or won’t acknowledge. Nazzal’s contention is that when the Turks claim to be implementing the Astana de-escalation, they’re basically just fudging it.

These sorts of claims from Tahrir al-Sham only raise more questions about a Turkish intervention that is, frankly, bizarre. For a NATO member state to enter Syria with an armed escort from a sort-of al-Qaeda affiliate is, um, non-standard. It currently seems impossible to say how far Turkey’s intervention will go, or where it will end. Maybe Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani has deceived his own rank-and-file about the scope of his agreement with Turkey, or maybe Turkey plans to unilaterally amend or abrogate the terms of the agreement it’s reached with Tahrir al-Sham. If the deal between Turkey and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is less explicit or mutually understood than Nazzal says, then an armed showdown between the two is likely on the way, whatever the Turkish government has claimed publicly about a non-combat observer mission.

And if Turkey and Tahrir al-Sham turn on each other and this does get violent, then – as Nazzal makes clear at the start – Tahrir al-Sham has options.

Translation and original post follow, below the jump.

Jabhat al-Nusrah/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham media official Muhammad Nazzal (“Abu Khattab al-Maqdisi”), 13 October 2017:

“If it happens – and this is possible – that Turkey betrays [us] after entering the liberated territories, it won’t make any difference. Anyone who thinks repelling a cross-border Turkish invasion with one long defensive line makes military sense is mistaken. Even if there were an invasion – without this latest [Turkish] entrance – you wouldn’t deal with it just by facing it with a defensive line. Rather, that would be part of it, but the larger, stronger, and more important part would be inside the liberated territories. That’s if it happened, God forbid…

“And anyone who draws an equivalency between allowing the Turks to enter as part of a clear, explicitly drafted agreement to assume three military positions opposite these Kurdish militias and a full [Turkish] invasion, which would lead to grave ills, is likewise mistaken.

“No one says that the Turks’ entrance to these points is some desirable interest; rather, it’s the lesser of two evils. And none of what is now happening involves the implementation of the Astana agreement on the ground, as some are trying to depict it.

“Yes, Turkey wants to show to Russia and others that it’s implementing what they emerged with from Astana. But that’s not the reality.

“Likewise, drawing an equivalency between the Hayah and Ahrar [al-Sham] on the grounds that the Hayah did an injustice to Ahrar and aggressed on it because of Astana – just Astana – is also incorrect. Everyone knows what happened, and how things developed and worsened, starting with the Hayah’s request for military positions and a presence alongside Ahrar on the borders to secure [itself] from [Ahrar’s] treachery, and because Ahrar, in the Hayah’s view, wasn’t worth of its trust; and then these positions came from Ahrar, then the problems in the Badiyah, then Jabal al-Zawiyah, then Ahrar expanded the fight to Sarmada and its surroundings, then Salqin and its surroundings; until things ended with removing Ahrar from the border strip. Even if that had been the Hayah’s goal, it wouldn’t have been capable of doing it if it hadn’t been for Ahrar’s own aggression and behavior, starting with Jabal al-Zawiyah and on through Sarmada, and before that the points on the border.

“And there’s a point that some dear ones who have discussed [Turkey’s] entry have neglected, which is that what the Hayah – and previously the Jabhah – has done now, ending with its agreement to the entrance of a Turkish force, is a reaction and an attempt to minimize the losses from what happened in the Astana and Geneva agreements and the equivalent. It is not an acknowledgement of [those agreements], as some are claiming and trying to portray. [They’re trying] to show that the position of someone who went [to these talks], negotiated, sat down, and signed, to the point of giving coordinates and maps of his locations is similar to the positions of the Hayah, which has worked to minimize the harms of what they produced in these meetings and conferences abroad.

“And for [everyone’s] information: This [Turkish] entrance has conditions, including that the Turks will not control [these areas] or interfere in any form in the administration of any village or city, as well as our total dominance over them, such that we have the power to expel them at any time. This is the biggest distinction between [the Turks’] entrance within this framework and between those who wanted to bring them in unconditionally, for [the Turks] to come in to supervise the de-escalation agreement, which stipulates their presence on the entirety of the fronts with the regime… So the revolution would end, and it would come to a close overnight!”

Foreign Affairs: "Don't Fund Syria's Reconstruction"

New from me from for Foreign Affairs:

“Don’t Fund Syria’s Reconstruction”

As the regime of Bashar al-Assad draws closer to a victory on the battlefield, domestic Syrian and international attention has turned to the next fight – the terms of Syrian reconstruction. The opposition’s Western backers have supposed that reconstruction funds are their last useful means of extracting concessions from the regime, while experts have theorized how reconstruction efforts can be insulated from the politics of re-legitimizing Assad.

My take – well, I guess it’s in the article title.

المدن: "مسألة البادية وانهاء الجيش الحر"

مقالتي الأولى لصحيفة "المدن"، حول معارك البادية والموقف الأمريكي:

"مسألة البادية وانهاء الجيش الحر"

حلب اليوم، "سورية في أسبوع": "هل تغيرت أولويات الغرب في سورية؟ أم كانت مواقفه السابقة مجرد متاجرة سياسية؟"

مشاركتي في برنامج "سورية في أسبوع" على قناة "حلب اليوم" حول أولويات الغرب في سوريا وآفاق القضية السورية:

The Century Foundation: "Desert Base Is Displaced Syrians’ Last Line of Defense"

New from me for The Century Foundation:

“Desert Base Is Displaced Syrians’ Last Line of Defense”

In the Badiyah desert, the Syrian regime’s eastward advance has jammed together America’s covert war in Syria, its overt campaign against the Islamic State, and two camps holding tens of thousands of vulnerable displaced people, all in one shrinking space.

The United States and Russia reached a “deconfliction” arrangement to protect U.S.-led Coalition forces in the Tanf base – but now the Coalition presence at Tanf is all that protects the camps from advancing regime and allied forces.

The Coalition isn’t there to protect civilians, it’s there to fight the Islamic State – and around the base, there’s no more Islamic State. The U.S.-led Coalition won’t stay in this base forever, even if it’s unlikely to leave just yet. Now U.S. planners have to figure out how to safeguard these displaced Syrians and produce a solution for these camps, which have merged with America’s more hard-edged covert and overt efforts to become a single intractable problem.

War on the Rocks: "A Deadly Delusion: Were Syria's Rebels Ever Going to Defeat the Jihadists?"

New from me for War on the Rocks:

“A Deadly Delusion: Were Syria’s Rebels Ever Going to Defeat the Jihadists?”

Whatever else Syria’s rebels were, and whatever the reasons for backing them – they were never going to be a “counter-terrorism force.”

As combating al-Qaeda and the Islamic State gradually subsumed America and the rest of the world’s policy priorities in Syria, opposition boosters increasingly argued for backing Syria’s rebels in “counter-terrorism” terms. But this argument was never real. There were only sao many times rebels could work alongside (or under) jihadists, or stand aside while jihadists liquidated rival factions, before it became clear they would never be a useful counter-terrorism partner.

Yet because of outside policymakers and analysts’ simplistic sectarian logic and unhelpful repetition of opposition tropes, the policy debate on Syria got more and more disengaged from this reality. And in the end, there was no necessary reckoning over the opposition’s entanglements with jihadists until it was too late.