King Bashar

Here’s something I wrote earlier today. Forgive me if it’s a little too inside. The Gause-Yom piece I discuss, by the way, comes highly recommended.

(Also, I forgot to post my Foreign Policy article earlier, so please read that if you haven’t.)

King Bashar: What the Survival of the Arab Monarchs Tells Us About the Assad Regime

The staying power of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has left many perplexed. Since 2011’s wave of Arab revolution, Assad has outlasted his contemporaries among the region’s republican autocrats. President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, President Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen are all (basically) finished.

The Arab monarchs, on the other hand, have persisted. From Morocco to Saudi Arabia to Oman, the Arab world’s monarchies weathered unrest and emerged whole. Even Bahrain, which faced the monarchies’ most regime-threatening uprising, is intact.

It’s a phenomenon of survival for which Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause III offer a compelling logic in their Journal of Democracy article “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchs Hang On.” They cast that survival in strategic terms – and, reading the article this week, I couldn’t help but think that those terms also describe the Assad regime.

It may make sense, then, to think of Syria not as one of the last Arab republics standing, but rather as one of a host of Arab monarchies that refuse to die. The framework put forward by Yom and Gause might help explain how Assad has lasted so long – and why he could last substantially longer.

The central conceit of Yom and Gause’s article is a metric for longevity: three strategic factors for regime survival, of which each Arab monarchy possesses at least two. They dismiss explanations for monarchic survival based on the monarchies’ unique cultural legitimacy or their ability to remain above the political fray. Rather, the Arab kings, sultans, and emirs have survived by means of: 1) cross-cutting coalitions; 2) hydrocarbon rents; and 3) foreign patronage.

None of these factors are specific to monarchies, which is sort of the point – the Arab monarchies, after all, are basically just variations on autocracy. The same formula which explains the survival of Al Khalifa in Bahrain can explain the fall of Mubarak in Egypt. The Bahraini royals lacked a broad-based coalition of domestic support but had moderate hydrocarbon wealth and extreme wealth by association, as Saudi Arabia made clear that it would support the Bahraini monarchy to the hilt. In Egypt, by contrast, the decay of Egypt’s economy had hollowed out Mubarak’s popular base. Without real resource wealth to use and distribute, U.S. and Gulf support wasn’t enough to save the Egyptian president.

The Assad regime actually satisfies Yom and Gause’s definition of a monarchy – “a regime led by a hereditary sovereign who may hold varying degrees of power” – in all but name. In practice, the regime functions as an absolute monarchy, with no meaningful checks on the Assad executive. The iconography of the Assad regime – including the omnipresent portraits of Assad in shops, offices, and homes – hardly differs from the personalization of other Arab monarchies. Like them, Assad situates himself above the political fray. The state media makes clear that he is not a party to Syria’s national dialogue; rather, he only offers “notes and guidance” to “enrich” the process.

What’s most relevant, though, is that the Syrian state arguably possesses two and a half of Yom and Gause’s keys to monarchic survival. The regime isn’t resource-rich, but it’s being backstopped financially by foreign allies including Russia and Iran. So, like Bahrain, it enjoys hydrocarbon wealth indirectly – this is in addition to those countries’ apparently unlimited diplomatic and military support. Moreover, the regime’s core “cross-cutting coalition” of religious minorities and members of Syria’s Sunni majority alarmed by the prospects of Islamist rule may have frayed somewhat but seems essentially sound.

Yom and Gause’s three independent variables produce only one real dependent variable: a fall / not-fall binary. The Syrian regime’s points of commonality with the Arab monarchies help explain why it has survived until now. Moreover, given that none of these inputs are seriously threatened – Russia and Iran, for example, seem uninterested in making a trade for Assad’s head – the prospects for regime collapse according to the Yom-Gause rubric are bleak.

Of course, there are key differences between these cases. For all its bleating about Iranian conspiracy, Bahrain didn’t face the array of motivated enemies now funding and arming Syria’s opposition revolutionaries. Still, Assad’s domestic and international support give him cover for the sort of ruthless counterinsurgent campaign that could very possibly restore his control over the country.

Moreover, another point should worry those anxious to see Assad fall. As Yom and Gause note, “most of the monarchies in the Arab world today confronted social conflict early in the postcolonial era and thus rallied the coalitional pillars for their royal autocracies to survive.” The survival of this test is what separated the wheat of today’s royals from the chaff murdered by Nasserists in the streets of Baghdad.

If Assad survives, this war could be another Hama: a deadly threat to the regime that ultimately leaves it stronger. It seems that the evolution of Syria’s armed opposition towards Islamist militancy has only pushed Syria’s minorities and pro-regime Sunnis closer to the state. If the Syrian regime lasts for the next few years, then, it could conceivably have solidified a coalition that would allow it to last for decades more.

At that point – all nomenclature aside – it would be difficult to deny Al Assad its place next to Al Saud and Al Thani among the Arab world’s enduring monarchies.

Update: Weirdly, I forgot Qaddafi in Libya. So yes, he is also a republican autocrat who fell.

Al Jazeera Arabic: Reporter Ahmed Zeidan Tours 'Ateiba with Jabhat al-Nusra

In the above report, originally aired March 27 on Al Jazeera Arabic, we can see an example of the mainstreaming of Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) in regional media.

The report is titled (in Arabic) “Battles Between the Regime and Free Syrian Armies in al-Ghouta al-Sharqiya Outside Damascus.” As you can see from the video and the below translation, however, in this case Free Syrian Army (FSA) forces seem to have been subsumed by a JAN command.  The report, including Jazeera reporter Ahmed Zeidan apparently being walked through the town by JAN fighters and a brief interview with a JAN spokesman, arguably shows a normalizing of JAN’s role within the Syrian revolution in pan-Arab media – or, at the least, Al Jazeera.

On an unrelated note, you can see from the end of the report that Jazeera is putting a strong emphasis on the regime’s (as yet unconfirmed) use of chemical weapons.

Translation

Military reinforcements sent by Jabhat al-Nusra to the ’Ateiba area in al-Ghouta al-Sharqiya (East Ghouta), where the regime was able to cut off revolutionaries’ route to northern and southern areas several days ago. Al-Nusra’s fighters deployed across the front lines after they managed to expel the regime’s army from several buildings within the town, which drove Free Syrian Army forces to turn over control of the operations room to Jabhat al-Nusra.

Shells and bullets everywhere, including the destruction of a regime tank. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime’s army issues threats Jabhat al-Nusra, meanwhile, issues threats to the regime.

“Abu Hommam,” official spokesman of Jabhat al-Nusra in al-Ghouta: “Assad’s gangs approached from a number of directions in a desperate, failed attempt to occupy the town of ’Ateiba in order to impose a choking siege on the region. With the aid of God Most High, this invading force was repelled. A large quantity of equipment [lit. machines] and ‘Shelka’ vehicles Shilkas were destroyed; [the force] suffered grave losses of life among its soldiers, and, with the aid of God Most High, high-ranking officers were killed.”

Destruction is everywhere in the town of ’Ateiba, which is now entirely deserted. Here, a child’s swing near where a shell struck. Here, a kitchen abandoned by its owner amid the shelling around it. It seems from this house that its family fled in the night. Even chickens were not spared from the bombing.

This young man from ’Ateiba become a revolutionary and a fighter after his house, like others, was destroyed. “These houses, we invested in them with our blood all these years, all with the blessings of God, praise be to Him. What I’d like to say to the Arab nation, to this Arab Summit, is just that we want to stop this blood[shed] and killing that’s happening now in Syria.”

On the front lines, what worries some revolutionaries is the regime’s use of chemical weapons. In the rear, though, what worries civilians is the regime’s use of these heavy weapons – in addition to the use of chemical weapons.

Ahmed Zeidan, Al Jazeera, al-’Ateiba, al-Ghouta al-Sharqiya.

Translation Notes

First, I just don’t have time to put subtitles on this one. Sorry – hope everyone can follow along with the text.

I couldn’t find the vehicle make to which the JAN member refers. I guess it sounds like “Shellka” or “Chelka”? If someone chimes in with a correction, I’ll fix it.

Update: Woof, sorry, misheard one of the sentences above. The edit should be visible.

Update 2: So, this is the Shilka. Thanks to Mike and @ElSaltador for their help!

Moaz al-Khatib Speech at the Arab Summit: March 26, 2013

Translation follows:

Greetings (al-salam alaikum) to you from a brave people, a quarter of whom have become homeless; and 200,000 of whose sons have been put in prisons; and who have paid a price for their freedom close to 100,000 martyrs; and whose country (infrastructure) has been destroyed at the hands of a mad, barbaric regime.

Greetings from a people that has been butchered in full sight of the world for two years and has been bombarded with all kinds of heavy weaponry and ballistic missiles while some governments still scratch their heads, wondering what to do.

Greetings from the only people in the world whom warplanes bomb in bakeries so that they might emerge drenched in the blood of women and children. Greetings from the widows and the orphans, from the tortured and the oppressed, from the injured and crippled, from the prisoners and detainees, from the emigrants and displaced, from the mujahideen and the troops, from the martyrs whose spirits have scattered throughout this misbegotten world.

Greetings from a people who will follow the path of their freedom and possesses enough will to demolish the world’s greatest idol and enough love to fill the world with tranquility, warmth, and compassion.

We hate war and fighting … and we began a peaceful revolution. The regime, with its recklessness and barbarity, pushed that revolution to arms, violence and destruction.

I will speak now about our wounded but resilient people with the following points.

First: Most Syrians have ceased to care about international conferences so long as they are unable to extend even the minimum support for Syrians’ freedom. Does the affirmation of the right of self-defense require years of the open and systematic murder of the Syrian people?

Second: With our sincere thanks to all the parties that try to help us, and they are many – we nonetheless repeat that our people has paid the price of its freedom with its blood, its decisions stem from its interests, and it rejects instruction by others in its decision-making. Regional and international differences of opinion have helped complicate the problem. Our interests may coincide with some parties, but our revolution is of our own making. The Syrian people alone ignited it and will decide its course.

Third: The Arab League, with [our] thanks, has put forward a bold initiative to give Syria’s seat to the Syrian people after [the people’s] voice [lit. decision] was expropriated for half a century. This seat is part of restoring the legitimacy of which the Syrian people was deprived for so long. This surmounting of international pressure is not just an accomplishment presented to the Syrian people, rather, it shows what can happen when there is solidarity. I say that the role of the Arab nations with their neighbors in terms of mutual understanding and cooperation is a civilized, leading role, and the Arab League must restore it. In the name of the Syrian people, I thank all of our brothers for this great accomplishment.

Fourth: There are constant attempts to misrepresent the Syrian revolution, along three lines:

First, minorities. And I always say, If you want to know how the regime treats minorities, then look to our beloved brothers in Lebanon. When the Syrian regime stormed them, what did it do to them? To all the sects! Look what it did to the Kurds, to the Palestinians, and the Christians, even our brothers the Alawites! Who killed General Ghazi Kan’an, and who arrested Dr. Abdul-Aziz al-Khair? Yesterday, our Alawite brothers tore from the regime its last figleaf by declaring it renegade and savage, saying that it flouts the will of the entire Syrian people. What is happening in Syria is a struggle between slavery and freedom, between justice and injustice. And I’ll tell you about something: in the beginning of the revolution, elements linked to the regime tried to light the fuse of civil war among our brothers in Banias, in which Sunnis mix with Alawites, all of whom know that they are one people with the same rights and responsibilities. A delegation came from each, from the elders (sheikhs) of both sides and made it past the crisis, proving that the Syrian people doesn’t need the Assad mafia, that it can live together and will go on living a life with dignity and justice.

Second [of the three lines], chemical weapons. Nobody has batted an eye at what has happened to the Syrian people. There are those who have passed along timid messages, and here I’m being frank with our people, and they ask: Is it possible to destroy these weapons? And I said that is something to be decided by a comprehensive national conference that can happen, in my opinion, as part of a deal for the entire region that does away with all types of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Brothers here and governments of the world, the opposition will not sell their country.

The third of these lines is terrorism. Is terrorizing a country for two years acceptable? Can anyone seriously talk about terror when every day the Syrian people is butchered in full view of the world? They say, We aren’t against the Syrian people, only the foreign extremists. I’m not sure if it has to do with the fact that they’re foreign, or with their beards! What about the thousands of Russian and Iranian experts and Hizbullah fighters? Are they all Syrians? Let them all leave, and we’ll ask the forgiveness of our honored brothers and guests. There are many Syrian mothers – French mothers and Dutch mothers – who have sent me messages. She said, I beg you, my children left for the jihad in Syria. Do you agree with this? I said to her, Your children have a living conscience and can no longer stand the wholesale slaughter of a people! But I also say to all the young people: If your family needs you, then do not come. Serving your parents, even if they aren’t Muslim, is at the core of jihad on the path of God. They also ask who will rule Syria. Syria’s people are the ones who will decide. Not any other country – the Syrian people will decide who will govern them and how. Its sons will work out how to live together, brought together by God’s word: “There is no compulsion in religion.” As for extremist thought, it is the product of injustice and corruption. We need to treat what leads to it, and not just blame those whose conscience can no longer the daily massacres.

Fifth: The regime is the one who rejects any solution for the crisis. We welcome any political solution that spares more blood and avoids further destruction. We put forward to the regime a humanitarian initiative without a single political or military stipulation. Just release the innocent. Arrogantly, the regime said no.

Forgive if I mentioned this example, just so you know a piece of what happens in [Syria’s] prisons. There is a hotel called the Carlton. Opposite is a [security] branch, Branch 215.I ask of the officials of the Syrian regime, if they claim that they don’t know it, to go now and visit it, before the blood is washed from its floor. Some time ago, one of my students was arrested. They hung him by his hands for seven days, with intense torture. After that, he lost his mind. Because he was being tortured in a room whose floor was covered in blood and urine and that held a number of bloated corpses, and the stench was deadly. The worms boiled in those corpses, and they forced him to sleep on top of them. He went insane from the terror, but that wasn’t enough for them. They chopped him to pieces in front of the other prisoners! Is anyone in the world satisfied with that?

We asked only for the release of the detainees, and especially the women and children. Are there children? Yes, my brothers, and I can give you names. There was a child at the Ya’four checkpoint, one year old, who went for two weeks without any food or help!

We prefer a political solution in order to save more blood and destruction. The Syrian revolution has no warplanes or Scud missiles, and the regime alone is the first and last one responsible. We want freedom, not for the country to go on to more destruction. We want to proceed according to transitional justice and a national understanding and a clear political solution that prevents this regime from inflicting more savagery and devastation.

Sixth: Syrian society is a civilized one. But its sons suffer from something: that they had never before sat with each other. They discovered themselves with the revolution. They established civil administrations, police forces, courts, a judiciary, underground hospitals, schools amid the bombing!

There are many obstacles, but there is a determination to succeed. Among the accomplishments so far is the establishment of a temporary government whose president, Ghassan Hitto, was chosen and in whom we all have confidence. We in the National Coalition’s council wait for Mr. Hitto to submit a platform for debate. Just as we are now considering turning the Coalition into a comprehensive national conference.

Seventh: We ask, in the name of our oppressed people, for support in all its forms from all our brothers and friends. That includes the full right to self-defense, Syria’s seat in the United Nations and other international organizations, and the freezing of the money that the regime stole from our people, to be set aside for reconstruction.

Seventh: I thank all the governments of the world that support the Syrian people in winning its freedom, and we ask them all to meet the commitments to which they promised.

There are tens of countries that have offered assistance. An American official said to me: Are you embarrassed to say that the United States has helped you with $365 million for humanitarian aid? I said, We’re not embarrassed. And we thank all the world’s governments, but I say: The role of the United States is bigger than this! And I requested in a meeting with Mr. Kerry that a Patriot missile umbrella be extended over Syria’s North. He promised to study the issue, and we still wait for a decision from NATO to save the lives of innocents and return those displaced to their countries. Not to fight, but rather to protect people and allow them to return to their normal lives.

Tens of countries provided assistance, and I thank in particular the state of Qatar that hosted the conference, and our dear brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and our brothers in Jordan and Lebanon and Iraqi Kurdistan, all of whom shoulder a great burden. I offer special thanks to our brothers in Turkey and Libya, and to the unknown soldier who opened his arms unconditionally to Syrians, our brothers in Egypt. I thank our honored brothers in the Emirates, Tunisia and Morocco, and all the countries that joined us in this meeting. I thank our brothers in the Emirates, I thank our brothers in Tunisia and Morocco, and all those who supported the right of the Syrian people to their freedom. I ask all of them to ease the processing of Syrians and their residency, and to support them to the extent possible.

Eighth: Our dear brothers, forgive me if I’ve gone a little beyond the bounds of diplomatic custom. There’s something I’d like to say to you in front of all of our peoples: Omar bin Khattab was stopped by a woman in the road who said to him, Fear God, Omar. So [his companions] said to her, You say this to the Commander of the Faithful?! [Omar] said to them, Leave her. There is no good in her if she does not speak up, and no good in us if we do not listen.

I say this to you as the youngest of your brothers: Deal mercifully with your people for fear of God, and shield your countries with justice and fairness, and sow love everywhere. Our peoples long for more dignity, justice and equality, and I’m sure that if we walked among them, they would embrace us and lay their heads on our shoulders and cry for the weight of pain and trouble they bear. Our peoples are a heavy responsibility. We ask God to help you support them in your goodness.

And there is a request that reached me in hundreds of messages, even if it is outside the normal bounds of diplomacy. I ask you, if you think it appropriate, to pass a resolution in this conference – including whatever necessary to accommodate the conditions in each country, and in response to the calls of many – to release all the detainees in the Arab world, so that the Syrian revolution’s day of victory in breaking the cycle of injustice might be a day of joy for all our peoples.

From Surat al-’Asr: ‘Indeed, mankind is in loss, except for those who have believed and done righteous deeds and advised each other to truth and advised each other to patience.’

May God’s peace and mercy be upon you.

Translation Notes

Please forgive any typos in either the video or the written translation. Been racing to get this out in time to be useful.

The original video is here. I also relied on the text of the speech, posted on al-Khatib’s Facebook page here. The translation of Surat al-‘Asr has been taken from here.

Apologies for the red text – still trying to figure out how best to impose text on a mixed light and dark background.

Also, like to acknowledge my roommate, who grilled me a delicious steak while I was translating. So that was pretty clutch.

"Al-Bernameg": Amr Hamzawy on Democratic Institutions

[Update, 1 February 2021: YouTube subsequently removed this video in response to a rights claim.]

In this translated clip – taken from the March 8 episode of “Bernameg al-Bernameg” – we see Egyptian political scientist cum politician Amr Hamzawy pretty effectively sum up the liberal critique of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-led process of institution-building.

Hamzawy’s point is a rebuttal to those, inside and outside the Brotherhood, who’ve defined democracy and democratic legitimacy principally in terms of elections – or, as host Bassem Youssef and Hamzawy put it, “the ballot box.” As we’ve seen since (at least) November 22, a forward-moving democratic transition – just like democracy in general – depends on a shared perception that the system is inherently fair. If segments of the population are convinced that the system is irreparably stacked against them, then they have little reason to play by that system’s rules.

(Also, if you’re not familiar with it: In the first section of the clip, Hamzawy and actress Basma, his wife, are clowning on Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi and this clip from the March 1 episode of “Al-Bernameg.” It’s untranslated, but you don’t really need to speak Arabic to figure out that Brotherhood Supreme Guide Muhammad al-Badi’ is feeding Morsi revolutionary buzzwords.)

Some notes:

First, apologies for putting the subtitles on top of the video. Blame Hamzawy’s white shirt.

Also, I’ve translated “القصاص” here as “justice,” but that loses a little something of the Arabic. The Arabic word, which doesn’t really have an English parallel, is close to “retribution” – a sort of justice for a wrong.

The Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front

Below is a translation of the charter of the Syrian Islamic Front, a coalition of Islamist brigades working to topple the Assad regime. (Original document here, posted January 21.)

Most immediately evident is that the Front is essentially fighting a two-front war: it’s looking to topple the Assad regime, but it’s also aiming for the establishment and reform of Islamic morals in Syria. In that sense, the Front is fighting with one eye on what will follow the collapse of regime authority.

Among (many) other noteworthy points is the Front’s envisioned place for religious minorities. Non-Muslims are nominally accorded equal rights, but those rights are strictly circumscribed by Islamic shari’a. By my reading, the status of Shi’ites and Alawites is ambiguous. The document makes clear (largely through omission) that the scope of acceptable diversity in Islamic thought and practice is limited to variations on Sunnism. As non-Sunnis perceived as heretics, then, Shi’ites and Alawites exist outside that Sunni consensus. It is unclear if they would be accorded the same baseline protections as Christians or if they would instead be dealt with more harshly.

Translation Note: The word “reform” is used throughout this document. It should be understood in the religious sense, i.e., the repair of general morals and religious belief. It should not be understood as political reform.

Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front 

Introduction:

Praise be to God; we thank Him and ask His forgiveness and guidance. Prayers and peace be upon God’s servant and messenger, our Prophet Muhammad, and on his family and companions.

To accomplish the righteous duty with which God most high has tasked us, consensus has been reached between the movements, groups, and brigades listed below in this Charter on the formation of an Islamic front to be called the “Syrian Islamic Front.” It is to undertake Islamic activity of all kinds and in all fields in Syria.

What follows is the Charter of the Front, which is considered – along with its explanatory materials and organizing regulations – the principal reference and determinant of the direction and work of the Front.

Section One: The Definition of the Front and Its Goals

[The Front is] an Islamic, reformist, comprehensive front that works to build an Islamic, civilized society in Syria ruled by the law of God, with which He graced mankind. To that end, it embraces the organizational work that brings about solidarity and coexistence among the elements of Syrian society. This includes various means, including military action, which aims to topple the regime and establish security. It also encompasses civil action, including da’wa (proselytization), educational, humanitarian, media, political, and service work.

1) The Principal Headquarters of the Front: In Syria.

2) The Goals of the Front:

• Toppling the regime and establishing security throughout beloved Syria.

• Working to empower religion on the individual, society, and state level.

• Preservation of society’s Islamic identity and the building of a comprehensive Islamic character.

• Rebuilding Syria on the sound bases of justice, independence and solidarity in accordance with the principles of Islam.

• Active participation in societal development.

• The preparation of expert leadership in all areas of life.

3) Vision:

Building a civilized Islamic society in Syria ruled by the law of God, with which He graced mankind.

4) The Message:

We are a comprehensive Islamic front working to liberate the land and people [of Syria] and to build, through organizational work, a civilized Islamic society in Syria.

Section 2: Principal Focuses

1. The reference for this Charter is based on the principles of sharia, as well as its complete rules and general aims (maqasid). No one in an Islamic society is above accountability, whoever he may be. This principle needs to be embodied in all constitutional and legal formulations, as well as in the freedom of the judiciary to enforce it.

2. Whenever we turn to principles and overarching issues, we find that dispute is rare or minimal. Whenever we turn to secondary issues or details, we find that agreement is rare or minimal. The divisions among those involved in military or civil work are principally rooted in differences in their view of reality and the means and approaches that should be used to address it, in addition to differences on the ordering of priorities. All these are difficult to resolve, and so we resort to general principle.

3. The Syrian Islamic Front is considered one of the Islamic forces at work in Syrian society, so we work to maintain the unity of our message and coalition and to avoid division. We work to reach understanding with all those working on behalf of Islam with whom it is possible to cooperate according to a common understanding of righteousness, piety, and rightly guided vision. We try to avoid antagonizing them or treating them harshly to no benefit.

4. We believe in the importance of a comprehensive review of our previous assumptions and methods insofar as it helps to avoid the repetition of mistakes and realize greater successes, both military and civil. This civil work includes da’wa and reform of morals.

5. The Front’s convictions spring from the approach of the ahl al-sunna (Sunnis), drawn from the Book of God and the confirmed sunna (actions and sayings) of the Prophet, peace be upon him. It is also based on the understanding of the righteous forefathers among the Companions and followers [of the Prophet] and respected (followed) imams.

6. The exercise of good behavior and morals and the calling of people to embrace them (da’wa) are among the authentic approaches of the righteous forefathers. We adhere to that approach in word and deed.

7. Our approach is one of centrism and moderation. It is far from religious fanaticism and its resulting deviation of creed and action. It is also far from a neglect [of religion] and the resultant weakening of the role of religion in governing public life.

8. [The Front] focuses on building correct thinking and the proper methods. It also focuses on the adoption of a gradual, controlled approach, bearing priorities in mind.

9. The Front, in its makeup and activities, springs from organizational work and adopts the principle of shura (consultation) as a means of arriving at decisions.

Section Three: The Relationship between the Members of the Front

1. The relationship is based on Islamic brotherhood and the adherence to counsel and propriety in the case of any division.

2. Priority [shall be given] to the principle of forgiveness and pardon in any dispute, as well as the mending of relations between the two parties.

3. [There shall be no] fanaticism or closed-mindedness in favor of a single view.

4. Shura is a principle in which we believe, and it is binding in decision-making that is not administrative or military. In this way, we aim to avoid the dominance of a single view.

5. The reference for all the actions of the Front is the Leadership Council (majlis al-qiyada). The Legitimate Body (al-hai’a al-shar’iya) is the legitimate governor of all the actions of the Front and its decisions are binding for the Front.

Section Four: The Relationship between the Elements of Syrian Society

Muslims:

1. The unification of Muslims in righteousness and the condemnation of division, dispute, and extremism.

2. The enlargement of the sanctity of the Muslim. The avoidance of rule over him through unbelief, wantonness, or heresy (bid’a); rather, rule only through the guidance and evidence of the ’ulama (ahl al-’ilm).

3. The recognized schools of Islamic thought (al-madhahib) among ahl al-sunna are a great intellectual wealth left to us by the umma’s (Islamic nation) scholars. We adhere to them but do not cling to them fanatically. We always work to achieve compromise between those advancing and working for Islam and to unite them in goodness, as that is considered among the best acts of worship of God most high. This is coupled with generally assuming the best of Muslims and the avoidance of snooping and hunting for mistakes and lapses.

4. Thinking the best of Muslims and overlooking their faults. Bearing their words and actions with as much forbearance as possible, coupled with advice to them.

5. Distinction in instances of da’wa between friendliness to people with the goal of lenience and reform, and between hypocrisy and silence about the truth, to say nothing of saying illegitimate things.

6. Concern with the state of Muslims throughout Syria and efforts to aid them and defend them. Administrative and financial integrity, transparency, the flow of information, the fighting of corruption, purifying society of bribery, and the protection of government jobs from personal exploitation are the basis of right-guided governance. We will work with everything at our disposal to make these principles part of public life.

7. Attention to everything that addresses the interests and needs of the people, standing with their just demands, and the rejection of any injustice that compromises their legitimate rights.

8. Women have rights like those of men, and they have responsibilities like those of men. The relationship between men and women is complementary. The crucial factor in men and women’s actions is integrity and competence, taking into consideration the legitimate particularities that distinguish women from men. This comes with affirmation of the necessity of liberation from the customs and norms that restrict the role of women in public life and that do not rely on the definitive rulings of shari’a and its general aims (maqasid). It also comes with affirmation that the West’s actions to westernize women and remove them from the framework of Islam with which God blessed them are rejected.

Non-Muslims:

1. Islam is the religion of the state, and it is the principal and only source of legislation. We will work through all legitimate and possible means to ensure that there is no law that contradicts the set and confirmed principles (al-thawabit al-mu’tamada) of Islamic shari’a.

2. The preservation of the geographic unity of Syria and the rejection of any plan to divide it on an ethnic or sectarian basis, bearing in mind that all Syrians enjoy the rights required for them by [religious] law.

3. Coexistence between the sons of one nation, however their schools [of thought] or creeds might differ. That entails mutual responsibilities and rights. It makes the principle of the sanctity of blood, money, and honor something shared by all and something upon which there can be no infringement except according to the rulings of Islamic shari’a and through [its] conclusive judicial rulings.

4. Justice and fairness are the basis of the relationship in dealing with non-Muslims. Difference of religion is not a justification for injustice against anyone.

5. All members of society can participate in realizing its general interest, however their schools [of thought] and creeds might differ.

6. The call for the integration and mixing of religions and sects is rejected according to [religious] law. Moreover, it contains a kind of aggression against those religions and communities and is a sort of religious and cultural adulteration.

Introduction to the Syrian Islamic Front:

Why the Front?

• To undertake the responsibility and carry out the charge with which God has commanded us in terms of furthering His religion and instituting His law.

• The Islamic current must have a unified voice to clearly articulate its demands and rights in order to guarantee that the just demands of the Muslim people are realized.

• The importance of an organized institutional effort to unite the brigades on the ground, develop the aid effort, and correctly place funds insofar as that accomplishes the Front’s present and future goals of building an ideal Islamic society.

• People’s need to spread the correct teachings and unerring rulings of religion, based on the Book [of God] and the sunna; their thirst for knowledge of the truth and how it can be followed, as well as righteousness and its application, especially after oppressive regimes implemented a state of intellectual terror and suffocation in the name of security that resulted in intellectual, dogmatic, and behavioral disfigurements. All this makes it imperative that there be good, upright models distinguished by their adherence to the Book [of God] and the sunna in word, deed, conviction, and labor to spread God’s message (da’wa). This is to address the sickness and correct the path.

Our Vision:

Building a civilized Islamic society in Syria that is ruled by the law of God with which He blessed us.

Our Message:

We are a comprehensive Islamic front that works to liberate [Syria’s] land and people and build a civilized Islamic society in Syria through institutional work.

Our Goals:

1. Toppling the regime and establishing security throughout beloved Syria.

2. Working to empower religion on the individual, society, and state level.

3. Preservation of society’s Islamic identity and the building of a comprehensive Islamic character.

4. Rebuilding Syria on the sound bases of justice, independence and solidarity in accordance with the principles of Islam.

5. Active participation in societal development.

6. The preparation of expert leadership in all areas of life.

Our Means:

The Front works in the following areas and along the following axes: military, political, media, intellectual, da’wa, educational and aid.

These fields are organized and joined by a number of general methods considered a shared basis for engaging them. Among these are:

1. Establishing the principle of shura through the participation of all those disposed to solutions and reason in the making of critical decisions.

2. Appealing to all Islamic brigades to join the Front and participate in decision-making and defining the future of Syria.

3. Cooperation and coordination with all forces working on the ground to topple the regime.

4. Disseminating the teachings of Islam in Syria society through da’wa and intellectual activity which the Front will undertake.

5. Putting forward programs and specialized courses in a number of areas, including: military training, Muslim personal training, training of Islamic evangelists (du’at), as well as other courses and important development programs.

6. Consultation and engagement with the Islamic institutions working according a clear, legitimate vision.

All fortune through God.

The Names of the Founding Entities of the Syrian Islamic Front

1. Ahrar al-Sham (the Free Men of Syria) Brigades (all governorates of Syria)

2. Al-Iman (Belief) Combat Brigades (Damascus governorate and the surrounding countryside)

3. Al-Hamza bin Abdul-Mutallab Brigade (Damascus governorate and the surrounding countryside)

4. Suqour al-Islam (the Hawks of Islam) Brigade (Damascus governorate and the surrounding countryside)

5. Saraya al-Maham al-Khassa (the Special Operations Brigades) (Damascus governorate and the surrounding countryside)

6. Liwa’ al-Haq (Banner of Righteousness) (Homs governorate and the surrounding countryside)

7. Harakat al-Fajar al-Islami (The Islamic Dawn Movement) (Aleppo governorate and the surrounding countryside)

8. Mus’ab bin ’Ameer Brigade (Aleppo countryside)

9. Jama’at al-Talee’a al-Islamiya (The Islamic Vanguard Group) (Idlib countryside)

10. Ansar al-Sham (Supporters of Syria) Brigades (Lattakia governorate and surrounding countryside)

11. Jeish al-Tawheed (The Army of Monotheism / Unification) (Deir al-Zour governorate and surrounding countryside)

Dodge Middle East: "Are You Dodge?"

They keep showing this ad while I’m watching episodes of 04 online.

I guess it grew on me?

(Was this an English-language ad?  It must’ve been.)

Bassem Youssef: "Why you do this?"

From the January 4 episode of “Bernameg al-Bernameg” (“The Show Show”), Bassem Youssef responds to the lawsuits filed against him:

[Update, 1 February 2021: YouTube subsequently removed this video in response to a rights claim.]

He’s obviously petrified.

Also, just to say, I’ve seen people translate the name of the show as “The Program Program,” which I suppose is technically correct.  Still, “show” and “program” are both acceptable translations for “bernameg” (برنامج), and in American idiom, we typically say “show.” (E.g., “The Daily Show.”)

In any case, I much prefer “The Show Show” as a translation.  But I guess خلّي قلبك دليلك (let your heart be your guide).

Also, I saw on this Washington Post blog that someone is apparently translating whole episodes of “Al-Bernameg.”  Whole episodes!  Seriously, what a champion.

"Just a second, Mister President.": Morsi look-alike at Alexandria demonstration

This really has no broader significance. I was just entertained.

President Morsi look-alike on Nahda stage

From the “Sada al-Balad” writeup:

Video: “Sada al-Balad” has exclusive meeting with President Morsi look-alike on Nahda stage

On the main stage, there could be found a look-alike of President Muhammad Morsi . The man, named Ramadan and hailing from Sohag governorate, began to imitate President Muhammad Morsi. In response, those present chanted, “We love you, Mr. President.”

Ramadan directed a message to the president, telling him, “Stand fast, Mr. President, God is with you.”  He asked the president to implement shari’a. He also said that he loves President Muhammad Morsi because he is devout and prays the fajr (dawn) prayer in the mosque.

This is what years of Arabic study have been building up to: translating part of this video.

(Also, the ambient noise /sound quality made it difficult to hear parts of this, so I definitely missed a few things. HT: Sarah Carr.)

Bassem Youssef: "To us, you aren't sheikhs or 'ulama."

I know that some people are sick of the more serious serious segments of Bassem Youssef’s “Bernameg al-Bernameg” (literally, “The Show Show”), but I thought this one, from his December 21 episode, was useful.

If you’ve watched the second season of his show, you’ve seen that he’s really been going in on the Brotherhood and Islamists in power, but also on a certain kind of religious figure — mostly satellite televangelists and the sort of audience they attract.  The sort of crushing, video archive-aided takedowns he’s been offering week after week have a political dimension, but they also amount to a sort of broader social criticism.  He’s challenging a certain popular kind of Egyptian religiosity and being really deeply, cuttingly sarcastic about a class of religious figures who might otherwise assume that they’re above this kind of criticism.

Apologies for not choosing something funnier, but this soliloquy (rant?) does a lot to explain both the underlying logic of his recent episodes and his harsher, sometimes angry tone.

(Click “CC” to turn on English subtitles!  I tried to make them come on automatically, but I obviously failed. )

[Update, 1 February 2021: YouTube subsequently removed this video in response to a rights claim.]

(Sorry if I muffed anything up — let me know, and I’ll retool the caption file in YouTube!)

Qaradawi: Egyptian Protests Fitna, Khurouj 'ala Wali al-Amr

There were a number of noteworthy points in the November 25 episode of Sharia and Life. Certainly one of the most striking, though, was Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi’s characterization of recent protests against President Muhammad Morsi’s constitutional declaration as khurouj ’ala wali al-amr and fitna. These (related) charges are grave. I’ve left these terms untranslated below, as they have no immediate English parallel, but they basically amount to “rebellion against the legitimate ruler” and “chaos and discord,” respectively. These ideas were among those deployed by authority-friendly clerics (Egyptian and otherwise) during Egypt’s January 25 Revolution to discourage protesters and discredit their actions as un-Islamic. Qaradawi has now turned them on those organizing and participating in Tuesday’s planned mass protests.

What follows is the most relevant back and forth (33:37 – 34:38):

عثمان عثمان: بالعودة إلى الموضوع المصري، الأخ عمرو نصر يسأل: هل تعدّ ما يحدث في مصر الآن من الدعوة إلى إضراب وتعليق عمل المحاكم والاعتراض على القرارات السياسية لرئيس الجمهورية وحشد الجماهير لذلك، هل يعتبر ذلك نوعاً من أنواع الخروج على ولي الأمر الذي وجب الـ(garbled)

الشيخ يوسف القرضاوي: نعم، هذا نوع من الفتنة، ومن الإفساد في الأرض. أنا أدعو إلى من يريد أن، يعني، يتشاور مع الآخرين، يفتح حوار مع الناس، يتكلّمهن. أما الذين يدعون إلى أن البلد تتوقّف وإن الناس يحارب بعضهم بعضاً وإنه ليس هناك إلا أنّنا نفرض أنفسنا على الآخرين، هذا أمر لا يجوز أبداً. ولا يقبل في لا منطق الشوى لا منطق الديمقراطية ولا أي منطق.

Othman Othman: Returning to the subject of Egypt, Brother Amr Nasr asks: Do you consider what is happening now in Egypt – in terms of a call for a strike, suspension of the functioning of the courts, objection to the political decisions of the president of the republic, and, to that end, assembling for mass action – do you consider that a kind of al-khurouj ’ala wali al-amr who we must (garbled).

Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi: Yes. This is a sort of fitna, of corruption on earth (al-ifsad fil-ardh). I call on those who want to consult with others, open a dialogue with people, speak to them. As for those who are calling for the country to come to a standstill and for people to go to war with each other and that there is nothing left but to impose ourselves on others, this is not at all permissible. It is not acceptable according to the logic of shura, of democracy, of anything.

Elsewhere, Morsi differentiates between those who disagree and those who are obstructionist (10:07 – 10:20):

الشيخ يوسف القرضاوي: أنا لا أمنع الناس تطالب مثلاً بأنّها تتشاور في هذا الأمر، أنّ يكون من حقّهم التشاور، لا بأس. الشورى شيء، ولكن المعارضة لأجل المعارضة…

Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi: I would not stop people from demanding, for example, to be consulted on this issue. Consultation is their right. Of course. Shura is one thing, but opposition for the sake of opposition [is another]…

Other notable passages include this (3:15 – 4:17), in which Qaradawi defends, in general terms, Morsi’s right to issue the constitutional declaration. Later in the program, he goes on to defend the declaration’s individual points on their merits.

الشيخ يوسف القرضاوي: نعم، من حقه أن يفعل ذلك بحكم المسؤولية التي كلّفه الله إياها. هو رئيس مصر. ما معنى رئيس مصر؟ يرأسها بأي شيء؟ يرأسها بأن يتولّى مسؤوليتها. هو مسؤول عن كل فرد فيها.  كلّكم راعِ، وكلكم مسؤول عن رعايته – كل واحد مسؤول عن رعايته. فالمسؤولية مسؤولية عامّة، وهذا كلام رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلم. ولذلك، من حقنا أن نسأل لماذا فعلت كذا ولماذا فعلت كذا. الدكتور مرسي أصدر قرارات من أجل الوطن المصري الذي هو رئيسه، والذي هو مسؤول عنه أمام الله وأمام الناس وأمام التاريخ.

Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi: Yes, [Morsi] has the right to do that by virtue of the responsibility with which God has entrusted him. He is the president of Egypt. What does it mean to be president of Egypt? How does he lead? He leads by assuming responsibility for it. He is responsible for everyone in it. All of you are shepherds, and all of you are of the flock – everyone is responsible for those in his care. The responsibility is a public responsibility. This is what the Prophet of God said. So yes, we have the right to ask why you did this or that. Morsi issued resolutions for the sake of the Egyptian nation of which he is the president, and for which he is responsible before God, the people, and history.

Here Qaradawi discusses further the “enemies” of Egypt and the umma and how they aim to sabotage Egypt’s recovery (13:00 – 14:00):

الشيخ يوسف القرضاوي: هناك أناس، طبعاً، لا يهمّهم إن البلد تستقرّ وتبدأ في مرحلة الإنتاج الحقيقي. يريدوا أن تظل البلد في فوضى مستمرة وهؤلاء أعداء هذا البلد، والله العظيم ليسوا مخلصين أبداً. (garbled) الفساد في هذه الديار وهذه الأمّة، وسينتقم الله منهم. لأنّهم لا يرودون الخير لأمّتهم، يريدون أنّهم يشغبوا على الناس لتظل البلاد مضطربة مضطربة، وهذا لا يستفيد منه أحد إلا أعداء الأمّة. الأمّة الحقيقة تريد أن تستقرّ، والاستقرار معناها العمل، والعمل معناه الإناج، والإنتاج معناه النفع العام للجميع! لماذا لا نهيّن لأنفسنا هذا الأمر؟!

Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi: There are people, of course, who aren’t concerned with whether the country becomes stable and begins a new stage of productivity. They want the country to remain in a state of continuous chaos. They are the enemies of this country, by God, they are not righteous at all. (garbled) the corruption in these houses and in this nation (umma), and God will exact retribution from them, because they do not want the best for the nation. They want to stir up discord among people so that the country remains unsettled. Nobody benefits from this except the enemies of the nation. The true nation wants to become stable – stability means work, and work means production, and production means the benefit of all! Why do we not make this easier for ourselves?!

And here Qaradawi dismisses the idea that Egypt’s opposition will be able to rally a million-man protest (milyouniya) on Tuesday (14:13 – 15:44):

الشيخ يوسف القرضاوي: (garbled) مظاهرات مليونية من أعداء الثورة أبداً. لا يستطيعون أن يخرجوا مليونية إطلاقاً. الذين يستطيعون أن يخرجوا المليونيات هم الإسلاميون وأتباعهم من أبناء البلد المخلصين الصادقين.  أبناء العمال وأبناء الفلاحين وأبناء المعلّمين وأبناء الأطباء والمحامين. هؤلاء هم الذين يخرجون، الذين يخرجون بمليونيات. الآخرون ليس عندهم مليونيات. أرجوهم أن يكفّوا عن الشغب على الأمة. من أراد أن يناقش الآخرين، يناقش بالحسنة! الباب مفتوح للجميع.  ليس هناك، يعني، سلطة مستبدّة، وربّنا أنقذنا، أنقذ هذا البلد من هؤلاء الذين كانوا يتحكّمون فيه ولا يكاد يسمع لأحد! لا يكاد يسمع لنا صوت! ندخل البلد، ويفرض علينا حصار من أوّل من ندخل، ويعني… فأنقذنا الله وأكرمنا بهذه الثورة التي أصبحنا فيها أحرار، سادة أنفسنا! تستطيع أن نقول وأن نفعل …

Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi: There will never be million-man marches by the enemies of the Revolution. They can’t muster a million-man march. The ones who can turn out a million-man march, they are the Islamists and their followers among the righteous, honest sons of the country. Sons of workers and peasants and doctors and lawyers. They are the ones who come out, who attend million-man marches. The others do not have million-man marches. I ask of them to refrain from sowing discord within the nation (umma). Whoever wants to discuss with others, let him discuss with good intentions! The door is open to all. There is no[longer] tyranny. God saved us, saved this country from those who were ruling it, when hardly anyone could be heard! People’s voices were barely heard! As soon as we would enter the country, they would encircle us… So God saved us and graced us with this Revolution in which we became free, our own masters!

[Transcription note: In some cases, the transcription reflects al-Qaradawi’s use of Egyptian dialect instead of more rigid Fusha, particularly on أن/إن and pronoun suffixes.]

Mehio, "What is Qatar doing in Kuwait and the Emirates?"

Below is a translation of Lebanese journalist and commentator Saad Mehio‘s September 22 read on intra-Gulf relations — more specifically, those between Qatar and everyone else.  (Via the Twitter feed of Professor Abdulkhaleq Abdulla.)

What is Qatar doing in Kuwait and the Emirates? 

– I –

Is Qatar really interfering in the internal affairs of Kuwait, the Emirates and Bahrain?

At the start, this question belonged to the world of rumors.  When Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jasem Al Thani came forward to deny these accusations, however, matters began to take on another shape – a serious, political one, to be specific.  Why?

The denial meant that the issue had gone from being “biased rumors aimed at sowing the seeds of discord between the Gulf states” (as a Lebanese journalist volunteered today) to being a matter of debate in the Gulf states’ foreign policy. After all, there’s no smoke without fire.  Most importantly, the countries of the Gulf have grown accustomed to addressing differences within the Gulf Cooperation Council in secrecy.  Just the fact that an official voice from Qatar insisted on moving from the custom of silence to the world of the explicit, then, betrays that something is going on in relations between the Gulf states.

The writer of these lines recalls an episode months after the revolutions of the Arab Spring erupted: While eating lunch with a Qatari ambassador to a Gulf country, we were surprised as the ambassador exploded in anger when he saw the restaurant’s “garcons” constantly approaching the table to listen in on us.  The ambassador then said angrily: “Have they gotten so afraid of us that they’re driven to watch us like this?”

– II –

Of course, this fear doesn’t stem from Qatar’s exporting of democracy to these countries.  After all, how can it export what it lacks?  Someone who lacks something, as is well-known, can hardly give it away.  True, it supported Egypt and Tunisia’s revolutions with its media, and sent forces to Libya’s revolutionaries, and now sends weapons and funds to Syria.  But it has done that based on three drivers: Firstly, its Emir’s desire’s to put Qatar’s vast wealth towards the best that money can buy in terms of reputation and diplomatic influence.  Secondly (and more importantly), Doha’s inclinations seem at most times to amount to American foreign policy with Qatari colors.  And thirdly, there is Qatar’s intense desire to retain its independence, wrested from its Saudi big brother – even if that means turning to its American big brother.  This is perhaps represented best in Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood at the expense of the Saudi-supported Salafi forces.

What concerns the other countries of the Gulf, and especially Kuwait and the Emirates at this point, is the second motive: that is, Qatar serving as the bridge by which America wants to transport its desires for reform to these countries.  The latter, in particular, is well aware that the Arab Spring would not have bloomed and toppled Mubarak, Ben Ali, Qaddafi and Saleh had America not irrigated it.

Given that the countries of the Gulf are unable to air their dirty laundry with the great power that represents their only protection from the ruin of Iranian ambitions – and before that, Iraqi ones – they have perhaps found it better to fortify the Gulf home by cutting off the Qatari house within.

These countries may succeed.  But this will not undo the fact that change and reform in the Gulf states have already reached the core of the international agenda.  The clearest new evidence of that came out yesterday when Mike Posner, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, launched a fierce and unprecedented campaign on the government of Bahrain, accusing it of breaking all its promises to reform and hold the mukhabarat back from its people.

– III –

What does that all mean?

It confirms what no longer needs confirming: The Arab Spring is not a passing season. Rather, it is part of a comprehensive international strategy that will only end when the whole makeup of the Middle East has changed.  It’s no use trying to stop it by spending billions of dollars funding extremist Salafists in Egypt, Tunisia and other countries to undermine their democratic transitions, or by dispersing billions more to paper over each Gulf state’s internal contradictions.

In this context, supposed Qatari “interference” may only be the tip of the iceberg under the Gulf’s waters these days.

* * *

How right former American ally Ali Abdullah Saleh was when, in the wake of the announcement of the “Freedom Agenda” in the Middle East, he said: “If we don’t shave ourselves quickly, they’ll do it for us.”

Al-Dustour, "Egypt Will Only Be Saved From Death and Destruction by the Union of the Army and the People"

Below is a translation of the front-page editorial that seems to have led to the confiscation of privately owned newspaper Al-Dustour’s Saturday, August 11 edition.

I did what I could to maintain the original, ah, excited tone.  And as usual, apologies for any mistakes.

Egypt Will Only Be Saved From Death and Destruction by the Union of the Army and the People

In a few days – no more than sixty – the new Brotherhood (Ikhwangi) constitution will be done away with.  This outcome is sealed, of course, by the Brotherhood constitution’s sweeping of the country…  Marking and announcing openly the establishment of the Brotherhood’s Emirate.

After several days and over the coming ten years, Egypt will witness the worst days of its political past and history of struggle and the collapse of its citizens’ patriotic honor…  The collapse of the citizen’s honor in front of his family and his children, and the violation of individual property rights…  Killing and bloodshed… Cutting out the media’s tongue and muzzling it…  The declaration of fascism and the fall of democracy…  Fear and panic for Egyptian families…  And the spread of crime, in all its forms, in the ugliest way imaginable.

After the ratification of the new constitution, legislative authority will be transferred and the Consultative Council (Meglis ash-Shura) will return to the Brotherhood’s control…  And naturally, that legislative power will be lost by the military establishment that now holds it.

At that time, the current senior leadership of the armed forces – who protect the constitutional legitimacy of the civil state, lest its identity be changed to that of a Brotherhood emirate – will be overthrown.  The critical question posed, then…  What comes after the toppling of the present armed forces command…  Will the new leadership of the armed forces come from the Muslim Brotherhood, or no??  If the leadership comes from the Brotherhood, then no individual or group in society will be able to freely express their opinion, protest peacefully or violate the doctrine of the Brotherhood’s Emirate…  If this happens, God forbid, there will be massacres and murder in the streets for all to see until the whole of society submits to the Brotherhood’s rulings and religious doctrine, avoiding a clash with it…  This is the real and honest picture that society will see within days.

Egypt will not be saved from death and destruction except by the union of the army and the people, with the formation of a national salvation front made up of political leadership and the army and the declaration of a civil state under military protection in line with the Turkish system…  If this does not happen in the coming days, Egypt will fall, and, over the few days remaining before the announcement of the new constitution, we will regret it…  The people must go out and protest peacefully, and it is their patriotic duty to do so until the army responds and announces its support for the people.

Readying for the Announcement of Zero Hour

May Egypt Be Under God’s Protection

Al-Rashed, "Victims of Syrian Propaganda"

Below is a translation of Al Arabiya General Manager Abdul Rahman al-Rashed’s defense (published in pan-Arab newspaper Asharq al-Awsat on August 6) of his channel’s Syria coverage.  Al-Rashed’s piece is, in part, a response to Sultan al-Qassemi’s recent Foreign Policy piece, “Breaking the Arab News” (English).

Evidence to the contrary, I swear I’m not stalking al-Qassemi.  I’m just looking for interesting or useful Arabic materials that haven’t already been translated to English.  Also, I’ve got some time to kill.

Again, apologies for any mistranslation or violation of Asharq al-Awsat‘s intellectual property.

Update: A day later, here’s the official translation.

Victims of Syrian Propaganda

Abdul Rahman al-Rashed

Since the Syrian crisis began, propaganda has played an important role for both sides of the conflict, but it has been more important, effective and successful for the regime of Bashar al-Assad.  Further, I would say that this “propaganda” [1], despite its failure to stop the Syrian’s uprising, has bought more time for the regime than what its forces and shabiha have accomplished on the ground.

Among the regime’s most recent lies were comments attributed several days ago to Riad al-Asaad, commander of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), in a Reuters report.  In these quotes, which were entirely fabricated, al-Asaad claimed that a thousand of his men had been killed in a series of defeats.  That falsehood was not the first; there is, in fact, an army of regime employees producing similar lies.  It isn’t enough for them to promote the regime’s positions in the media, in addition to commenting on and responding to conflicting reports; they go beyond that, falsifying pictures, news and statements in various media.  The propaganda aimed at the West focuses on the revolutionaries being “Qaeda” terrorists and a grab-bagof Islamist extremists.  The propaganda directed at Arabs tells them that what’s happening to the Assad regime is an American-French conspiracy.  And the messages directed to Syrians also differ: for Christians, they’re being targeted by Islamists; for pro-revolution Syrians, they are told that the revolution is a Israel-directed conspiracy against the Arabs and Islam, and that Israeli weapons have been discovered with the revolutionaries.  There is propaganda directed at the revolutionaries themselves, meant to turn them against each other or sow disinformation: when the village of Al-Haffah, near Lattakia, was seized by revolutionaries in what came to be called the Battle of al-Haffah, messages claiming that the FSA had ordered a tactical retreat were directed at them through the media.  As an FSA official told Asharq al-Awsat,the fighters in fact withdrew, thinking that those were the orders of the FSA leadership.

I am not shocked, then, when I hear politicians or media figures in the West adopt the official position of the Syrian regime, given the huge quantity of lies that reach them.  The strangest thing, in fact, is that Russian media aimed abroad circulates Assad regime-produced propaganda materials, even going to great lengths to add to them.

I am surprised, however, when I hear Syrian regime propaganda repeated by researchers and bloggers among us, despite the ease of testing that propaganda’s truth or falsity.  When Sultan al-Qassemi wrote an article claiming that we are biased and falsify videos and news reports on behalf of the anti-regime revolutionaries, I initially thought that it another product of the Syrian regime’s propaganda.  Al-Qassemi not only committed grave errors; rather, he confirmed that the Syrian regime is successful in misleading even educated and informed Arabs.  What he wrote would have been unacceptable even a year ago, when the uprising was just beginning.  The facts on the Syrian issue are clear to us in the region, regardless of our leanings or affiliations.

In spite of the abundance of pictures and videos published daily from the country’s battle zones, the Syrian regime in fact does so much more than the ugly truth which is presented – sometimes to a degree that can’t be believed.

Among the facts of what is happening in Syria which many don’t believe is thatIranians and Russians have joined the regime’s forces in battle for more than a year.  We knew about this early on, but there was little evidence we could present.  Even when pieces of evidence were put forward, the regime media worked to call them into question and turn the issue from one of mercenary killers into one of people who had been wronged [2].  The story of the bus seized by rebels in the past few days was treated the same way.  The bus was carrying fighters from the Revolutionary Guard, so the regime hurried to claim that they were pilgrims.  We know that no one is traveling to Syria now for tourism or to visit religious sites; everyone who appeared in the video were men of fighting age, with no women or children among them.

Of course, it’s easy for some to theorize and criticize from a distance, to summarize everything happening as something purely political and divide everyone according to set axes and categories.  Meanwhile, what’s happening in Syria is clear, supported by huge quantities of evidence with unimpeachable credibility.  This war has gone on for 17 months, more than enough to examine the facts.

Even if these issues are oversimplified for the reader – with what’s happening reduced to media maneuvering within larger political rivalries and various regimes’ manipulation – that doesn’t negate the larger facts evident to the country’s people themselves, which are the most important thing.

Were the Syrian regime not so evil, people would not have continued to risk their lives all this time, whether protesting in isolation or fighting in defense of their families and neighborhoods.  These are not lies or fantasies or political partisanship.

And on the other hand, were Assad’s forces actually convinced of their cause, rather than forced to fight, they would have won long ago.  The regime possesses a vast arsenal of weapons, over half a million soldiers and security personnel involved in the fighting and uninterrupted supplies from its allies; despite all that, it is now encircled in its capital.

1. Here al-Rashed actually uses the Arabic transliteration of the word “propaganda”, as opposed to the Arabic “دعاية”, whose meaning can range from “advertising” to “propaganda” depending on the context.  “دعاية” is used in the remainder of the piece.

2. Honestly, not a thousand-percent sure what al-Rashed means by “أناس مظلومين”, which I’ve translated (clumsily) as “people who had been wronged”.  I assume he means that Syrian media made these “mercenaries” out to be misidentified and slandered, thus inverting Arabiya’s initial coverage.

Al-Qassemi Response: Al-Athbah, "'A New Horizon'?"

Below is a translation of Abdullah bin Hamad al-Athbah’s response (published in Qatari newspaper Al-Arab on July 9) to Sultan Sooud al-Qassemi’s critical account of Al Jazeera Arabic’s “love affair” with the Muslim Brotherhood (“Morsi’s Win Is Al Jazeera’s Loss”, English and Arabic).

Apologies if I’ve mangled any of the translation (especially the poetry, woof) or if this in any way violates Al-Arab’s intellectual property.  Clarifying notes on the translation and any special context can be found at the bottom of the page.

“A New Horizon”?

Abdullah bin Hamad al-Athbah

My esteemed Emirati colleague Sultan Sooud al-Qassemi has written an article in which he criticizes what he thinks is Al Jazeera’s bias in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.  Now, we should emphasize that al-Qassemi is practicing his right to freedom of expression and criticism.  Still, I don’t know why he sees Al Jazeera’s likening of Morsi to Nasser as simultaneously “romancing” Morsi and insulting him because he’s condemned the Nasser era and military rule.  His point needs some clarification for the unenlightened, and this writer, poor servant that he is, is among them. 

Al-Qassemi goes on to assemble evidence that Al Jazeera leans toward the Muslim Brotherhood in an unprofessional fashion.  As proof, he states that Dr. Yousef al-Qaradawi – who was granted Qatari citizenship – is the principal guest on the channel’s religious programs.  Or course, he ignores the fact al-Qaradawi is one of the great scholarly pillars of our truereligion, regardless of his citizenship or his ideological affiliations.  Moreover, I do not know what religious programs are on Al Jazeera other than “Shari’a and Life”!  Or did he use the phrase “religious programs” because his criticism of Arabic-language Al Jazeera was directed at Anglo-Saxons and Franks?  I hope they look closer at this article, especially since it was written with an Arab hand in the English language and only later translated to our mother language.  This is among our friend’s faults: he addresses the West before the East on what is an Eastern issue and, moreover, a purely Arab one!  I had also hoped that he would check his information – if he had, he would know that Qaradawi left the Muslim Brotherhood a not-inconsiderable time ago. 

Al-Qassemi says that Al Jazeera spared no effort in promoting the Muslim Brotherhood after the Brotherhood’s decision to contest the presidential elections, so the channel established “Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr” a few days after the fall of Mubarak.  Now, I would like to emphasize to al-Qassemi that most of the Egyptians I know call Mubarak “the deposed.”  Moreover, I hope that al-Qassemi’s close friend, the Egyptian “media expert”, will tell him that al-Qaradawi supported Aboul Fotouh through the elections’ first round, not al-Shater or Muhammad Morsi.

Al-Qassemi goes on to say: “When Morsi’s office wanted to kill the story of what seemed to be a fabricated Iran news-agency interview with the president, it knew exactly who to call.”  Of course, my esteemed colleague forgot that Dr. Mohammad Morsi had already become the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt when the Persian Fars News Agency claimed that it met with him and that the Office of the Egyptian Presidency denied the meeting. I don’t know what the problem is with contacting Al Jazeera to deny this story, especially since Al Jazeera is the most-watched news channel in the Arab nation.  Why waste time with others?  The question is, then: would al-Qassemi change his position and say that Al Jazeera is not the Brotherhood’s channel if Morsi had denied the interview with Fars on Sky News Arabic instead of Al Jazeera?

Al-Qassemi then writes: “The alliance between Qatar, the host and backer of Al Jazeera, with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is no secret. The Gulf state hosted Khairet El Shater in March for several days… Qatar has also promised $10 billion worth of investments in Egypt, a significant amount that certainly will keep it in the favor of the ever shifting Muslim Brotherhood for the foreseeable future. Additionally, last year, Al Jazeera network appointed a ruling family member to take over from its resigned Muslim Brotherhood ex-boss Wadah Khanfar as the channel’s new head, which increased speculation that the channel’s coverage will continue to be in line with the state’s pro-Islamist agenda.”

I don’t know what the problem is with the fact that Al Jazeera hosted al-Shater in Qatar, just as Sky News Arabic hosted defeated presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq – whom Egyptians consider among Mubarak’s fuloul.  Is hosting Shafiq or Omar Suleiman, deputy of the deposed Hosni Mubarak, confirmation that one is biased in favor of the military or against Egypt’s revolution?  As for Qatar’s promise to invest 10 billion dollars, that was made after the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces assumed power in Egypt in the wake of the toppling of Mubarak – that is, before the election or victory of Dr. Morsi.  Moreover, that investment will benefit the Egyptian citizen first and foremost!  Does it make sense for Qatar to go back on this promise, then, in so doing serving the military and those who long to bring down President Mohammad Morsi?

I would also like al-Qassemi to help us understand how the nomination of the Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani as the general manager of Al Jazeera confirms that the channel will keep up its biased support for these movements.  By this I mean, why didn’t Wadah Khanfar stay – given that he was, as you stress, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood?

Al-Qassemi goes on to demonstrate Al Jazeera’s bias in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian National Council, relying on the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar.  I had hoped that the Arab al-Qassemi would not quote Al-Akhbar, which is a tool of the Party of Iran and those who hope to preserve its status.  Seeing as how more than one of employee of Al Jazeera contacted al-Qassemi and confirmed that Al Jazeera is biased towards the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, I hope that he will help them work at Sky News Arabic, with its slogan “A New Horizon”.  And as the poet said:

Whosoever does good, he will not lack for rewards

God’s kindness for His people will remain

As God is behind that intention

من يفعل الخير لا يعدم جوازيه

لا يذهب العرب بين الله والناس

والله من وراء القصد

Translation Notes: Throughout the article, al-Athbah describes al-Qassemi as zameel (زميل) commonly translated as “colleague,” but, in this sense, lacking a perfect English-language equivalent.  I’ve reflected this usage only in part, basically because normal English usage only allows you to write “the/my colleague al-Qassemi” so many times.  Anyway, a native would have a better intuitive sense of it, but I think al-Athbah is basically being facetious.

English-language transliterations of names are, basically, inconsistent.  I’ve chosen to reflect the given individual or institution’s chosen English spelling.  Failing that, I’ve used whatever’s most common, so long as it’s not so obviously wrong as to offend me.

With regards to al-Athbah’s point about al-Qassemi’s reference to Al Jazeera’s “religious programs” (برامج دينية), this seems to stem from a mistranslation of al-Qassemi’s original English article.  In his original English text, al-Qassemi doesn’t make this mistake.

Al-Athbah’s point regarding the word “deposed” (مخلوع) stems from the fact that al-Qassemi refers to former President Hosni Mubarak as simply “Mubarak” rather than, as is common in Arabic media, “the deposed President Hosni Mubarak”.

Lastly, real talk, I am not a poetry head, so my translation of that closing poetry is real dubious.  There is a non-zero chance that I turned that verse inside-out.  In recognition of that, I’ve reproduced the original poetry below the translation.